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ABSTRACT 
 
The research work in this PhD thesis presents an extensive investigation into the security settings of 
Card Not Present (CNP) financial transactions. These are the transactions which include payments 
performed with a card over the Internet on the websites, and over the phone. Our detailed analysis on 
hundreds of websites and on multiple CNP payment protocols justifies that the current security 
architecture of CNP payment system is not adequate enough to protect itself from fraud. 
Unintentionally, the payment system itself will allow an adversary to learn and exploit almost all of 
the security features put in place to protect the CNP payment system from fraud. With insecure modes 
of accepting payments, the online payment system paves the way for cybercriminals to abuse even the 
latest designed payment protocols like 3D Secure 2.0. 
We follow a structured analysis methodology which identifies vulnerabilities in the CNP payment 
protocols and demonstrates the impact of these vulnerabilities on the overall payment system. The 
analysis methodology comprises of UML diagrams and reference tables which describe the CNP 
payment protocol sequences, software tools which implements the protocol and practical 
demonstrations of the research results.  Detailed referencing of the online payment specifications 
provides a documented link between the exploitable vulnerabilities observed in real implementations 
and the source of the vulnerability in the payment specifications.  
We use practical demonstrations to show that these vulnerabilities can be exploited in the real-world 
with ease. This presents a stronger impact message when presenting our research results to a non-
technical audience. This has helped to raise awareness of security issues relating to payment cards, 
with our work appearing in the media, radio and TV. 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
AC Application Cryptogram – the EMV protocol utilises 3-DES encoded 
cryptograms as a secure method of communication between the EMV 
payment card and the Issuing Bank.  There are four different types of 
cryptogram; TC (transaction approved), AAC (transaction declined), ARPC 
(request online approval from the Issuer) an ARPC (Issuer authorisation 
decision). 
AAC Application Authentication Cryptogram – is the application cryptogram 
generated by an EMV card indicating that the transaction has been cancelled. 
ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram – in the protocol sequence for 
transactions that require online authorisation, the card generates an 
Authorisation Request Cryptogram to signify that it wishes to complete the 
transaction online.  The Issuer responds with and ARPC, which encodes the 
Issuers authorisation response to the transaction request.  The ARPC is 3-
DES or AES encrypted using the Issuers private key which allows the card to 
ensure that the card to validate that the response came from the Issuer and 
has not been altered. 
Payment System A payment system is an inter-network of globally connected systems that 
facilitate the settlement of the financial transaction. 
Tokenisation Tokenisation is a process in which sensitive data is transferred between 
parties in reordered strings of number or tokens. Tokenisation uses 
mathematical formulas and random number generators that creates characters 
of no value to an attacker. 
Payment Card 
Tokenisation 
When the process of Tokenisation is applied on a payment card, it is then 
known as payment card tokenisation. When payment card tokenisation is 
implemented, the actual card numbers are replaced with random numbers 
which masks the actual card numbers. 
Firewall Firewall is a software or a hardware component that acts as a defence layer 
implemented to secure the system against known cyber-attacks.  
Glossary of Terms 
xiii 
PAN Primary Account Number (PAN). Refers to 16-digit payment card number 
that links the card to the customer account. 
Cardholder/Customer The cardholder/customer is an authorised person entitled by the card issuing 
bank as the owner of the card 
Acquirer The payment acquirer maintains contractual relationships with the merchants 
and provides the merchant with a trading account to collect the cardholder 
transactions. 
Payment Card Token provided by the financial institution (bank for example) to the 
cardholder/customer that can be used by facilitate payments. 
Account Number The account number is an 8-digit code that links to the cardholder account 
and is used during check payments and internet money transfers. 
Sort Code The sort-code is a 6-digit numeric code that identifies the bank and the 
branch where the cardholder account is held. 
Magnetic Stripe Magnetic Stripe is made up of tiny iron-based magnetic particles in plastic 
like film. The purpose of a magnetic stripe is store payment application data 
and allow the cardholder to swipe the card through the merchant POS 
terminal. 
CVV Cardholder Verification Value (CVV) is a three-digit value generated by the 
card issuing banks and is embedded in card data before the card is issued to 
the cardholder. 
CVV2 Cardholder Verification Value-2 is a three or four-digit code printed on the 
front or at the back of the card. 
Cardholder Data Includes user payment card data including any authentication information 
which can identify a cardholder in the payment system. 
Cryptography Cryptography is a science of securing data or communication in the presence 
of adversaries. 
PCI  Payment Card Industry – A consortium of five card payment networks 
American Express, Discover Financial Services, JCB International, 
MasterCard, and Visa Inc. that works towards defining, maintaining and 
evolving payment card standards for global interoperability. 
PCI DSS Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS). A framework 
defined by PCI for secure handling and storage of payment card data. 
Encryption A cryptographic technique of obscuring information to make it unreadable. 
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol 
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure 
Glossary of Terms 
xiv 
Card Issuer Card Issuer or simply an issuer is a financial body that issues a payment card 
and maintains contractual relationship with the cardholder 
MO/TO Mail Order/Telephone Order 
Payment 
Processor(s) 
Entities that process user payment card details. Includes but are not limited 
to: merchants, payment acquirers, card payment networks, card issuing banks 
and any intermediate service providers. 
Protocol Set of rules and procedures with which the computing systems communicate 
and operate. 
PoS terminal/Card 
reader 
Point of Sale terminal. Provided by the merchant where the cardholder 
inserts their payment card to initiate payments. 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
Smart Card A token that has a capability to secure store and process the data. 
SSL Secure Socket Layer 
TLS Transport Layer Security 
EMVCo Europay MasterCard Visa 
RFID Radio Frequency Identification 
SDA Static Data Authentication 
DDA Dynamic Data Authentication 
CDA Combined Data Authentication 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure 
3-DES Triple DES – is the common name for Triple Data Encryption Algorithm 
which applies the Data Encryption Standard (DES) three times to each data 
block.  3-DES is a 64-bit block-cipher 
AC Application Cryptogram – the EMV protocol utilises 3-DES encoded 
cryptograms as a secure method of communication between the EMV 
payment card and the Issuing Bank.  There are four different types of 
cryptogram; TC (transaction approved), AAC (transaction declined), ARPC 
(request online approval from the Issuer) an ARPC (Issuer authorisation 
decision). 
Acquirer Refers to the bank that holds the destination bank account for the transaction, 
which is typically the bank that issued the POS terminal to the merchant.  
Also referred to as the “acquiring bank”. 
ARPC Authorisation Response Cryptogram – in the protocol sequence for 
transactions that require online authorisation, the card generates an 
Authorisation Request Cryptogram to signify that it wishes to complete the 
transaction online.  The Issuer responds with and ARPC, which encodes the 
Glossary of Terms 
xv 
Issuers authorisation response to the transaction request.  The ARPC is 3-
DES or AES encrypted using the Issuers private key which allows the card to 
ensure that the card to validate that the response came from the Issuer and 
has not been altered. 
ARQC Authorisation Request Cryptogram – is generated by the card to indicate that 
it wants to complete the transaction online (see ARPC). 
ATM Automatic Teller Machine – commonly termed cash machines, they allow 
bank customers to withdraw cash from their bank account. 
CA Certificate Authority –  in EMV each of the card scheme providers Visa, 
MasterCard, American Express, JCB, Discover and Union Pay act as the 
Certificate authority for their own branded cards. The CAs generate the 
Issuer’s RSA private keys thereby allowing the Issuers to generate RSA 
public private key pairs for their cards.  ATMs and POS terminals can 
validate the cards RSA signature using the CAs public key. 
Cardholder This is a generic term for the person with an EMV credit or debit card who is 
making a payment in a shop / restaurant or is withdrawing cash from an 
ATM.  The term also implies that the person has a bank account to which the 
card is attached. 
Chip & PIN The common name used in the UK to refer to EMV payment system.  The 
EMV specifications defines the operation of the payment cards, POS 
terminals and ATMs. 
EMV Europay MasterCard Visa is a global standard for card payments (commonly 
termed “Chip & PIN”).  The standard ensures the interoperability of EMV 
payment cards, ATMs and POS terminals across different banks and in 
different countries. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
The Internet is no doubt a historic evolution in communication for the human race. Free from limits of 
time, distance and territories, the Internet today has reshaped our society’s behaviour in a way that 
many aspects of our lives are now connected online. This includes electronic commerce (e-commerce) 
where we buy or sell goods online further facilitated by various internet merchants like Amazon, 
Apple, PayPal to name a few.  
The convenience of making purchases suing online payment makes it even more attractive for 
customers experience. In 2016, a total of 1.8 billion transactions were made which amounted to a total 
of £154 billion by UK based merchants. This is an 18% increase in the online spending patterns 
recorded in 2014 where 1.3 billion transactions were recorded totalling to an amount of £120 billion. 
All this convenience of making payments over the Internet is possible because of networks provided 
by payment processors and a piece of plastic – a payment card: which is now common practice and 
the most widely accepted form of payment by online merchants. 
One should consider that an element of fraud exists in systems where the money flows. Payment fraud 
over e-commerce is a $20bn business worldwide [1]. In 2017, e-commerce payment fraud has 
surpassed the thresholds fraud rate recorded in any of the previous years amounting to a total of £432, 
for cards issued in the UK [2]. The payment industry is effective in mitigating other categories of 
payment card frauds through the introduction of more secure technologies. However, the statistics [2] 
suggests that, for e-commerce payments, the cybercriminals are well ahead of the intelligence of 
payment system security designers. Cybercriminals have also adapted to the changing and ever 
evolving payment systems and invest their time to identify the weakest links in order to exploit the 
system. 
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There are several challenges1 identified by the payment industry which need to be considered while 
designing an online payment system (we will discuss these challenges in Chapter 3). However, 
superseding every other challenge is the business need to provide convenience to the customer at the 
checkout while making an online card payment.  
This has resulted in the online payment system being loosely regulated with its security 
implementations left mostly upon the online merchants. As online merchants work more on attracting 
customers by offering more choices and convenience to make payments, it may impact the security of 
online payment system, benefitting cybercriminals to exploit weaknesses and practice fraudulent 
purchases. Choices of implementation options have also resulted in the modes of payment being 
inconsistent from one web merchant to another. Several researchers [3][4] claim that the online 
payment system is badly designed for the customers and even recently Sir Tim Berners Lee  stressed 
that we are way behind in designing a conventional method of making card payments on the Internet 
[5]. 
Technically, in the payment system terms, e-commerce payments are referred to as Card-Not-Present 
(CNP) payments and the transactions performed in physical stores are referred to as Card Present (CP) 
payment systems. This distinction becomes much clearer in Chapter 2 where we expand our 
knowledge of different components of the card payment system. In what follows next is a description 
of our aims and objectives with this PhD. 
1.1 Aims and Objectives  
With this research work, we primarily aim to answer the following question: “Does the philosophy of 
providing excessive convenience to the customer at the checkout have any effect on the security of the 
CNP payment system?”. In particular, we aim to explore the security settings of each method that is 
presently in use by the payment industry stakeholders to accept CNP payments. Our objectives are to 
explore the following questions: 
 What are the root causes and consequences of increasing online CNP payment fraud? 
 How securely does each party in the CNP payment eco-system process and handle the 
payment card data? 
 What is the minimum card data required by the card issuing banks to process a CNP 
payment? 
 How does the card issuing bank establishes the identity of a cardholder making a CNP 
payment (how secure is user-authentication in the CNP payment system), and 
                                                     
 
1 Challenges includes customer authentication, payment credential confidentiality, payment data integrity, 
customer non-repudiation explained in Chapter 2. 
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 How do cybercriminals obtain the payment card and user authentication information required 
to make payments even in the most secure modes of CNP payment systems? 
To answer these questions, we have followed a structured analysis of payment protocols which are 
currently in use by the payment industry to accept CNP payments online. 
At this point, it is important to mention that the research work done in this PhD and the experiments 
we performed are from a standard customer accessible platform on online merchant websites (the 
checkout page from where payments are made) and without any escalated privileges from payment 
processors2. This, to a substantial extent, has demonstrated that the vulnerabilities that our research 
has discovered can be exploited effortlessly.  
For many reasons research into the security of card-not-present is projected as a business activity. 
Therefore, the research work in this PhD sets out to bridge the gap in between the academia and the 
business worlds and provide a mixed-method approach to an investigation into the security of CNP 
payment systems.  
1.2 Contributions of the Thesis 
The research work carried out in this PhD represents a significant contribution to the subject of CNP 
payment security research in the following ways: 
 Reviewing and updating already insufficient academic research on the security analysis of 
CNP payment systems. 
 Development of structured architecture framework which serves as a blueprint for further 
research into the security analysis of CNP payment system. 
 Critical evaluation and comparison of strengths and weaknesses of existing CNP payment 
protocols. 
 Implementation of a merchant platform which can link to multiple payment acquirers 
(merchant payment service providers) and assess the security provided by the payment 
acquirers. 
 Implementation of automated desktop tools and Android-based contactless card reader 
software which are programmed to perform security assessments over online merchant 
websites and contactless payment cards. 
 First public description of 3D Secure 2.0 frictionless authentication protocol in use by card-
issuing banks to provide more security to the online CNP payment system. 
                                                     
 
2 Payment processors includes card issuing banks, payment networks, payment acquirers and online merchants. 
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Following our methodology, we have identified several previously undocumented vulnerabilities 
in the online CNP payment system. Combining these vulnerabilities we empirically demonstrate 
the workings of at least three attack scenarios on the online CNP payment system: Distributed 
guessing attack, cardholder impersonation attack and betrayal attack. 
 Our structured responsible disclosure exercise assisted online merchants, payment acquirers, 
card payment networks and card-issuing banks in identifying and patching the vulnerabilities 
that we discovered during our analysis on the CNP payment system. 
 Passing our research finding to the general public and more importantly educating them in 
how to securely handle their payment card details online. 
1.3 Collaborations and Publications 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 in this PhD thesis reflect research papers that were published as conference 
papers, journal articles and as technical reports. A list of our publication with co-authors and 
acknowledgements is listed below:  
 Ali, M.A., Arief, B., Emms, M. and van Moorsel, A., 2017. “Does the Online Card Payment 
Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?” In IEEE Security & Privacy, 15(2), pp.78-86. [6] 
 Mehrnezhad, M., Ali, M. A., Hao, F., & van Moorsel, A. (2016, December). “NFC payment 
spy: a privacy attack on contactless payments.” In International Conference on Research in 
Security Standardisation, (pp. 92-111). Springer . [7] 
 Ali, M.A., Emms, M., Arief, B. and van Moorsel, A, (2015, July). “Extracting Credit Card 
Details from the Online Payment System. (TR 1475),” Newcastle University – School of 
Computing Science Technical Report Series, July 2015. 
Ali, M.A. and van Moorsel, A., 2018 “Designed to be Broken: Security Analysis of 3D 
Secure 2.0 Frictionless Authentication,” in 23rd International Conference on Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security (FC 2019), St. Kitts, 2019. 
Ali, M.A., Centeno, M.P, Azad, M.A., Hao, F. and van Moorsel, A., 2018, Consumer Facing 
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The security of CNP payment system is not only crucial for payment processors but also has an 
impact on the lives of customers who are the primary driving factors for the success of CNP payment 
systems. Therefore, with an intent to educate the current security posture of CNP payment systems, 
we publicise our findings in a mode accessible to general public.  We have not only spoken during 
several public visiting events at the university but also used the media to carry this message of secure 
handling of their payment credentials while making purchases online. Following are some of the 
media articles and blog posts by renowned researchers appraising our research work: 
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 BBC Radio 5, “Six seconds – all it takes a fraudster to get your Visa details,” 2 December 
2016  
 BBC Radio Newcastle, “Alfie and Anna at Breakfast – Visa card hack,” 2 December 2016 
 BBC UK, “Frighteningly easy' for criminals to get Visa card details, study claims”, 2 
December 2016 [8] 
 The Telegraph UK, “Hacked in just six seconds: How criminals only need moments to guess 
card number and security code,” 2 December 2016 [9] 
 msn.com, “Six seconds – all it takes a fraudster to get your Visa details,” 2 December 2016 
[10] 
 Canada TV (ctvnews.ca), “How hackers can guess your credit card information in just 6 
seconds,” 2 December 2016 [11] 
 BBC Radio 4, “Criminals take just six seconds to guess Visa card number and code, experts 
find,” 2 December 2016  
 The Sun, “Gone in six second – Internet crooks can now hack your credit card details in just 
seconds”, 2 December 2016 [12] 
 The Times, “Fraudsters take six seconds to steal bank card details” 2 December 2016 [13] 
 AOL, “Criminals take just six seconds to guess Visa card number and code, experts find,” 2 
December 2016 [14] 
 The Guardian, “Tesco Bank cyber-attack involved simply guessing details, a study claims”, 2 
December 2016 [15] 
 ITV Lunchtime News, “Hacking takes seconds, say experts at Newcastle University,” 2 
December 2016 [16] 
 Schneier on Security, “Guessing credit card security details,” 5 December 2016 [17] 
 AT&T ThreatTraq #225, “Distributed Guessing Attack,” 14 December 2016 [18] 
The importance of a part of our work was recognised when the cyber-criminals exploited distributed 
guessing attack, managing to steal at least £2.5 million by abusing at least 9000 customer accounts 
belonging to Tesco Bank. We reported the distributed guessing attack to the payment processors 
(including Visa payment network) at least 10 months before the attack was exploited by the 
fraudsters. This to an extent demonstrates the practical impact of our research work. 
 SCMagazine UK, “Tesco Bank allegedly ignored warnings of hack from Visa, ” 29 
November 2016 [19] 
 The Times, “Tesco Bank failed to heed the warning on cyberattack,” 28 November 2016 [20] 
 
1.4 Presentations 
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During the course of my Ph.D., I was privileged to be invited as a guest speaker at following research 
institutes and payment security conferences: 
 “Trends in Online Payment Security.” Computer Laboratory Security Talks, University of 
Cambridge, UK. Jan-2017. 
 “Does the Online Card Payment System Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?” University of Kent, 
UK. Jan-2017. 
 “We Have Your Payment Card Details.” Research Exhibition, Home Office, London, UK. 
June 2016. 
 “Trends in Payment Security (Masterclass).” CESG CyberUK in Practice, Liverpool, UK. 
May 2015.  
 “Trends in Card Payment Security.” Indian Institute of Technology (IIT), Kanpur, India. 
April-2017. 
 “Exploiting Vulnerabilities in the Online Payment System.” Smart Payment Conference, 
Frankfurt, Germany. Sept-2017. 
  “Six Seconds to Hack a Credit Card.” FINSEC - The Banking Security Summit, Dubai, 
UAE. Feb-2017. 
1.5 Structure of Thesis 
Chapter 2 presents an introduction to the context of global card payment system. We 
highlight the security features of a payment card and introduce the reader to various ways in 
which a payment can be performed using the payment card. We then categorise the card 
payment systems in two types: Card Present (CP) and Card Not Present (CNP). Furthermore, 
we provide a detailed description of protocols involved in CP transactions and perform a 
comparative analysis of their security features and limitations. 
Chapter 3 presents literature review which is relevant to the research performed on the card 
payment systems. It will focus on the vulnerabilities that were explored and practically 
proven to exist in the payment systems by the researchers.  
Chapter 4 presents our analysis methodology following which we have achieved identifying 
certain vulnerabilities in the online CNP payment system. It draws best practices from 
cybersecurity literature and assembles them into a structured blueprint which can be applied 
by current and future researchers interested in the analysis of CNP payment security.  
Chapter 5 comprehensively examines protocols involved in the CNP payment transaction. It 
will broadly classify CNP payment protocols into two categories: authorisation-only and 
authentication-enabled CNP protocols and will further detail the working of available 
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protocols within each category. It will conclude by assessing the security strengths and 
weaknesses associated with each protocol in the CNP payment system. The conclusions from 
this chapter are foundations for establishing research questions that we aim to answer in this 
PhD. 
Chapter 6 demonstrates a distributed guessing attack on the authorisation-only online 
payment system. The attack effectively turns the process that is meant to validate the card 
payment details into a process which delivers to the attacker all card data required to make an 
online payment. It will also detail the vulnerability disclosure exercise that we performed on 
the affected parties in the online CNP payment system. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting 
countermeasures to mitigate the distributed guessing attack.  
In the next two chapters, we focus our study on the security of authentication-enabled CNP 
payment protocols. 
Chapter 7 describes our work in applying reverse engineering techniques to study certain 
obscure components of 3DS 2.0 authentication-enabled CNP payment protocol. It will 
provide the first public description of components of 3DS 2.0 protocol which enable the card 
issuers to efficiently accept online CNP payments without requesting any passcodes from the 
customer. It will also address the vulnerabilities or weaknesses that were identified in the 
3DS 2.0 protocol. 
Chapter 8 will introduce two attack scenarios on the 3DS 2.0 payment protocol. Firstly, it 
will demonstrate the cardholder impersonation attack which allows an attacker to use stolen 
cardholder details by circumventing the security features of 3DS 2.0 in place to protect 
cardholder payments from fraud. Secondly, it describes a betrayal attack on 3DS 2.0 protocol 
which will enable a ‘trusted’ adversary to perform transactions using any random card details. 
The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the challenges of solving the vulnerabilities 
and suggesting some countermeasures that can be adopted to mitigate exploited attacks. 
Chapter 9 concludes this PhD thesis with a summary of the contributions that the research 
work has provided to the community. It evaluates the results that we achieved against our 
research question: “Does the philosophy of providing excessive convenience to the customer 
at the checkout has (have) any effect on the security of the CNP payment system?”. Finally, it 
will suggest the directions for future explorations in the area of payment systems research. 
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Chapter 2. Card Payment Systems 
 
This chapter starts with a brief introduction to the parties and processes involved in the card payment 
process. It will look at how the payment card evolved from a simple paper to include much-advanced 
processors embedded in simple plastics. Next, the chapter defines payment transaction types 
supported by the card, outlines the messaging standards and protocols used across the parties in the 
payment system. 
Once the context of the system is established, this chapter continues with an overview of payment 
card fraud which evolved over the years. We will look at the techniques adopted by fraudsters and the 
chain under which these cybercriminals operate. Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion on 
the insights that were obtained from payment fraud trends which helped me to select a topic of interest 
for the research. 
The 
Merchant
(PoS)
The 
Merchant
(website)
The 
Payment 
Acquirer
The 
Cardholder
The 
Cardholder
Card Present
Card Not Present
AB
The Issuer 
IB
Purchase 
Request
Transaction 
Request / Response
Transaction 
Request / Response
Purchase 
Request
The Card 
Payment 
Network
 
Figure 1 – Parties and process involved in the card payment transaction. 
2.1 The Card Payment System  
The card payment system uses a buyer’s existing credit/debit card to transfer funds from the buyer’s 
bank account into merchant’s bank account. To understand how the card payment system operates, let 
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us start with a basic overview of the system. Figure 1 shows the parties and the processes involved in 
the card payment transaction. 
The cardholder initiates the transaction process by presenting his card to the merchant’s payment 
acquiring devices such as a Point of Sale (PoS) terminal / card reader or a website. In the next step, 
the merchant submits a payment request to the cardholder’s card issuing bank. The payment request to 
the card issuing bank travels through a series of networks provided by the acquirer (the merchant 
payment processor) and the payment card network (Visa, Mastercard, American Express etc). The 
card issuing bank verifies the cardholder’s card details and account balances and responds back to the 
merchant with the result of the transaction (approved or declined), through the same route as of 
transaction request. Below is the description of parties involved in a card payment transaction: 
The cardholder/customer is an authorised person entitled by the card issuing bank as the owner of 
the card. The cardholder purchases goods either through a card-present, or a card-not-present 
transaction. For the card-present transactions, the cardholder inserts their card into the PoS terminal 
and completes a transaction by entering the PIN or by signing the merchant receipt. For the Card-Not-
Present (CNP) transactions, the cardholder enters their payment card details on merchant websites.   
Within the CNP payment system, there are Mail Order (MO) and Telephone Order (TO) transactions. 
For MO transactions, the card details are provided in the email to the merchants, and for Telephone 
Order (TO) type transactions, the cardholders provide their card details verbally to the merchant over 
the phone. 
The Merchant is an organisation accepting payments, usually in exchange for goods or services. The 
merchant provides the cardholder with an interface which can be used by the cardholder to initiate a 
payment. 
The Issuer is the bank or an organisation that issues the payment card to the cardholder. The payment 
card provided by the issuer can be used as a token to initiate payments from the merchant’s provided 
payment interface. The issuer holds the cardholder bank account and has final approval of the 
payment. The issuer has access to cardholder information such as account balance, name, full address, 
any other personally identifiable information belonging to the cardholder, which is not visible to the 
rest of the payment network. 
The Payment Acquirer facilitates the communication between the merchants and the card payment 
networks. The payment acquirer maintains contractual relationships with the merchants and provides 
the merchant with a trading account to collect the cardholder transactions. The payment acquirer 
offers a range of services to the merchants which includes: 
 Providing merchant with a trading bank account 
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 maintaining the merchant compliant programs, Payment Card Industry Data Security 
Standard (PCI DSS) [21], General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [22] as an example 
 producing a line of defence against fraud 
 in some cases, accepting liability for fraudulent transactions. 
In payment industry terms, the acquiring bank is also known as merchant’s payment processor, the 
payment gateway or sometimes as merchant’s acquiring bank or simply an acquirer. 
The Card Payment Network manages the network that connects thousands of payments acquiring 
banks to the card issuing banks worldwide. Visa, MasterCard and American Express (Amex) are 
some examples of the most heard card payment networks. Some card payment networks like Amex, 
Discover, Japan Card Brand (JCB) issue the cards to the cardholders and thus verifies the payment 
requests as well. Such type of a payment network is said to be operating in a closed-loop network. 
Visa and MasterCard, on the other hand, support 
open-loop network. Card payment networks are 
sometimes referred to as Card Brands. 
Service Providers. There can be additional 
business entities involved in the processing of a 
transaction (not shown in Figure 1). For example, 
certificate authorities, tokenisation servers, 
managed firewalls or card data storage servers. 
Payment industries generally categorise them as service providers.  
2.2 Evolution of Payment Cards 
It all started in the year 1940’s where the first bank card “Charg-It” was introduced locally by Baggins 
bank [23]. Figure 2 illustrates the physical properties of a Charg-It card which shows the card as a 
metal token with account number embossed on the front. When the customers used Charg-It for 
purchases, the merchants accepting the card forwarded the customer bill to the Baggins bank which 
reimbursed the money to the merchants. Customers were charged for the purchases on a monthly 
basis. 
Later in 1950, the Diner club credit card was introduced [23] with advanced physical properties of a 
payment card. The Diner club card was more a cardboard piece, with account numbers embossed on 
the front. A decade later, the cardboard was replaced with a plastic card.  
Around the same time in 1958, BankofAmerica introduced their first credit card [23][24]. Earlier 
cards than BankofAmerica were regional specific, operated locally and only with certain merchants. 
However, BankofAmerica expanded their network and began issuing the card to multiple banks 
across the country. This created a chain of the network that connected banks to banks. Later in 1970, 
 
Figure 2 - ChargeIt credit card 
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BankofAmerica had a spin-off which 
later became Visa Inc as we know it. 
MasterCard came along the same lines in 
1966 as the Interbank Charge Association 
[23].  
To accept payments using cards, 
merchants began using a card-imprinter 
device “Zap-Zap machine” which took an 
impression of raised card numbers on 
payment cards The impression of card 
numbers was taken over two pressure sensitive carbon papers/bills. One of the bill was handed to the 
card issuing bank where a person would type the transaction information into their payment 
processing systems. This system took days, was insecure and was prone to errors. All these 
limiatations paved the way for Magnetic stripe technology that allowed magnets to store and recover 
the information onto a tape or stripe. 
Figure 3 shows the first magnetic stripe card prototype unveiled by IBM in 1970 [24]. The cardholder 
was required to swipe the stripe cards across a magnetic reader provided by the merchant. The 
payment industry was slow in the adoption of magnetic stripe card technology. However, further 
enhancements to the magnetic stripe interface, low production cost and durability of magnetic stripe 
cards over cardboard cards made them more palatable to the financial industry, and magnetic stripe 
cards started to become a universal media for making payments. It was around the same time when 
ATM machines were introduced. In 1967, Barclays became one of the earliest banks to install ATM 
machines across the streets for public use in the UK [23].  
Since the universal adoption magnetic stripe cards in the 1980s, the payment card mostly remained 
unchanged until in 1990s when cards with embedded smart chips were introduced [24]. With 
cryptographic processing intelligence and secure storage technology, these smart cards offered robust 
electronic media to host banking applications and secure communication standards. In 1994 – 
Europay, Mastercard and Visa (EMV) [25], a consortium of card payment networks, came up with an 
EMV protocol [26]: a secure communication protocol for payment applications using smart cards.  
Around early 90’s the Internet was released for public use. Merchants saw business potential in the 
technology, and soon webstores began to appear on the Internet [23]. Musical records and Pizza were 
few of earliest made orders on the Internet using a payment card [27]. 
In 2003, the UK payment industry announced the replacement of magnetic stripe cards with EMV 
enabled smart payment cards. Smart cards with EMV protocol require the cardholder to enter a four-
 
Figure 3 – Magnetic stripe card prototype proposed 
by IBM 
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digit Personal Identification Number (PIN) on the PoS terminal provided by the merchant to complete 
the payment: this is the reason why EMV is also referred as ‘Chip and PIN’. The PIN is given to the 
cardholder by the card issuing bank. 
Another technological evolution in the payment card in the form of support for making touchless 
(contactless) payments was introduced in 2003. Unlike earlier smart cards which require a point of 
contact for communication with the reader, contactless payment cards exchange messages with the 
reader terminal wirelessly using RFID technology [28]. Contactless payments are designed for low-
cost in-store payments usually about £30 in the UK and do not require PIN verification for 
authentication. The five-year period from 2003-2008 saw rapid development in the payment card, 
especially RFID technologies. The ease with an RFID component can be build made it possible to 
have a payment application on wristbands and paper stickers. Sometimes contactless payments are 
also called proximity payments because the card is required to be in very close proximity (around 15 
cm) to the reader [29]. 
All these technological evolutions to a payment card brought it to what we see it today (shown in 
Figure 4). It is to be noted that one of the primary features of the payment card has never evolved and 
is still in operation today i.e., the presence of card number and expiry date embossed or printed on the 
front of the card. 
2.3 Payment Card Overview 
A payment card is a token provided by the card issuing bank to the cardholder which is used to initiate 
payments. A payment card contains data in several places and provides support for multiple payment 
interfaces. Let us start by inspecting the visual elements of a payment card. Figure 4 shows the front 
and back of a typical payment card.  
Visual elements on the front side of a payment card include: 
1. Card issuer name. The name of the card issuer that issues the payment card to the 
cardholder. 
      
Figure 4 - Visible Elements on the Payment Card 
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2. Chip/Secure Element. The chip is an electronic medium which hosts the card issuing bank’s 
payment application. With cryptographic processing intelligence and secure storage 
technology these chips provide robust electronic media for EMV [25] to host and run banking 
applications and communication standards. 
3. 16-digit card number. Also called the Primary Account Number (PAN), this field is a 
unique 16-digit payment card identifier assigned by the card issuing bank. The PAN links the 
card to the cardholder’s bank account and is usually printed or embossed on the front of the 
card. There can exist multiple PANs belonging to a single cardholder account. The first six 
digits of a PAN collectively is called as the Bank Identification Number (BIN) or the Issuer 
Identification Number (IIN). The BIN identifies the type and brand of a payment card.  
4. Card expiry date. The card expiry date denotes the date beyond which the card is rendered 
unusable. Some cards also have a starting date which indicates when the card is valid from.  
5. Cardholder name is printed or embossed on the front card. This information is stored by the 
card issuing bank when the cardholder opens their bank account. 
6. Account number and bank sort code. This account number should not be confused with the 
PAN. The account number is an 8-digit code that links to the cardholder’s account and is used 
during check/paper payments and the Internet money transfers. The sort-code is a 6-digit 
numeric code that identifies the bank and the branch where the cardholder account is held.  
7. Payment card network/Payment brand. Identifies the network under which the payment 
card operates. There are five internationally recognised payment card bands. They are 
MasterCard, Visa, American Express, JCB and Discover. There can by many more card 
brands as it is also country specific. This field also denotes the type of the card among credit 
and debit card. 
8. Support for contactless. The logo indicates that the card supports contactless interface. 
Visual elements on the back of a payment card include: 
9. Magnetic stripe. The magnetic stripe is made up of tiny iron-based magnetic particles in 
plastic like film. The purpose of a magnetic stripe is to store payment application data and 
allow the cardholder to swipe the card through the merchant PoS terminal.  
10. Signature stripe: Each card also has a signature panel, and this is used to verify the identity 
of the cardholder making in-store purchases. During a transaction, the merchant requests the 
cardholder to sign the merchant receipt. The signature on the card is then compared with the 
signature on the merchant receipt. The transaction is only accepted in case of a signature 
match. 
11. Card Verification Value (CVV2): CVV2 is a three or four-digit code printed on the front or 
at the back of the card. The purpose of CVV2 is to identify the cardholder when the 
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transaction is made either online or over the phone. The CVV2 is almost always requested on 
every transaction made online, and it drastically reduces the number of fraudulent 
transactions. American Express prints a four-digit Card Identification Code (CID) on the front 
of the card. 
Many cards also have various other security features, such as holograms, on either the front or back of 
the card. Also, one might not be able to see it, but every card that supports contactless payments has a 
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) antenna.  
2.4 Payment Card Technologies 
In this section, we will review the technology behind three interfaces available in a modern payment 
card: magnetic stripe, chip cards and EMV, and contactless cards and EMV.  
 Magnetic Stripe Technology 
Magnetic stripe has a capability to store information which can be read electronically by magnetic 
stripe reader head. Each magnetic stripe payment card comes with a pre-loaded payment application 
that contains information about the user payment account as embedded by the card issuing bank. 
There are two tracks containing payment data located within the magnetic stripe – Track 1 and Track 
2.  Track 1 is the longer track, up to 79 alphanumeric characters, where Track 2 is the shorter, up to 42 
numeric characters and mainly used for the older dial-up transmissions. Occasionally, the high-
coercivity magnetic stripe cards contain an additional track which can hold up to 107 numeric 
characters. 
Track 1 includes all fields of Track 2 plus the cardholder’s name and additional fields for exclusive 
use by the card issuer. Figure 5 illustrates the structure and contents of Track 1 inside magnetic stripe. 
Mainly we have a field for PAN, cardholder name, card’s expiry date, a service code which specifies 
the interchange rules and controls risk management functions and the final field is discretionary data 
which is used to provide security functions to a magnetic stripe transaction. Discretionary data 
includes one or more of the following fields: PIN Verification Key Indicator (PKVI) [30] , PIN 
Verification Value (PVV) [30], Card Verification Value (CVV) [31] and Card Validation Code 
(CVC) [31].  
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With each magnetic stripe read, the card provides stored payment application data which is fetched by 
the PoS terminal to process a transaction. The terminal then applies security protocols for cardholder 
verification and risk management to complete a transaction.  
 Magnetic Stripe Card Security 
Each magnetic stripe card has a cryptographically derived Card Verification Value (CVV) which 
makes magnetic stripe cards much secure than just having the PAN and expiry date [32]. CVV 
prevents counterfeit cards from being generated by using the cardholder data obtained from paper 
receipts. CVV is a three-digit value generated by the card issuing banks and is embedded in card data 
before the card is issued to the cardholder. It is calculated by encrypting the PAN and expiry date with 
a symmetric key only known to the card issuer. The output cryptogram from the encryption is passed 
through a conversion function which reduces the cryptogram size to a three-digit numeric value. CVV 
is kept to three-digit because of the storage restrictions in the magnetic stripe. Every time, the 
payment data is received in the authorisation request, the card issuer extracts the PAN and expiry date 
and generates a local copy of CVV using the same symmetric key. If the CVV received during 
authorisation request matches to the locally generated CVV, the card issuer ensures that the 
transaction data is coming from the real-card issued to the cardholder. 
 
Figure 5 - Structure and contents of a Track 1 magstripe 
 
Figure 6 - Structure and contents of a Track 2 magstripe 
Chapter 2. Card Payment Systems 
 
16 
2.4.2.1 PIN Validation 
One of the most common methods used by the card issuing banks to generate and validate the card 
PIN is by using VISA PIN Verification Value (PVV) algorithm [30]. The PVV is a four-digit 
cryptographic signature encoded on the payment card by the card issuing banks.  The PVV is derived 
by encrypting together three elements (i) payment card number (ii) a key identifier and (iii) a four-
digit PIN, with a PVV generation key is only known to the card issuer. 
When the cardholder enters the PIN, the PoS terminal combines the transaction data, the card data 
including PVV and the cardholder entered PIN; encrypts it and forwards it to the card issuing bank as 
an authorisation request. To validate the PIN, the card issuing bank either retrieves a local copy of 
PVV stored in their database or generates a PVV from the PIN and PAN received in the authorisation 
request. The generated PVV is compared with a reference PVV received in the authorisation request. 
A match in the PVV indicates that the cardholder has entered the correct PIN at the PoS terminal. 
2.4.2.2 Magnetic Stripe Card Limitation 
Magnetic stripe cards work simply as memory sticks and are best suited for the applications like 
ticketing, loyalty pass where security is not of prime importance. Apart from storing and retrieval of 
static data, not many operations could be performed on the magnetic stripe cards. The other problem 
associated with magnetic stripe card is the amount of information that can be read. The access control 
policies on fetching the amount of data cannot be defined on the magnetic stripe. This means any 
reader with magnetic head, can read all the contents stored within a magnetic stripe. This came as an 
opportunity for attackers to practice a trivial type of fraud on magnetic stripe cards: Skimming. In 
skimming fraud, the magnetic stripe technology cannot prove the difference in the actuality of a real 
and counterfeit card generated through skimming. 
Skimming: One of the methods used by card thieves is skimming. In this type of fraud, ATMs are 
physically modified with a minimal effort in a manner that is difficult for the cardholder to detect. The 
way skimming works is that thieves put a card scanner on top of the little slot where the payment card 
is typically inserted in an ATM machine. These skimmers allow the card to pass through them into the 
ATM slot while also scanning the card and stealing the numbers off it. This happens so discretely that 
    
Figure 7 – Skimming devices found attached to ATM machines 
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many victims have no idea that something is a miss until they look at their bank statements probably 
weeks later. And because many ATM card slots use similar designs, there are plenty of skimmers that 
are designed to look  almost exactly identical to legitimate card slots making it even harder for a 
customer to realise what is going on. 
Of course, though, the magnetic stripe transactions are protected with a PIN, and to do anything 
notoriously useful with the skimmed card. To steal the PIN, miscreants also install small pinhole 
cameras in inconspicuous locations on the ATM to capture footage of cardholder keying the PIN. To 
capture PIN, there are also number pad overlayers available in the black market which just look like 
the keypad on the ATM. 
Nowadays due to this becoming common practice, the public and banks have become more aware and 
the scammer may get caught when they try to retrieve their scamming equipment from the ATMs. To 
resolve this, more advanced skimming devices on the black market transmit stolen card information 
and PINs wirelessly making it much easier for the fraudsters to practise their scheme without getting 
caught.  
 Chip Cards and EMV 
Chip cards or smart cards fill the gap of ensuring the security and integrity of data stored inside the 
card’s memory. Assisting this secure storage is a microprocessor capable of performing much 
advanced cryptographic tasks such as support for AES and DES algorithms. Data in smart cards is 
stored as files with the root file called as Master file and branch files are called elementary files [32].  
EMVCo [25] is a consortium of card payment networks that was set-up to maintain interoperability 
between payment card operation.  EMVCo created the "Integrated Circuit Card Specifications for 
Payment Systems". These specifications are related to ISO7816 [33] and create a common technical 
 
Figure 8 - The process of Static Data Authentication (SDA) 
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basis for card and system implementation of a payment system. Integrated Circuit Card Specifications 
for Payment Systems can be obtained from an EMV website [25]. These specifications define an 
EMV chip and pin protocol [26], a messaging standard using which the payment cards operate and 
communicate with compatible readers. EMV draws its key functionality using features provided by 
these smart cards. Let us look at how the EMV protocol provides armour against cloning and 
counterfeit attacks. EMV specifications define three security features in the chip and pin protocol:  
 Card authentication,  
 cardholder authentication, and  
 transaction authorisation. 
2.4.3.1 Card Authentication 
Validates that the card and the Issuer involved in the transaction are authentic, and not counterfeit. 
This step also ensures the uniqueness of card-specific data set up by the card issuing bank has not 
been altered by anyone. EMV specifications define at least three modes of card authentication [26]:  
 Static Data Authentication (SDA),  
 Dynamic Data Authentication (DDA) and  
 Combined Data Authentication (CDA).  
All these methods rely on the signature scheme based on asymmetric cryptography as established by 
relevant payment card network. Let us explore in detail the card authentication mechanisms.  
PKI in EMV is a 3-tier architecture with root Certification Authority (CA) signing public keys for the 
card issuer which consecutively signs relevant data and public keys for the card [34]. 
Static Data Authentication (SDA). SDA was designed for initial versions of smart cards that had 
limited processing capability and can securely store only limited data. SDA validates the integrity of 
the application data stored within the smart card IC. However, SDA does not authenticate the card 
itself.  
The process of SDA is shown in Figure 8. During the card personalisation phase (before the card is 
issued to the cardholder), the card issuer prepares the payment Application Data (AD) which is 
relevant to the cardholder account. The AD is signed with the card issuer’s private key (S1) and is 
stored in the smart card IC. The card issuer’s public key (P1) is signed by the CA’s private key (SCA) 
and this issuer’s public key certificate is stored in the smart card IC. 
During the transaction process, when the cardholder inserts the card into the PoS terminal, the CA’s 
public key (PCA) (which is issued to the acquirer and resides with the PoS terminal) is used to validate 
the issuer public key certificate which resides within the card. The PoS terminal extracts the issuer 
public key (P1) from the certificate. In the next step, the PoS extracts the signed application data 
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(signed by S1) from the card and validates it using P1. Once the signed application data is found valid, 
the reader and the issuer can be assured that the data in the smart card IC can be trusted and has not 
been altered.  
Dynamic Data Authentication: DDA is an advance scheme of card authentication, where each card 
is personalised with its private key used by the card to generate a signature – Signed DDA (SDDA). 
The signature encodes transaction data and a random number given to the card by the PoS terminal 
which guarantees uniqueness for every transaction. In this scheme of card authentication, the card’s 
public key (PIC) is signed by the issuer’s private key (S1) and card public key certificate is stored in 
the smart card IC. The issuer public key (P1) is further signed by CA’s private key (SCA), and issuer 
public key certificate is stored in the smart card IC.  The CA’s public keys are distributed to the PoS 
terminals. During a transaction, the validation of SDDA by the reader indicates that the card is 
authentic and is issued to the cardholder by the card issuer.  
Combined Data Authentication. With CDA, both the POS terminal and the card issuer verify the 
integrity of the payment card. Much similar to DDA, in CDA the card generates a transaction specific 
signature (SDDA) which is used by the PoS to verify the transaction. In addition, an Application 
Cryptogram (AC) is also generated by the issuing bank to be signed by the card using a shared secret 
key. An AC consist of transaction specific data and a random number which guarantees transaction 
uniqueness.  During a transaction, a request to sign the AC is sent to the card by the card issuing bank. 
Having validated the received signed AC from the card, the issuing bank can guarantee the card 
authentication. 
 
Figure 9 - The process of Dynamic Data Authentication 
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2.4.3.2 Cardholder Authentication 
Cardholder Authentication guarantees the identity of the actual cardholder making a transaction. This 
is achieved by using either of the three methods: Signature, PIN and no CVM (Cardholder 
Verification Method). PIN verification can either be online or offline. Online PIN verification is much 
similar to what we saw in Section 2.4.2.1 with a magnetic stripe. However, with offline PIN 
verification process, the PIN entered by the cardholder is compared to the PIN loaded into the card. 
2.4.3.3 Transaction Authorisation 
The third security feature defined in EMV chip and pin specification [26] is transaction authorisation 
which indicates whether the transaction was approved or declined. This is achieved by using either of 
the two modes: offline and online method. 
Transaction authorisation relies on Transaction Certificate (TC) which is a cryptogram generated in a 
similar manner as of AC. TC combines the data used for the transaction, the type of cardholder 
authentication used for the transaction and the mode of transaction authorisation used for the 
transaction. Therefore, TC can be regarded as a receipt which guarantees transaction non-repudiation 
[35]. Figure 50 in Appendix A, details the EMV transaction sequence diagram. Markantonakis K., 
Mayes K. (2008) “Smart cards for Banking and Finance” [34], provides a more detailed analysis of 
EMV Chip and Pin transaction protocol. 
 Contactless Cards and EMV 
Advancements in the EMV payment ecosystem towards fast and secure payments were achieved with 
the introduction of contactless cards. Unlike chip and PIN card which require point of contact for 
communication with the reader, contactless card talks to POS terminal wirelessly using RFID 
technology. Contactless payments are designed for low-cost in-store payments usually about £30 in 
the UK and do not require PIN verification for cardholder authentication.  
The EMV contactless transaction protocol is derived from the EMV chip and pin protocol and is 
further enhanced to minimise the transaction processing times at the PoS terminal.  The EMV 
contactless specifications define at least two variations of contactless transaction protocol. Both of 
these protocol sequences derive three security features from EMV chip and pin protocol as defined in 
Section 2.4.3. 
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Figure 10 - An example checkout page showing the card data fields required to make an online 
CNP payment transaction 
 Card Not Present (CNP) Transactions 
These are transactions which are performed by the merchant in physical absence of both the 
cardholder and the card. All CNP transactions require the cardholder to submit: 16-digit card number, 
the expiry date and sometimes the CVV2 and cardholder billing address information. The identity of 
the cardholder making a purchase cannot be established in CNP transactions. CNP transactions can be 
categorised into two types: online CNP transactions and Mail Order/Telephone Order (MO/TO) 
transactions. 
Online CNP Transactions. Transactions performed online on the merchant web store are categorised 
as online CNP transactions. The cardholder enters their payment card details on the merchant 
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provided checkout page. Figure 10 illustrates an example checkout page provided by the merchant 
website. Typically, the checkout page contains the following pieces of information for the customer. 
1) Selected product for purchase, type of payment method selected by the customer, payment 
currency type and amount. 
2) Type of online CNP payment protocol supported (Chapter 4 gives more details on types of 
CNP protocols) 
3) Fields for the customer to input her payment card details. An asterisk (*) symbol indicates 
minimum fields required by the merchant to process this transaction. Note that there is no (*) 
symbol at ‘Security Code’ field which indicates that CVV2 is not mandatorily required for 
this transaction.  
4) Cardholder address fields which serves two purposes for the merchant: firstly, it is used by 
the merchant to ship the purchased items to the customer and secondly to compare the 
cardholder address with the card issuing bank for fraud protection purposes. In Chapter 6, we 
will detail most of the fraud protection filters (also called as transaction safeguards) used by 
merchants and card issuing banks. 
5) Use of captcha for cardholder validation is an example of how to not design a checkout page 
as it adds inconvenience to the customer at the checkout. Providing convenience to the 
customer at checkout is one of the primary objectives of the online merchant. We have 
several patents (Amazon one-click [36] for example) filed by online merchants that preserve 
ways of providing customer convenience at checkout. 
The research work in this PhD mainly focuses on the security of online CNP payment systems and 
transactions. The online CNP payment system is complex and has multiple protocols, therefore, we 
provide a complete description of CNP payment protocols in Chapter 5. 
Mail Order/Telephone Order (MO/TO). The payments performed over an e-mail or over the phone 
are categorised as MO/TO. For Mail order transactions, the cardholder provides her payment card 
details to the merchant via an e-mail. Telephone order transactions require the cardholder to reveal her 
payment card details to the merchant, verbally and over the voice. Merchants for MO/TO maintains a 
virtual terminal where they insert the cardholder provided payment card details to initiate payments. 
2.5 Payment Card Fraud Overview 
In this section, we review fraud over card payments as it affects the global payments system. Payment 
card fraud is an international issue that spans across nations, states and borders. Fraud overpayment 
cards has amounted to a total of $22.80 billion globally for the year 2016 [1]. This is 4.4% increase in 
the global card payment fraud rate as compared to the year 2015 where it was recorded $21.79 billion 
[37]. The United States (US) alone accounts for an overall of two-fifths (38.7%) of the global card 
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payment fraud rate amounting to a total of $8.45bn for the year 2016 and it is estimated that by the 
year 2020 the US card payment fraud could surpass $28bn [38]. To the contrary, card fraud losses for 
Europe in 2016 reached $2.12bn and about 73% of the European card fraud came from the United 
Kingdom (UK) and France [39]. In fact, for Europe, card payment fraud in one of the EMPACT 
priority, under Europols priority crime areas (2018- 2021 EU Policy Cycle [40]). Over the last six 
years it is established that the costs associated with the losses on financial systems constituted to the 
largest single category of fraud across the globe and over the Internet [37].  
So how does a perpetrator achieve in practising fraud over electronic payment systems? A simple 
answer to this question is fraudsters in most cases targets weakness in the payment system 
technologies and exploits them for their interests and/or monetary gain. The methods used by 
fraudsters to abuse the payment system varies and depends upon the type of system (among card 
present and CNP) being targeted. Fraudsters methods can be well understood by mapping the payment 
card fraud patterns over the evolution/improvements of card payment technologies.  
For this study, we take the payment card fraud patterns from the UK as an example. Figure 11 shows 
UK card fraud statistics from 1998 to 2016 [2]. The statistics reveal that ratio between the different 
types of card fraud changes year on year. In the figure, the red line represents fraud losses on card 
present payment types and blue line signifies the fraud that occurred over CNP payment interface. 
Figure 11 also shows the introduction for significant security improvements in the card payment 
system technology listed below:    
 
Figure 11 - UK Card Fraud by Type from the year 1998 to 2016 
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(1) Online CNP payment systems were introduced in 1994 enabling merchants to accept card 
payment on their virtual stores on the Internet. Customers paid for the purchased items by 
entering the card details as printed on their cards. 
(2) 3 Domain (3D) Secure protocol was introduced to secure online CNP payments (discussed in next 
chapter). This enabled the card issuers to secure CNP transactions with the use of static passwords 
only known to the registered cardholders. 
(3) EMV Chip & PIN cards introduced into the UK replacing the existing magnetic stripe cards.  The 
introduction of Chip & PIN cards was phased, starting in 2004 with the majority of cards replaced 
by the start of 2006. 
(4) 2009 reported the first year on year decrease in total card fraud reported in the UK, this decrease 
is mainly attributed to adoptions of sophisticated fraud screening detection tools by the Issuing 
banks [2]. 
(5) In the UK the EMV Static Data Authentication (SDA) cards were replaced by Dynamic Data 
Authentication (DDA) and Combined Data Authentication (CDA) cards which perform additional 
cryptographic authentication, making them more secure than the original SDA cards [32][41]. 
Figure 11 illustrates that each time a new security feature is introduced to the card payment system the 
pattern of card fraud changes. It also shows that when a new security feature is successful in reducing 
card fraud in one particular area, in the following years, card fraud will increase in other areas.  The 
overall result being that the total value of card fraud has continued to steadily increase, despite a 
number of significant improvements in EMV card security during the period 1998 to 2016. 
For example, prior to 2004 magnetic stripe payment cards were vulnerable to cloning because of the 
magnetic stripe, section 2.4.1, and cards authorised by signature were very vulnerable to being lost in 
the mail before the customer had signed the card.  After 2004 the type of fraud committed moved 
towards cloned magnetic stripe cards being used overseas and “card not present” fraud (e.g. telephone 
payments).  Both of these fraud types side-stepped the new Chip and PIN security features of EMV by 
taking advantage of weaknesses in non-EMV payment streams. Prior to 2004, before the introduction 
of EMV chip and pin, fraudsters have shown to target the magnetic-stripe based card present 
transactions. CNP fraud, on the other hand, shows a gradual increase from the year 1998 to 2008 just 
before transaction risk profiling was introduced. However, fraudsters have shown to bypass CNP 
transaction safeguards as this is reflected by the growing fraud rates from the year 2011 of CNP 
payment systems. Presently, CNP fraud standouts to be the single largest category of fraud amounting 
to a total of 70% of the total card fraud rate for the year 2016 [2]. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
Online card payments are the first of many new payment technologies being introduced to the 
payment system.  By analysing the vulnerabilities that online CNP payments have introduced we can 
better understand how those vulnerabilities impact the patterns of card payment fraud in the future.  
The new technologies, described in this section, will both combat fraud and create new opportunities 
for fraud, as shown by Figure 11. 
In the following chapters we will study the literature of card payment systems to analyse the 
vulnerabilities introduced to the protocols.  We outline an analysis methodology that we used to 
analyse future changes to online card payments protocols required for the introduction of subsequent 
payment technologies and identify potential vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 3. Literature Review of Card Payment 
Protocols and their Vulnerabilities 
 
This chapter presents a structured literature review performed on the security of card payment 
protocols and their associated vulnerabilities. The literature work selected in this chapter sorts some of 
the leading scientific research conducted on the real world and deployed payment protocols. With this 
literature review, we aim to learn the research gaps explored by the literature and explore the 
vulnerabilities identified by each research outcomes. We also discuss the methodology adopted by the 
previous research that has achieved in obtaining the required data to overcome any restrictions on 
access to data and protocols. The chapter will conclude with a discussion on the takeaways from the 
literature review which is then applied to performing security analysis on the online payment 
protocols.  
Online CNP payment protocols are part of the payment system which uses cardholder’s data that can 
be obtained from another mode of payments like EMV chip and PIN, EMV contactless and Magnetic 
stripe payments. This means the security of online payment protocols must be analysed in the broader 
context of the payment system. Therefore, our literature review is primarily divided into three 
sections, each exploring the analysis on a different form of payment systems. The sections include 
security analysis of EMV chip and PIN protocol, EMV contactless protocol and CNP payment 
protocols. 
3.1 Research Categories 
This section lists the academic research papers included in this literature review and identifies which 
of the four categories to which they are applicable. 
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in the EMV Protocol 
Murdoch et al. (2010) “Chip & PIN is Broken” [43] 
Roland and Langer (2013) “Cloning credit cards: a combined pre-play and downgrade attack on EMV 
contactless” [44] 
Bond et al. (2014) “Chip and Skim: cloning EMV cards with the pre-play attack” [45] 
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Barisani et al. (2011) “Chip & PIN is definitely broken” [46] 
Degabriele et al. (2011) “On the Joint Security of Encryption and Signature in EMV” [47] 
Anderson et al. (2005) “Chip & SPIN” [48] 
Exploitable Vulnerabilities in EMV Contactless Payment Technology 
Emms et al. (2014) “Harvesting High-Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless 
Credit Cards Without the PIN” [28] 
Emms et al. (2013) “Risks of Offline Verify PIN on Contactless Cards” [49] 
Francis et al. (2012) “Practical Relay Attack on Contactless Transactions by Using NFC Mobile 
Phones” [50] 
Roland and Scharinger (2013) “Applying Relay Attacks to Google Wallet” [51] 
Roland et al. (2012) “Relay Attacks on Secure Element-Enabled Mobile Devices: Virtual 
Pickpocketing Revisited” [52] 
Roland et al. (2012) Practical Attack Scenarios on Secure Element-Enabled Mobile Devices [53] 
Kfir and Wool (2005) “Picking Virtual Pockets using Relay Attacks on Contactless Smartcard 
Systems” [52] 
Diakos et al. (2015) “Eavesdropping near-field contactless payments: a quantitative analysis” [54] 
Hancke (2011) “Practical Eavesdropping and Skimming Attacks on HF RFID Tokens.” [55] 
Security Analysis of CNP Payment Protocols 
Murdoch et al. (2008) “3D-Secure: or How to not design an authentication system” 
Drimer et al. (2007) “Optimised to Fail: Card readers for online banking” 
Redteam-pentesting. (2005) “Online Banking: Warning about the deceptive security of the iTAN 
process” 
Redteam-pentesting. (2009) “Man-in-the-Middle Attacks against the chipTAN comfort Online 
Banking System” 
Redteam-pentesting. (2005) “New banking security system iTAN not as secure as claimed”  
 
3.2 Security Analysis of EMV Chip and PIN Protocol 
EMV Chip and Pin is an open-source and well-documented protocol. The proven complexity of EMV 
Chip and Pin protocol and its widespread use across the globe made the protocol much attractive for 
research communities. There is a substantial amount of research addressed on the security analysis of 
EMV Chip and Pin protocol. In this section, we will focus on the research papers which have 
identified practical exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol.  
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As discussed in the previous sections, EMV defines functions that establish the authenticity of the 
card, however, there is no mechanism defined which verifies the authenticity of the reader that the 
card communicates with. This provides ample opportunity for an attacker with a rogue reader to 
communicate with the EMV card. 
Figure 12 shows two EMV shimmer devices found in EMV enabled ATM machines. These shimmers 
are attacker tools that intercept communication between the EMV card and a PoS terminal or an 
ATM. Although there is no known possibility for an attacker to create a cloned copy of victim's EMV 
card, shimmed details can be used to create a magnetic stripe version of victim's card. 
EMV smart card chip contains all components of cardholder payment application data found in 
magnetic stripe except for CVV. EMV interface contains its own version of Card Verification Value 
generally referred to as iCVV or dynamic CVV. iCVV which is different to magnetic stripe CVV 
prevents the shimmed data being copied and used over magnetic stripe interface. The rationality 
behind the success of shimming can be related to the negligence of some card issuing banks while 
validating the CVV: they do not validate the CVV while authorizing a magnetic stripe transaction. 
Murdoch et al. (2010) [43] identifies a vulnerability in the EMV payments system which allows an 
attacker to authorise a payment whilst entering an incorrect PIN.  A man-in-the-middle device can 
subvert the cardholder verification process, see Figure 13.  The MITM device tells the POS terminal 
that the PIN entered by the attacker is correct, whilst telling the EMV card that this is a transaction 
verified by signature and therefore no PIN required.  This bypasses the primary security of the EMV 
Chip & PIN protocol i.e. the cardholder PIN.  
 
Figure 12 - Shows two real EMV shimmer devices found in EMV enabled ATM machines 
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The research team performed practical experiments to demonstrate that the vulnerability was present 
in UK issued credit / debit cards and UK POS terminals.  The importance of this research was 
highlighted in 2012 when criminals were arrested in France, they had exploited the vulnerability to 
conduct 6,000 fraudulent purchases with a total value of more than €500,000 [56]. This research also 
uncovers critical failings in the banks transaction validation processes.  The transaction data 
transmitted to the issuing bank includes the Terminal Verification Results (TVR) and the Issuer 
Application Data (IAD), which together encode the results of the cardholder verification carried out 
by the POS terminal and card.  These data are signed by the card, so the man-in-the-middle cannot 
alter them.  However, despite this, the data required to clearly identify the fraud are split across 
several data fields some of which are visible to the POS terminal and others are visible to the issuing 
bank.  This creates an ambiguity in the data which makes it difficult to detect this type of attack at 
either the POS or the issuer.   
The EMV transaction protocol is designed to ensure that the EMV payment cards issued by many 
different issuing banks are accepted at any of the POS terminals / ATMs worldwide.  This is a 
challenge as the cards, POS terminals and ATMs support multiple authorisation modes (online / 
offline), authorisation methods (PIN, signature, contactless) and cryptographic authentication 
technologies (SDA, DDA, CDA).  To make any EMV card compatible with any POS / ATM, the 
protocol includes a negotiation at the start of the transaction to decide on authorisation mode, method 
and cryptography.  The POS / ATM will select the most secure combination of mode, method and 
cryptography available to both the card and the POS / ATM. 
 
Figure 13 – Murdoch et al. (2010) protocol sequence 
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This negotiation process is a significant weakness in the protocol.  There are a number of research 
papers that prove it is possible for a man-in-the-middle to alter the capabilities of the card or the POS / 
ATM, to cause the POS / ATM to select an exploitable authentication mode, method or crypto.  This 
type of attack is called a downgrade attack, where vulnerability is discovered in the EMV protocol 
and the attack must put the POS /ATM into a given mode to enable the vulnerability to be exploited.  
Two such attacks are Roland and Langer (2013) [44] and Barisani et al. (2011) [46]. 
The vulnerability discovered by Roland and Langer (2013) [44] allows the attacker to create cloned 
EMV contactless cards.  In normal operation a cloned EMV contactless card should not be accepted, 
because the private key on the original EMV contactless card cannot be copied.  This means that the 
cryptographic signature produced by the cloned card will not be validated by the POS terminal.  
However, the downgrade element of the attack alters the capabilities of the cards to fool the POS 
terminal into performing a magnetic stripe mode contactless transaction rather than the EMV mode 
transaction.  The cryptographic protection on the magnetic stripe contactless transaction is much 
weaker than the combined RSA / 3-DES protection employed in EMV mode transactions.  This paper 
demonstrates that the CVC3 code, used to authorise magnetic stripe mode transactions, can be 
manipulated to reduce the number of possible values to 999.  This allows a cloned card to be created 
with the 999 possible CVC3 responses encoded upon it. 
Degabriele et al. (2012) [47] describes a theoretical partial oracle attack on the RSA cryptography 
used by DDA / CDA cards.  This paper demonstrates that it is theoretically possible to forge the DDA 
/ CDA cards digital signature.  However, even at best, the attack would need to run 4,639 partial 
transactions against a card to generate the forged digital signature, making the attack impractical.  
Given that each transaction takes approximately 500ms, to complete the attack would require access 
to the card for 38 minutes. 
Barisani et al. (2011) [46] was a black hat presentation at DEFCON 19 which covered a number of 
known issues in EMV such as the Murdoch et al. (2010).  Part of which introduced a downgrade 
attack in which POS terminal can be convinced to reveal the PIN entered by the cardholder in plain 
text rather than in enciphered form, thereby allowing a man-in-the middle to record the PIN. 
3.3 Security Analysis of EMV Contactless Payment Protocol 
There are a number of known vulnerabilities in the underlying technologies which support EMV 
contactless payments, these can be split into the following categories: 
 eavesdropping contactless payments 
 extending the effective range of NFC  
 Flaws with the EMV contactless protocol 
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These categories of vulnerability have one thing in common, they take advantage of the underlying 
contactless / NFC technology. They are very difficult to guard against and or prevent.   
Eavesdropping, Skimming and Extended Range Reading  
Contactless payments utilise the ISO-14443 wireless communications standard (International 
Standards Organisation, 2011), which is an open standard used in many different contactless 
applications on smartcard and mobile devices.  Use of this common standard leaves contactless 
payments vulnerable to data hijacking attacks such as eavesdropping, skimming and extended range 
reading.  The data gathered by these attacks include the 16 digit card number (PAN) and the card 
expiry date, which research shows is sufficient to create a new account on Amazon.com and make 
online purchases, as we will see in Chapter 6.  This is due to the minimal security checks on some 
websites which do not enforce a full check on all of the card-not-present security fields recommended 
by EMV, i.e.  the PAN, expiry date, CVV2, cardholder name and cardholder address.  Therefore 
despite the cryptographic security that prevents cloning of EMV cards based on the data obtained 
through contactless eavesdropping, skimming and extended range reading; the data collected are still 
useful in performing card-not-present attacks. 
Eavesdropping 
A number of research projects have looked into the practicalities of eavesdropping the ISO-14443 
wireless communications.  These projects show that it is possible to eavesdrop the data from a 
contactless payment at a distance of 1 metre.  The research does prove that eavesdropping produces 
exploitable data, thereby making the contactless EMV cards vulnerable to attack.  However, the 
research also shows that the equipment required to perform contactless eavesdropping is very 
specialised requiring a great deal of electronics expertise to build.  For instance Diakos et al. (2015) 
[54] presents excellent research which builds the eavesdropping equipment into everyday objects such 
as a shopping trolley.  However, as the research also shows, the RF receiver and the signal processing 
equipment required are complex and would require a great deal of work to make the equipment 
portable enough to be used in real-word attack scenario. 
This would make eavesdropping a much less attractive method of collecting credit card data when 
compared with skimming attacks using an NFC enabled mobile phone.  Research by Francis et al. and 
research by Emms et al. show that skimming attack can be performed using off-the-shelf Android 
mobile phones which are very portable and discreet. 
Hancke et al. (2011) [55] makes a comparison between eavesdropping and skimming attacks using the 
same equipment.  The result of the comparison between the eavesdropping and skimming concludes 
that eavesdropping has the potential to read from a greater distance, however, the skimming provides 
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more reliable data reading.  With eavesdropping being more susceptible to atmospherics, 
environmental conditions and RF interference. 
Skimming 
The popularity of NFC enabled Android mobile phones provides a perfect attack platform for 
contactless skimming as demonstrated in (Francis L, Hancke G, Mayes K, Markantonakis K., 2012) 
[57].  However, that is not the only potential attack vector, an attack platform was developed that 
masquerades as an NFC door reader by [49]. The door reader accesses all of the cards in a victim’s 
wallet before activating the door opener.  Our multiple card reader software utilises the standard anti-
collision functionality present in the ISO 14443 standards [59] (part 3). Emms et al. (2013) [27] 
exploit the EMV offline Pin verify command from contactless interface. Contactless transactions do 
not require the cardholder to enter their PIN. However, the researchers discovered the offline PIN 
verify command is functionally available on most of the UK issued payment cards. This PIN verify 
command can be exploited by an attacker to guess the card PIN without blocking the card. The 
research demonstrated a viable attack scenario where a contactless physical access control reader is 
programmed with part of an EMV transaction protocol. When the user scans a wallet with payment 
card onto the access control reader, it selects a payment application on the card. Figure 14 shows a 
Verify PIN protocol sequence implemented by the reader. It can be seen from the figure that, the 
reader, after selecting the payment application, gets the number of PIN attempts left of the card. If not 
zero, the reader attempts a PIN verify command with a random PIN on the card. The command is 
executed until the right PIN for the card is guessed or until the PIN counter is zero. 
Extended Range Contactless Reading 
The maximum practical communication range of EMV contactless payments cards is approximately 
10cm.  EMV uses the restricted communications range of ISO 14443 as a design security feature.  The 
cardholder authorises the payment by tapping their card on the POS terminal, the assumption being 
that the cardholder must be present at the merchant location to authorise the payment.   
There has been significant research into the extending the read range of contactless payment cards.  
Kirshenbaum and Wool (2006) [60] demonstrates that ISO 14443 cards can be read at a distance of 
30cm which is 6 times the design distance.  The experiments show that to increase the effective 
reading range of ISO-14443 cards that reader must increase the transmission power from 200mW to 4 
Watts and increases the antenna size from 5cm diameter to 50cm diameter.   
Hancke et al. (2011) [55] introduces an interesting concept, it utilises two separate antennas to extend 
the reading range.  A standard ISO 14443 reader uses a single antenna to power the card, transmit data 
to the card and to receive the card responses.  The two antenna approach uses one antenna to power 
and transmit, it uses the second antenna to receive the card responses.  Using a second receiving 
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antenna allows the attack to increase the reading range of ISO 14443 whilst using less signal power 
and smaller antenna diameters. 
One of the attack scenarios explored in Oren et al. (2013) [61] is a “mafia fraud attack” scenario.  The 
POS terminal (“ghost”) which is dedicated to receiving fraudulent transactions.  An extended range 
contactless reader (“leech”) is used to capture transactions from passing victims at a range of 1 meter 
whilst the contactless payment card is still in the victim’s wallet.  The “ghost” and the “leach” are 
connected by the relay allowing them to be many kilometres apart. 
Emms et al. (2014)[28] demonstrated another practically viable attack on the EMV contactless cards. 
The researchers were able to bypass the contactless transaction limit from £30 in the UK to a million 
Euros. The flaw in the protocol is exacerbated by the fact that the EMV contactless specifications 
does not define the transaction value limits for transactions made in foreign currency to the card. For 
example, if the card is issued in the UK, an attacker can practically bypass the transaction limit by 
attempting a transaction in currency type other than GBP. 
3.4 Security Analysis of CNP Payment Protocols 
Murdoch et al. (2008) [4], analysed the architecture and design of 3D-Secure 1.0 and termed the 
protocol as an example of “how to not design an authentication protocol”. The authors exploited two 
design flaws associated with the 3DS 1.0 protocol: Activation during shopping and the use of static 
passwords for authentication. With activation during shopping, the customers were enrolled into the 
system at the time of making a purchase. The demerits were, the customers were not educated about 
the protocol and were not used to interacting with integrated frames loaded as pop-ups which made it 
difficult for customers to distinguish between an actual 3DS 1.0 window and a phishing window. 
Cyber fraudsters designed similar looking 3DS 1.0 pop-ups to steal customer card details to be able to 
 
Figure 14 – Verify PIN protocol sequence 
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register the card and use it over the 3DS 1.0 system. Also, due to stringent password policies, it was 
difficult for the customers to maintain their password remembered. The password-based scheme was 
proven to be costlier for the card issuing banks as they were required to maintain a dedicated customer 
support team for changing or resetting of 3DS 1.0 passwords. 
Later, the password-based scheme was made optional by the payment regulators and the card issuing 
banks were allowed a freedom to choose the type of authentication method to be implemented across 
the 3DS 1.0 protocol. This resulted in the card issuing banks deploying inconsistent and unpopular 
authentication methods which were more burdensome for customers. One such example is the Chip 
Authentication Protocol (CAP) that has been introduced in the Europe for securing transactions over 
the Internet. CAP cryptographically binds an online transaction with a one-time token generated by a 
handheld reader provided by the card issuing banks. Each time the transaction is initiated, the 
cardholder submits the transaction specific token (CAP response) along with the payment card data on 
3DS 1.0 window. Once the token corresponding the transaction is successfully verified, the card 
issuing bank accepts the transaction. The CAP extended the features of EMV Chip and Pin protocol 
and there were no specifications maintained to explain how the CAP should be implemented for 
online cardholder authentication.   
Drimer et al. [3] performed an analysis of CAP by reverse engineering the protocol and found that 
there were variations in the ways the CAP was implemented from one card issuing bank to another. 
Their detailed analysis on UK versions of the CAP protocol unveiled that the protocol was vulnerable 
to EMV chip and PIN middleman attack [43]. The vulnerability allowed the middleperson to 
circumvent the PIN security and generate CAP responses required for authentication over 3DS 1.0. 
The CAP protocol may be further abused by criminals during mugging. There is a serious case 
reported in July 2018, where two French students were attacked to death for not revealing their card’s 
PIN. Furthermore, there were inconsistencies in the ways in which the card readers from different 
vendors generated CAP responses. For example, card readers from Racal Watchword, generated 
incorrect CAP response in case of PIN mismatch but this was not informed to the users. Two 
technical reports from redteam-pentesting [37] [38] claimed that, TAN enabled protocols (static TAN, 
iTAN and chipTAN) which makes use of static or dynamic passcodes provided by the card issuing 
banks were vulnerable to phishing attacks. It was no surprise that TAN systems were further made 
optional. 
3.5 The Contribution of Literature Review to this PhD Research 
The literature review in this chapter has focused on three areas of academic research related to the 
security of the EMV chip and PIN protocol, EMV contactless protocol and CNP payment protocols.  
The research in the literature review influenced the research presented in this PhD thesis as follows: 
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 Security Analysis of EMV Chip and PIN 
Our methodology, which is discussed in the next chapter is influenced by the research into exploitable 
vulnerabilities in the EMV protocol.  My guide (Aad van Moorsel) encouraged the use of controlled 
practical experiments in my research.  This allowed me to demonstrate that the vulnerabilities 
highlighted in the protocol were exploitable in the real world, and thereby increase the impact of the 
research.  This approach has proven very successful in our papers which are discussed in Chapter 6, 
Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. 
Papers in this category looked at the system wide impacts of the individual vulnerabilities in the EMV 
Chip and Pin payment systems.  This gives context to our research and has helped us to more fully 
understand the impact of the vulnerabilities identified by my research and assisting me to convey this 
message to a non-academic audience; the general public, law enforcement and the payment industry 
stakeholders. 
Learning from the papers in this section, during the first of my research, I developed a part of EMV 
chip and PIN specification that helped me understand the EMV chip and PIN transaction process 
which benefitted my research to understand how the payment protocols are designed and 
implemented. 
 Security Analysis of EMV Contactless 
Research into the exploitable vulnerabilities in the EMV contactless technology, have both influenced 
and confirmed the technology choices made in our experimental work.  Work by Hancke (2011), 
Roland and Scharinger (2013), Roland et al. (2012) demonstrated the use of NFC enabled 
smartphones as a practical attack platform against EMV contactless payments. Learning from their 
research, I developed an application on NFC enable android phone which emulated the EMV 
contactless POS terminal. The NFC application developed was helpful in extracting the payment card 
details from its contactless interface. There are cases where features in the contactless transaction 
protocol / technology does not affect the security of contactless payments but has a potential to affect 
entire CNP payment system. This is further explained in Chapter 6. 
Research presented by Emms et al. (2014) and Emms et al. (2015) helped me in understanding how 
the payment authorisation messages are handled by the card issuing banks in the backend. 
Work by Kfir and Wool (2005) and Diakos et al. (2015) on extending the range of NFC 
comprehensively explores extended range reading and eavesdropping contactless payments which 
supported my assertions made on contactless cards that it is not difficult for criminals to steal user 
payment card details from a distance using contactless interface. 
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I started my research applying the lessons learned from EMV contactless technology on security 
assessment of university-based RFID access control systems. This project work [64] exploited a 
vulnerability which would allow attackers to create cloned copy of the university issued smart cards. 
 Security Analysis of CNP Payment Protocols 
As discussed earlier, and even pointed by Murdoch et al (2014) [4], the deployed CNP payment 
systems has escaped academic scrutiny to a major extent. The research papers detailed in this section 
are only a broader overview of the challenges faced by payment protocol designers. The research 
articles available for CNP payment system do not provide an extensive technical detail on every 
aspects CNP protocols that are currently in use. Before I started my research work, there were a lot of 
questions still needed to be answered for example:  
 What are the standards which are needed to be followed while accepting a card payment 
online?  
 If the freedom is allowed for the merchants to choose the type of payment protocol 
(authorisation-only and authentication-enabled), then what is the minimum information 
required by the card issuing banks to process an online payment transaction?  
 Do the distributed protocol choices will have any effect on security of CNP payment system? 
How secure such a payment system be?  
 If the authorisation-only protocol is dependent upon static card details, then what is the data 
used by merchants and card issuers for their fraud protection algorithms?  
 Is the user machine (mobile and PCs) trusted enough to host card issuer bound keys and 
digital certificates?  
 As with EMV chip and PIN and EMV contactless, is the online payment transaction 
cryptographically bounded?  How is transaction authentication performed in the CNP 
payments? 
3.6 Conclusion 
There are several leading academic research teams actively analysing the security of payment systems 
and transaction protocol and researching potentially exploitable vulnerabilities in the payment 
protocols. EMV Chip and Pin and EMV Contactless have been especially given a substantial 
importance because of the availability of clearly defined protocol specifications. However, the 
research gaps associated with CNP payment systems were clearly defined and with the increasing 
fraud rates, it can be withdrawn that more research is needed in the area of CNP payment systems.  
In this literature review we have established a link between the existing academic research and the 
areas of weaknesses in CNP payment systems, which were of my potential interest of this research. 
Some of the weakness identified in the payment system which drove my research were: 
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 Wireless interface and the data available in EMV contactless interface introduce new 
categories of attack (i.e. skimming, eavesdropping and relay) for online payment systems. 
 The data in the EMV chip and PIN interface can easily be read by false readers making it 
possible for attackers to use the stolen card details over online payment system.  
 The 3DS 1.0 which required the cardholder to enter static passwords on a pop-up screen was 
more burden to the payment industry than a solution. This allowed a freedom for the online 
merchant to have options on the protocol they want to implement on their checkout systems. 
 Cryptographically bounded one-time passcodes for online payments using EMV readers were 
vulnerable to chip and PIN attacks where an attacker can generate one-time passcodes from a 
stolen payment cards.  
The literature review supports the assertion made in this PhD thesis that the security of the online 
payment system is fundamentally weakened by the philosophy of providing convenience to the 
customer at the checkout. Also, the requirement for backward compatibility makes it essential for the 
card data to be available in plain text across other interfaces which reduces the security to the least 
secure technology supported by the system. 
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Chapter 4. Analysis Methodology 
 
This chapter details the methodology developed as part of this PhD for the security analysis of the 
CNP payment system. We analysed studies conducted on a range of systems, including payment 
systems, money mules, OpenSSL and OAuth implementation in Android. This allows us to construct 
a framework of terminology, methods, and recommendations for the use of attack landscaping and the 
associated disclosure processes as a research method. This is the main drive for our research into 
vulnerability discovery and attack landscaping. By analysing several case studies (papers recently 
published in the topics of attack and disclosure, as reference), we have formulated a framework which 
consists of following stages: Security Architecture Assessment, Attack Landscaping and Vulnerability 
Disclosure.  
 
 
Figure 15 - Overview of Analysis Methodology 
Figure 15. shows the overview of analysis methodology. It identifies three stages and numbers them 
according to their occurrence. 
1. Security architecture assessment:  refers to the process of identifying, quantifying and 
assessing the vulnerabilities associated with a system under study. With security architecture 
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assessment we capture the CNP payment system information in a meaningful way to 
evaluates its security posture against potential vulnerabilities. For an efficient security 
architecture assessment, our methodology defines the following approaches to be followed: 
 System description: Comprehensively explains the processes and parties involved in 
a system including any messaging standards, communication protocols and their 
security features.  
 Vulnerability assessments: This phase will outline the vulnerability assessment 
objectives, define the test cases, details technique used for vulnerability scanning and 
identifies what controls are in place against a vulnerability database. We evaluate 
strengths and weaknesses of existing protocols by assessing the fraud infiltration 
process and techniques.  
2. Attack Landscaping: In the case when a vulnerability is discovered, the next step we follow 
in determining the feasibility and magnitude of the attack is to identify a representative 
instance of the attack. A systematic approach for this process is followed to ensure that an 
accurate likelihood is determined for each attack scenario. 
3. Vulnerability disclosure: After discovering a vulnerability, the next step is to pass the 
findings to the affected parties (i.e. the developer, maintainer or owner of the system with the 
vulnerability). In an approach for consistent and coherent procedure to achieve effective 
vulnerability exercise, we will discuss in the following sub-sections. 
 Disclosing the findings: Identifies whom to disclose the vulnerabilities, determines 
the timing of disclosure and details the level of disclosure. 
 Post vulnerability disclosure: Apart from describing the patching nature, this area of 
our research gives insides into the behaviour of stakeholders on patching which 
includes timings taken by stakeholders to patch the vulnerability, technical abilities of 
stakeholders involved in patching the system. 
Arguably, the above three discussed research methods are combined into a comprehensive 
methodology, providing scientific rigour to elements of the research of the attack, and providing 
scientific value by documenting the current state of the art (much like measuring a system in scientific 
experiments).  
4.1 Security Architecture Assessment 
Ensuring the security of CNP payment is a system wide concern. To date, resources in securing the 
CNP payment system have been heavily focussed on the following four aspects: data transport 
security, web client security, web server security and operating system security. Securing data during 
transport is important to preventing unauthorised parties from capturing transaction data, but it is only 
one part of the solution in securing the CNP payment system. The client and server-side security risks 
Chapter 4 Analysis Methodology 
 
40 
are equally important to understand and address. The last security topic – certainly not the least in 
importance – is the security of operating system of the transaction processing systems. The operating 
system is the foundation on which commercial online application are built. Weakness in the 
foundation can be exploited to compromise the server regardless of the security attributes of the 
applications or databases that stores payment card data. We have Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS) which governs the security requirement of the above four aspects for 
secure handling of payment card data.  
However, one component which is inadequately addressed by the academic literature while assessing 
the security of CNP payment system is the security assessment of CNP payment protocol itself. 
Payment protocols defines rules under which the CNP payment should be processed. There is a 
common misconception that data transport security through the Internet protocols like HTTP and TLS 
are sufficient enough for the proper and secure functioning of the CNP payment system. However, 
HTTP and TLS are somewhat general in that they can be applied to any web-based session, whether 
or not it involves commercial transactions. Payment system protocols go beyond simply securing the 
communication channel; they also establish rules by which commercial transactions will be paid and 
provide a means for transferring payment between merchants and consumers bank account. To fulfil 
this gap in literature on the security of CNP payment protocols and to answer questions on growing 
CNP payment fraud, in this research we investigate the security of CNP payment protocols currently 
in use by the payment industry to accept card payments over the Internet. 
Selecting target protocols for research. A number of protocols for supporting card payment 
transactions have been defined and implemented for the CNP payment system, the result has been a 
plethora of confusing and competing mechanisms to accept payments. For our research we will focus 
on payment protocols currently in use by the payment industry while accepting card payments online. 
We organise CNP payment protocols into two meaningful categories and present an overview of each 
protocol that have established themselves in today’s burgeoning CNP payment system. Based on the 
type of payment processes supported, we classify CNP payment protocols into two categories and 
they are authorisation-only, and authentication enabled (which further includes 3 Domain Secure 3DS 
1.0, 3DS 2.0 and Secure Electronic Transaction (SET)).  
 System description.  
In the next step we capture CNP protocol information in a meaningful way and evaluate its security 
posture against potential vulnerabilities. We start by identifying the processes and parties involved in 
a CNP payment protocol under study. Further, we evaluate the security strengths and evaluates the 
effectiveness of security architecture of a protocol with an aim to explore its weaknesses. We aim to 
do this with a consistent representation for all architecture descriptions of protocols, so that the 
process of discovering attacks can be simplified. However, consistent and concise description of CNP 
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payment protocols is challenging because CNP protocols definitions are lengthy and security 
architectures are complex. As an example, for authorisation-only CNP payment protocol, there are no 
strict requirements in payment acceptance guidelines [39][40][41][42] (over 3000 pages in length 
when combined for all payment networks) and standards [43][44][68] that rules how payment should 
be accepted consistently. This has resulted in freedom for payment acquirers and merchants to have 
their own variations of protocol for accepting payments (see Chapter 6 for more details).  
Security architectures of CNP payment protocols are further perplexed by the influence of regulatory 
standards which are country and regional specific. For example, European Commission has mandated 
the use of 3DS 2.0 for every CNP payment performed over the Internet, where-as, Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has rejected a proposal to mandate any specific any 
fraud product for online payment including 3DS 2.0 [71].  
Such complexities and inconsistencies demand a suitable method to be defined to describe a system. 
Use of modelling languages which can express a system concisely is preferred. Modelling languages 
such as behaviour trees [72], UML sequence diagram [26][47], petri nets [74] and more are found to 
be applied by previous research on security analysis of computing protocols. For the description of 
CNP payment protocols we make use of UML sequence diagrams. Figure 16, shows an example use 
of UML sequence diagram from our study on 3DS 2.0 protocol (further detailed in Chapter 7). The 
above UML sequence diagram collates information from multiple sources in the 3DS 2.0 
specifications [75] and combines them into a single model. Each message, response and function are 
numbered to provide an easy to follow up to documented link with the reference tables. Use of 
reference tables can clarify interpretations and can give a link between system description and system 
implementations. 
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Comparison tables are used on two occasions firstly while comparing the security features and 
messaging standards of each latest protocol with its previous versions and secondly when comparing 
the fraud filters supported by payment acquires and card issuing banks. 
 Vulnerability Assessment  
Once the security architecture of CNP payment protocols has been captured, vulnerabilities can be 
assessed, and attack scenarios generated. Vulnerability assessment refers to the process of identifying, 
analysing and quantifying the potential vulnerabilities in the system under study. With vulnerability 
assessments on CNP payment protocols we 
 outline the vulnerability assessment objectives,  
 define the vulnerability assessment test-cases, 
 detail techniques and tools used for vulnerability scanning and 
 identify what controls are in place against a vulnerability database.  
Our overall objective with vulnerability assessment on CNP payment protocols is to scan, identify and 
investigate weaknesses that are open to vulnerabilities without actually compromising the current 
security posture of CNP payment system. To achieve this, the first challenge we have is to select a 
suitable platform for research. We approached card issuing banks and payment networks requesting 
 
Figure 16 - Sample UML sequence diagram 
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for test accounts, test cards and more detailed specifications on the CNP payment system than what is 
available on the Internet. Having received a very limited response, we designed our research from a 
standard customer accessible platform. For the CNP payment system the customer accessible platform 
comes in two forms: a merchant account with acquiring banks and a customer account with online 
merchants.  
A merchant accounts is offered by CNP payment acquirers to accept card payment online. For 
vulnerability assessments, we subscribed to the merchant accounts from payment acquirers and 
designed software tools which includes: ‘tshirtshop’ – a merchant webstore and a ‘toolkit’ that 
interfaces and performs security assessments on subscribed services. We also developed an android 
based NFC application to communicate with EMV contactless cards when required. To start with, we 
select at least 15 random online payment acquirers that provide payment services across countries and 
purchased the authorisation-only and authentication-enabled checkout services with real merchant 
trading accounts. Subscription also includes a package of payment fraud protection filters as used by 
real online merchants to defend their checkout platform against payment fraud.  
For vulnerability assessments over merchant webstores, we select at least Alexa top 400 merchant 
websites and create customer accounts on each website so that the merchant website allows us to 
make card payments. 
Experimental techniques we use for vulnerability assessments differ as it depends on the type of CNP 
protocol and the system being assessed. For example, for vulnerability assessments using merchant 
accounts and on authentication enabled CNP protocols we applied reverse engineering techniques 
using man-in-the-middle tools (network and application proxies including Wireshark, npcap and 
Fiddler) in the case where ‘no’ or ‘partial information’ about the protocol was available.  This allowed 
us to understand variations in protocol implementation and enabled us to investigate any improper 
configurations and vulnerabilities. For authorisation-only CNP payment protocols, we applied 
security failure analysis [76] which is a test to systems to assess its ability to protect itself from 
deliberate attacks. We have designed several software tools for vulnerability assessments over 
merchant accounts and merchant websites which includes a merchant webstore, a website bot detailed 
next. We have also developed NFC android application to read contactless cards description of which 
is given in Chapter 6. 
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tshirtshop. The merchant webstore we developed is a ‘tshirtshop’ (not made available for public use 
as it was not PCI DSS compliant) which allowed us to establish ourselves as online merchants and test 
the security settings provided by the payment acquires and card issuing banks. Figure 17 shows a 
screenshot of tshirtshop homepage, with four of the 308 products available for purchase. For each 
payment acquirer, the tshirtshop is capable to accept payment through authorisation-only and 
authentication enabled protocols. Typically, CNP payment acquirers offers two types of checkout 
systems to online merchants: hosted checkout and standalone checkout. Small online business 
websites use hosted checkout system also called as third-party checkout systems which is custom 
build to handle checkout operations (add and remove products) and to reduce the programming 
overhead involved in dealing with the response messages from payment acquirers which are 
forwarded to them by the card issuing banks. Standalone checkout systems on the other hand required 
the online merchants to setup their own checkout system which can handle the payment response 
messages send by the card issuing banks. Our tshirtshop is configured to support both of these 
checkout systems.  
The checkout system on tshirtshop as shown in Figure 18, is standalone and is built from scratch, 
supports VISA and MasterCard brands of payment cards and can handle payment response messages 
without using any third-party checkout providers. An example payment response as received by the 
tshirtshop from PayPal as payment acquirer is as shown in textbox below. 
RESULT=0&PNREF=VFHA0FF94691&RESPMSG=Approved&AUTHCODE=245PNI&AVSADDR=Y&AVSZIP=Y&HOSTCODE
=A&PROCAVS=Y&VISACARDLEVEL=12&TRANSTIME=2011-01-123:54:35&AMT=1.00&ACCT=1111&EXPDATE =1 
215&CARDTYPE=0&IAVS=N 
 
 
Figure 17 – a screenshot of tshirtshop homepage showing four of the 308 products available 
for purchase 
Chapter 4 Analysis Methodology 
 
45 
As we will study in the next chapter, these payment responses are called as an authorisation response 
(AuthzRes) and contains a string which indicates the status of transaction of payment initiator and as 
processed by the customer’s card issuing bank. The AuthzRes also indicates to the merchant the 
transaction status and any card data field put incorrect by the card holder. We started our vulnerability 
assessment process by studying AuthzRes codes from attacker mindset. For example, to make 
AuthzRes codes readable for the customers at checkout, these response codes are parsed by the 
merchants into the user understandable language. Perceiving the parsed AuthzRes from a rogue 
merchant’s mindset; the codes conversely could be used to learn all card data fields. 
Table 1 - Authroisation Response-code for tshirtshop with PayPal as Payment Processor 
RESULT=114&PNREF=VXYZ01234567&RESPMSG=114&AVSADDR=Y&AVSZIP=N&IAVS=N&CVV2
MATCH=N 
RESULT > 0 Result > 0 indicates the transaction was declined. RESPMSG gives a brief 
reason for the decline of the transaction. 
PNREF Value A unique value that identifies a transaction 
RESPMSG 114 The transaction was declined (Card security code doesn’t match). 
RESPMSG 113 implies that the transaction was declined because of the 
invalid card number. 
AVSADDR Y Address of the cardholder was verified for the transaction 
AVSZIP N Postcode provided at the checkout does not matches with cardholder’s bank 
file 
IAV N Cardholder country code is local 
CVV2MATCH N Card security code mismatch 
Table 1 shows an AuthzRes code for the merchant with PayPal as its payment processor. It can be 
derived from Table 1 that the transaction was declined because CVV2 supplied at checkout by the 
customer does not match with the actual card holder file with the bank’s authorization server. This 
AuthRes code also implies that the card number and the expiry date were valid. In the next step, the 
AuthRes code is simplified at the checkout in user natural language. For example, during our 
experiments with valid card numbers when the expiry was not entered correctly while making a 
purchase on website x (name masked), the parsed response string as shown in Figure 19 explicitly 
 
Figure 18 - PayPal hosted checkout system as supported by tshirtshop 
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stated “Your payment has been declined as your card expiry date was not valid”. Educating a 
user/attacker about the incorrect card data element.  
As we will see in Chapter 6, VISA authorization network does not detect multiple invalid attempts 
when distributed across multiple payment gateways, attacker has countless attempts to guess expiry 
date and all the other card data required to make an online payment. Using the AuthRes codes an 
attacker could easily be able to obtain card data fields for all Visa cards. 
In chapter 6, we will further decode and perform a detailed analysis of authorisation response codes of 
hundreds of online merchant websites from a customer checkout page where we study the 
authorisation-only CNP payment protocols. The level of information encoded in these authorisation 
response code allowed us to formulate an attack we call ‘Distributed Guessing Attack’ which will 
allow fraudsters to learn all the payment card details belonging to the target cardholder. 
Website bot. We designed a website bot – a web crawler that automates the vulnerability assessment 
process on selected group of websites. Website bot can perform the following three functions: 
 generates and verifies the validity of payment card numbers 
 automates repeated filling of payment card data fields 
 determines the number of invalid attempts allowed 
Generates and verifies the validity of payment card numbers. The website bot is programmed to 
use Luhn’s check algorithm to generate a database random payment card number. Although widely 
available, the Luhn’s algorithm is not well known. The algorithm provides a basic check of whether a 
payment card number is valid. The purpose of the algorithm is not to authorise a payment card 
transaction but to provide a first line of defence against misspellings and wrong input. The algorithm 
works as follows: 
Multiply every digit in the credit card number by its weight. The weights are either 1 or 2 depending 
on the position of the digit. If the card has an even number of digits, the first digit has a weight of 2, 
otherwise it has a weight of 1. Weights alternate: 1,2,1,2....., or 2,1,2,1… If the weighted value of a 
digit exceeds 9, subtract 9. Add together the weighted values of all digits, modulo 10. If the credit 
card number is correct, the result must be 0. To generate payment card numbers belonging to specific 
bank and brand (Visa, MasterCard, Debit or Credit), we provide BIN as an input to the website bot. 
 
Figure 19 - Response code revealing the validity of a card number and expiry date 
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    public static boolean luhnTest(String number) { 
        int s1 = 0, s2 = 0; 
        String reverse = new StringBuffer(number).reverse().toString(); 
        for (int i = 0; i < reverse.length(); i++) { 
            int digit = Character.digit(reverse.charAt(i), 10); 
            if (i % 2 == 0) {//this is for odd digits, they are 1-indexed in the algorithm 
                s1 += digit; 
            } else {//add 2 * digit for 0-4, add 2 * digit - 9 for 5-9 
                s2 += 2 * digit; 
                if (digit >= 5) { 
                    s2 -= 9; 
                } 
            } 
        } 
        return (s1 + s2) % 10 == 0; 
    } 
} 
Figure 20 shows screenshot of the website bot generating Barclay’s PLC bank’s Visa debit card 
number using the Luhn’s check logic shown in the above text box. The validity of card numbers 
generated by the website bot can be established by using authorisation response codes i.e. when a 
transaction is attempted using these card number the authorisation response for the card issuing banks 
will indicate whether the transaction is attempted with a valid card number or not. 
Automates repeated filling of payment card data fields. The website bot can simplify manual 
filling of payment card data on selected websites by automating the process. The website bot uses 
selenium web drivers to select card input fields on the checkout page of the selected website and 
populates the selected input field with the given value. For a card number, the website bot can initiate 
transaction on a range of expiry dates, CVV2’s and address fields.  
 
Figure 20 - A screenshot of the website bot generating Barclay’s PLC bank’s Visa debit card 
numbers 
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As we will see in Chapter 6, not all the four card data fields (card number, expiry data, CVV2 and 
address) are validated by each online merchant. The website bot determines what card data fields are 
used by the merchant website to accept a transaction.  
Determine the number of invalid attempts allowed. One of our experiments on the online payment 
system involved determining the number of incorrect attempts allowed on each merchant website. For 
a given card number, the website bot initiates repeated transaction on each merchant website with 
random card data fields until the merchant website stops the website bot from making further 
transactions.  
Once the details about websites and their checkout systems were captured, we maintained a table that 
compares the security features on each of the 400 online merchant websites. Figure 21 shows an 
example table comparing the security features of each merchant website. It can be seen from the first 
entry of the table that ‘Amazon’ web store requests card number and expiry data from their customers 
but does not request CVV2 and Postal Code. Similarly, for entry two the Ebay merchant website 
supported by PayPal payment acquirer requests for four card data fields and additionally supports Pay 
with PayPal or PayPal wallet system. Rows with orange background indicate that the experiments 
were not performed on that selected website (either due to high cost of products or costs associated 
with cancelling an order once its placed).   
4.2 Attack Landscaping 
After discovering the attacks, the attack scenarios can be analysed to determine their likelihood.  For 
our research we identify the following stages for attack landscaping.  
Representativeness. The first step in determining the feasibility and magnitude of the attack is to 
identify a representative instance of the attack landscape as it can be found in actual systems. For 
instance, if the attack considers online payments, the obvious way to proceed is to select the most 
 
Figure 21 - An example table comparing the security features of each merchant website 
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popular websites from the Alexa listing as a representative sample of online merchants. For each 
merchant in our representation sample we demonstrate the feasibility of the attack by practically 
exploiting the attack using our real test card and test accounts.  
Given a representative landscape, the study of the attack can then go in different directions. In some 
cases, the existence of the vulnerability needs to be demonstrated [3][51–54], in some cases the 
practical feasibility of the attack needs to be demonstrated [26][35][54–59] (our research on 
authorisation-only protocol required distributed attacks not to be spotted by the credit card payment 
acquirers and also required enough differences in the information requested for online purchases). 
The next stage in the attack landscaping exercise that we follow is to determine the magnitude of the 
problem. For instance, if the cause of the attack is outdated software [77] or insufficient patching on 
checkout system provided a payment acquirer or is a systemic problem. Chapter 6, Section 6.7 and 
Chapter 8 demonstrates the attack landscaping exercise we performed on the online CNP payment 
system. 
Finally, the disclosure exercise takes place, which is a closely monitored process of disclosing the 
vulnerability/attack and tracking the actions taken by various stakeholders.  
In addition to these primary five stages, we also look at the bigger picture of the landscape by 
considering various stakeholders involved:  
 System Owners: this could be the developer, maintainer, seller or whoever in charge of the 
system. They have an ability to make a modification to the affected system, for example by 
issuing patches to address known vulnerabilities.  
 Researchers: conduct a systematic analysis of the system, or they may accidentally stumble 
upon some problems when using the system that they believe might result in a vulnerability. 
They cannot fix any vulnerability themselves, so they need to get in touch with the system 
owner to pass their findings for the latter to take action on. 
 Attackers: When an attacker finds out about a vulnerability, they will try to exploit if for 
whatever reason (financial reward, just for fun, political motives, to name but a few). We will 
not discuss or explore this stakeholder much further in this as there are plenty of existing 
literature on them already.  
Each of these stakeholders has their methods – in relation to security architecture assessment 
(discussed in section 4.1), attack landscaping (described above) and vulnerability disclosure 
(discussed in the next section). 
4.3 Vulnerability Disclosure 
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Learning from the case studies and leveraging our previous experience in performing vulnerability 
disclosure, in this section we look at how we communicate the vulnerabilities to the vulnerable system 
owners with the aim of getting the vulnerabilities efficiently fixed. We broadly categorise 
vulnerability disclosure into two categories: (1) Full Disclosure (publishing the vulnerabilities on the 
Internet without any restriction), and (2) Responsible Disclosure (all relevant stakeholders agree to 
allow a period of time for the loophole/vulnerability to be patched before publishing the details on the 
Internet).  
Once we decide to notify the vulnerable stakeholders, there are several other crucial decisions to be 
made in order to provide a proper structure to the disclosure exercise. All of these decisions need to 
consider the ethics and morals of passing vulnerability information to the affected third party, and 
these considerations are not widely explored in the scientific community yet. There are questions that 
need to be addressed, such as: To whom do we disclose the vulnerability information? How should we 
handle the responses from the affected third party? How much information shall we divulge in the 
notification message?  
In an approach to find a consistent and coherent procedure to achieve effective vulnerability exercise, 
we will discuss in the following sub-sections two key steps: disclosing the findings and following this 
up with post disclosure activities. 
4.3.1.1 Disclosing the Findings 
The following issues were considered when disclosing vulnerability findings. 
Identifying whom to disclose to. It may be complicated to determine which parties to disclose the 
vulnerability to, and even if stakeholders have been identified, it is not always straightforward to 
actually contact the party. Large companies (like card issuing banks and payment acquirers) typically 
provide customer service contact details, but they might not be the right people to approach for 
vulnerability disclosure. In some cases, there might be a dedicated contact email or number for 
security-related issues (such as for reporting phishing and spam), but in others, there is nothing 
obvious as a port of call. 
The timing of the disclosure. Passing the vulnerability information forward to the affected 
stakeholders could have helped them to put down the adversarial activities. However, not disclosing 
or delaying passing the vulnerability information to the affected stakeholders may benefit the research 
in many other ways. For example, this would allow researchers to measure the behaviour and 
intentions of attackers, or to study how long the attackers would take to exploit the vulnerability 
[77][83]. This is a key factor in determining the likelihood of an attack and will give research a 
prominence dimension from which cyber-security can be studied, and if not followed may scale down 
eminence of the research. In general, data collection strategies and studies on attacker interest and 
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behaviour in exploiting the vulnerability are recommended by research on vulnerability disclosures 
[51][52][58][59]. However, it should not be extended beyond once the conclusions are made. 
Researchers should avoid interference with middle-level personnel and should commute with the most 
relevant managers whenever available[77]. 
Importance of the First Notice. With our research on the CNP payment system we intended to 
perform multiple disclosure exercises with the hosts that remained vulnerable did not respond to our 
first notification. We derived two important findings. 
Firstly, those contacts who accepted the vulnerability on our first notice patched their systems we 
found that only the earliest notice was likely to show more effect on the patching rate. Secondly, 
systems that did not patch or remediate after the first notification chose not to remediate and remained 
vulnerable. 
Level of Detail of Disclosure. Disclosure reports that lack the details of compromise will have a very 
limited response from the notified hosts [77]. For efficient notification process, the vulnerability 
disclosure report in our research included  
 A detailed description of every successful attack or any weakest link found during the 
assessment process 
 Features of the attack whether if it's practical or theoretically demonstrated. Disclosure report 
also mentioned the cost and time required to devise the attack.  
 The report clearly detailed the technical sophistication, and in detail, the tools used or are 
necessary to practice the attack.  
 A detailed description of any publicly available information or insider helps that may be 
required to make the attack practice. Is there any inside information about the system needed 
for the attacks to be exploited?  
 Samples of the defeated security devices were provided if practical and appropriate.  
 A statistical summary of the level of effort made during the vulnerability assessment was 
detailed. The number of times the attack was successfully performed, time to develop them, 
time to execute them, type of defeats. 
Suggested Counter Measures. The vulnerability disclosure report included not just discovering and 
detailing the weakness, but also suggested effective countermeasures, if practical. By providing 
suggested countermeasures, we will lend more credibility, but have to be careful that these potential 
fixes will not make the situation worse [84]. 
During the course of our disclosure exercise research, we had learned that the affected hosts were 
more amenable to deal with the vulnerability when a solution was offered along. It is essential that the 
recommendations for improvement should consider the business incentives and not distract the 
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vulnerable hosts from their core deliverables. Apparently, there are other researchers [85][86] that had 
expanded in detail the effects of patching when the solution was suggested. Li et al. in [86] found that 
the hosts were more open to fixing their system when the solutions were suggested. 
Tracking the Patching Behaviour. We could collect relevant data on characteristics of the defender. 
Defender features might include attributes of the hosting provider (e.g., large vs small, shared vs 
dedicated hosting, country headquarters), site owner (company size, company vs individual, country 
headquarters) or associated registrar.  
Handling the Response Messages. We argue that those involved in take-down should consider how 
to protect individuals from harm while creating an opportunity for research to advance the 
understanding of how to better perform take-down. Opting to keep information private can be even 
more dangerous than the reckless publication of information that aids attackers. The harm may be 
harder to observe directly (slowed take-down speed, lack of pressure to improve practices, etc.) but 
equally destructive.  
However, not all issues addressed during vulnerability assessments are mitigated because a lot may 
depend on the business decisions involved. In such a case, publishing the details of a vulnerability in 
the public will ‘name and shame’ responsible parties and victims [84]. 
4.3.1.2 Post Vulnerability Disclosure 
While most of the research we have looked into so far have only carried out the assessment until the 
disclosure of the vulnerability, a select few sought a further investigation into post vulnerability 
disclosure. Experiments carried out after the disclosure are useful to determine the adversarial 
attractiveness against the affected systems. Understanding the insidious tactics against the affected 
systems at this stage will provide an in-depth insight into the methods and psychology of the 
attackers. In that regard, there are three useful activities that can be performed post vulnerability 
disclosure: 
 Selecting hosts for further analysis: this will allow the research to continue to explore other, 
similar systems that might be affected by the same vulnerability, and to see if they get 
attacked too, or if some remedial actions can effectively thwart potential attacks. 
 Adversary Identification: in an ideal world, it would be desirable to be able to identify the 
attackers, so that they can be brought to justice. This activity will be closely related to 
electronic forensic investigation that law enforcement agencies or certain security companies 
have the capability of performing. 
 Adversary Characterisation: when it is not possible to identify the attackers, it would still be 
useful to be able to characterise attackers so that we can understand their profile better in 
order to come up with a more effective countermeasure. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
In this Chapter we constructed a framework of terminology, methods, and recommendations for the 
use of vulnerability assessment, attack landscaping and the associated disclosure processes as a 
research method. 
In the next part of this PhD we will demonstrate the application of our analysis methodology, to 
evaluate the security of CNP payment system. In Chapter 5 and Chapter 7, we will apply the first 
requirement of our methodology and perform security architecture assessment of the CNP payment 
system. In Chapter 6 and Chapter 8 we demonstrate the application of attack landscaping and 
vulnerability disclosure over CNP payment system. 
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Chapter 5. Online Card Not Present (CNP) 
Payment Protocols 
 
This chapter presents our security analysis on one of the most ignored components of the CNP 
payment system – the payment protocol. Although a great deal of resources has been spent on 
developing secure data communication through the Internet, there are plethora of confusing and 
competing mechanisms to handle payment information. This chapter organises the different protocols 
into meaningful categories and presents their strengths and weaknesses. To securely participate in the 
CNP payment, it is important to realise what security attributes are and are not provided by a given 
protocol.  For example, which protocols encrypt data, which authenticate cardholders as well as 
servers, which handle payments, and which offer nonrepudiation? How are these security attributes 
provided for a given protocol? This chapter objectively answers the questions asked above. 
5.1 Introduction 
The CNP payment protocol defines mechanisms for transferring of funds from the customer bank 
account to the merchant bank account for purchases over the Internet. The protocol defines the 
customer data and merchant data that is needed to be included in the payment request and defines 
rules for the merchants to be followed while accepting the payment. 
As discussed, there are broadly two fundamental protocols touted for CNP payment systems: 
authorisation-only and authentication-enabled CNP protocols. Authorisation-only CNP protocol is 
designed for providing speed and convenience to the customer at the checkout, and the payment 
process is straightforward, in that, the customer only must submit their payment card details during 
the purchase. In contrast, authentication-enabled CNP protocols adds an extra layer of user-
authentication on top of the authorisation-only protocol. With authentication-enabled protocols, the 
card issuer requires the cardholder to prove their identity through established methods (like 
passwords, security questions, one-time passcodes) before accepting the transaction. 
Before launching into the CNP payment protocols, one must recognise existing protocols widely in 
place to secure internet-based transactions. The Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a cryptographic 
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protocol used as a standard for securing Internet-based transactions today. Although TLS does not 
provide mechanisms for handling payment card data and processes involved in handling payment, it 
does offer confidentiality in web sessions.  
With SSL/TLS, the communication between the payment processors and the customer is encrypted, so 
that an attacker cannot intercept the payment card details. Further, the merchant is authenticated 
(customer authentication is optional) to prevent spoofing attacks, where an attacker sets up a fake 
merchant server. Because SSL/TLS is covered in many other research projects, to keep this chapter 
practical, we do not provide its technical description here. For good technical coverage of SSL/TLS, 
see [87]. 
In the context of measuring the security features provided by payment protocols, it is measured along 
the following properties by the payment service providers: 
 Payment Data Confidentiality. Protocols must ensure payment credentials confidentiality 
during the transmission and storage. The customer is an entity requiring the confidentiality 
and the stakeholders processing the payment are providing the confidentiality service.  
 Payment Data Integrity. These ensure that only authorised parties (cardholder or card 
issuer) are able to modify the payment data when stored and transmitted. 
 Card Authentication / Machine Authentication. These confirm the identity of the card 
(token) or, when appropriate, the machine (computer of the payment initiator) that is linked to 
the cardholder account. 
 Transaction Authentication. These authenticate specific transactions, typically 
cryptographically binding a random one-time code to the data of the transaction, achieved by 
the card or machine signing the transaction data. 
 Second Factor User Authentication. These are additional user authentication techniques that 
use information about a second authentication factor to establish the identity of the 
cardholder. 
 Payment Authentication. Techniques to ensure that the origin of any payment transaction 
message is correctly identified, combining (i) payment card / machine authentication and (ii) 
Transaction Authentication 
 Payment Non-repudiation. These ensure that the customer/cardholder cannot deny the fact 
that she has completed a transaction. When required, she must be able to provide a proof of 
the transaction. Typically, this is achieved by signing the transaction data with user specific 
keys. 
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In the following sections we assess the security architecture of authorisation-only and authentication-
enabled CNP payment protocols. For each protocol we describe the system either by using UML 
sequence diagrams or by simplified payment transition diagrams (in case there are more than five 
participants in the protocol). For each protocol we study, we detail the processes involved in a 
transaction, security features and limitations of each protocol.  
5.2 Authorisation-only CNP protocol 
Payment made using the authorisation-only protocol undergoes three phases: payment-authorisation, 
payment-clearance and payment-settlement. Each phase has its own responsibility and is discussed in 
detail below. An example checkout page from a merchant supporting authorisation-only CNP protocol 
is shown in Figure 22. 
 Payment-authorisation 
Payment-authorisation is a process which verifies the customer card details provided at the checkout 
against the customer record file held with the card issuing bank. Having validated the card details, the 
card issuer checks whether the customer account has enough money to purchase the requested goods. 
If the customer account is in good standings, the transaction request is accepted, and a hold is put on 
the customer money for the purchased item and the authorisation response is forwarded to the 
customer through the merchant. The payment-authorisation phase involves the following steps: 
 
Figure 22 – An example checkout page from a merchant website supporting authorisation-
only CNP protocol. 
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1 The customer starts the transaction process by filling his payment card details, shipping and 
billing information on the checkout page provided on the merchant website. The 
communication channel between the customer browser and the merchant server is TLS 
protected and provides confidentiality and integrity to the transaction data.  
2 The merchant determines the payment card type to verify if the given card type is accepted 
and once the card type is determined, the merchant formats an authorisation request 
message into a format understandable by the acquirer, shown in step 2, the authorisation 
request is submitted to the acquirer. It is also possible for a merchant to maintain multiple 
acquirers for different card brands. 
3 In step 3, the acquirer adds additional information to the received authorisation request 
message and formats the message to the structure understandable by the card payment 
brand (ISO 8583 [88], Standard 70 [89] or ISO 20022 [90]). The information included by 
the acquiring bank includes acquirer bank details and additional information required by 
the card issuing banks during the payment-settlement phase. The authorisation request is 
forwarded to the acquirer. 
4  In step 4, the card payment network determines the card issuer and forwards the payment 
authorisation request to it. This request is typically sent over a protected financial services 
network. 
5 In step 5, the card issuer authorises the payment and the result of the authorisation either 
accepted or declined is forwarded to the card payment network. If accepted, the 
authorisation code is provided, and the customer money of purchased item value is put on 
hold by the card issuing bank. If declined, the card payment network is notified as such 
with a decline reason code. 
 
Figure 23 - Parties and processes involved in an authorisation-only CNP payment 
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6 Shown in step 6, the card payment network forwards the authorisation response to the 
acquirer. When required, the acquirer parses the received authorisation response into the 
merchant system’s understandable language. 
7 The parsed authorisation response is then forwarded to the merchant in step 7. 
8 Finally, in step 8, the merchant completes the payment-authorisation by notifying the 
customer. 
Payment-authorisation is the only stage visible to the cardholder. Payment-clearing and payment- 
settlement are the processes internal to the acquirer/acquiring bank, the payment network and the card 
issuing bank. Unlike the payments over the Internet, customers over Mail Order/Telephone Order 
(MO/TO) transactions are requested to provide their payment card details to the merchant verbally 
over the phone or over the email.  Merchants that accept MO/TO transactions maintain a virtual 
platform where they enter the customer’s provided card details manually and attempt making a 
transaction from the platform.  
 Payment-clearance  
Payment-clearance is a process which provides a reconciliation to the acquirer. In this process, the 
customer bank bills the customer for the purchased item. Although the authorisation phase captures 
the payment on the cardholder account, the payment is not forwarded to the merchant account unless a 
clearance request is submitted by the merchant. The payment-clearance process has the following 
steps: 
9 The merchant requests the shipped item value from the customer account. To do this, the 
merchant creates and submits a transaction clearance file to the acquirer. The acquirer collects 
all the clearance files from the merchant and combines them into a single batch file. 
10 The acquirer sorts the received batch files and forwards them to relevant card payment 
network as a capture request file. 
11 The capture request file from card payment network is forwarded to the card issuing bank. 
12 Having received the capture request file, the card issuer verifies each record in the capture file 
to ensure the value are correct, and the requested amount matches to the acquirer clearance 
records as maintained by the card-issuing banks. If the records are found reliable, the card 
issuer provides a complete reconciliation to the acquirer (in the form of clearance code) for 
each record in the clearance file. The capture response is forwarded to the payment network. 
13 The capture response is forwarded from the payment network to the acquirer. The acquirer can 
use the capture code provided in the capture response in case of any disputes. 
 Payment-settlement 
During the payment-settlement process, the customer bank bills the customer for the purchased item 
and the merchant bank is credited with the value of customer purchase. This process is simplified to 
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exclude the message sequences passing through a payment network. The steps involved in payment 
settlement includes: 
14 The issuer processes the batch with payment-clearance files, identifies the acquirer and sends 
the payment to the acquirer account. 
15 The acquirer pays into the merchant account the value of cardholder’s purchase. This indicates 
the completion of an online payment process. 
Table 2 below shows an example code snippet for payment authorisation request from the merchant to 
the acquirer. It can be seen from the first row ( marked as 1) of the table that merchant adds a unique 
order code to each transaction (with <order> XML tag) and mentions the type of currency in which 
the transaction is needed to be made. The second row (2) shows the payment details passed from the 
merchant to the acquirer. The amount of card data required for the transaction may vary and this 
depends on the contract between the merchant and the acquirer. The third row (3) shows an additional 
transaction data.   
Table 2. An example code snippet for payment authorisation request 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//Worldpay//DTD Worldpay PaymentService v1//EN"  
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService_v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="098749304394857"> <!--Enter your own merchant 
code--> 
  <submit>  
    <order orderCode="000432"> <!--Enter a unique order code each time--> 
      <description>TSHIRTSHOP</description> <!--Enter a description useful to you--> 
      <amount currencyCode="GBP" exponent="2" value="50"/> 
1 
      <paymentDetails> 
        <CARD-SSL>  
          <cardNumber>4763672350641010</cardNumber> 
          <expiryDate><date month="01" year="2020"/></expiryDate> 
          <cardHolderName>Mohammed</cardHolderName> 
          <cardAddress> 
            <address> 
              <address1>2</address1> 
              <address2>Sidney Grove</address2> 
              <address3>Newcastle upon Tyne</address3> 
              <postalCode>NE45PD</postalCode> 
              <city>Newcastle upon Tyne</city> 
              <state>Tyne and Wear</state> 
              <countryCode>GB</countryCode>  
            </address> 
          </cardAddress> 
        </CARD-SSL> 
        <session shopperIPAddress="xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx" id="0215ui8ib1"/> 
      </paymentDetails>  
2 
      <shopper> 
        <shopperEmailAddress>cccsncl@gmail.com.com</shopperEmailAddress> 
        <browser> 
          <acceptHeader>text/html</acceptHeader> 
          <userAgentHeader>Mozilla/5.0 ...</userAgentHeader> 
        </browser> 
      </shopper> 
      <dynamicMCC>5045</dynamicMCC> <!--The merchant category code that applies to this 
transaction--> 
      <dynamicInteractionType type="ECOMMERCE"/> <!--The type of shopper interaction for 
this transaction--> 
    </order> 
  </submit> 
</paymentService> 
3 
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Table 3. shows an example authorisation response for an accepted transaction request from the 
acquiring bank to the merchant. As it can be seen, tag <orderStatus> indicates that the transaction for 
the card number <cardNumber> is authorised by the card issuing bank. 
Table 3. An example authorisation response for an accepted transaction request 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//WorldPay//DTD WorldPay PaymentService v1//EN" 
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService_v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="098749304394857"> <!--The merchantCode you supplied in 
the order--> 
  <reply> 
    <orderStatus orderCode="000432"> <!--The orderCode you supplied in the order--> 
      <payment> 
        <paymentMethod>VISA-SSL</paymentMethod> 
        <amount value="050" currencyCode="GBP" exponent="2" debitCreditIndicator="credit"/> 
        <lastEvent>AUTHORISED</lastEvent> 
        <AuthorisationId id="666"/>  
        <balance accountType="IN_PROCESS_AUTHORISED"> 
          <amount value="5000" currencyCode="GBP" exponent="2" debitCreditIndicator="credit"/> 
        </balance> 
        <cardNumber>4763672350641010</cardNumber> 
        <riskScore value="0"/> 
      </payment> 
    </orderStatus> 
  </reply> 
</paymentService> 
Table 4 shows an example authorisation response for a transaction marked as declined/refused by the 
card issuer. As it can be seen, <CVCResultCode> and <AVSResultCode> represents the CVV2 and 
the address verification results as verified by the card issuer. The <ISO8583ReturnCode> indicates 
the status of a transaction response and in this case, code="41" indicates that the transaction is 
rejected by the card issuer because the CVV2 supplied by the customer at the checkout does not 
match the actual CVV2 belonging the card (‘description’ field in the <ISO8583ReturnCode> indicates 
the reason of decline of a transaction) 
Table 4. An example authorisation response for a transaction marked declined 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>  
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//Worldpay//DTD Worldpay PaymentService v1//EN"  
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService_v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="098749304394857"> <!--The merchantCode you supplied in 
the order-->  
  <reply> 
    <orderStatus orderCode="000432"> <!--The orderCode you supplied in the order--> 
      <payment> 
        <paymentMethod>VISA-SSL</paymentMethod>  
        <amount value="050" currencyCode="GBP" exponent="2" debitCreditIndicator="credit"/> 
        <cardNumber>4763672350641010</cardNumber> 
        <lastEvent>REFUSED</lastEvent> 
        <CVCResultCode description="C"/> 
        <AVSResultCode description="E"/> 
        <ISO8583ReturnCode code="41" description="WRONG CVV"/> 
        <riskScore value="0"/> 
      </payment> 
    </orderStatus> 
  </reply> 
</paymentService> 
Authorisation-only CNP payment security relies upon the data entered by the cardholder at the 
checkout. Additionally, fraud detection filters are used by merchants, payment acquirers and card-
issuing banks to detect CNP payment fraud. Most of these fraud protection filters rely on the three-
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digit CVV2 code printed on the back of the card and the verification of the address information of the 
cardholder.  
Apart from fraud detection filters, the PCI DSS specification[21] and merchant specification from 
card payment scheme providers (such as Visa [66] and MasterCard[67]) outline the security measures 
that should be employed by any merchant. The PCI DSS[21], provides a comprehensive set of rules 
and controls for the secure handling and storage of sensitive card data. For example Table 5 shows a 
PCI DSS requirement 3 [21] which states that all parties in a payment ecosystem are prohibited from 
storing a card’s sensitive data (full track data and CVV2) even in an encrypted form. The card number 
may be stored; however, it should be rendered unreadable using strong cryptography. Merchants, 
payment acquirers, payments networks and banks involved in processing online payments are 
supposed to adhere to PCI DSS,  
Table 5 - PCI DSS’ rule on which card data may be stored 
Data Element Storage Permitted 
Primary Account Number (PAN) Yes 
Cardholder Name Yes 
Expiration Date Yes 
Full Track Data No 
CAV2/CVC2/CVV2/CID No 
5.3 Security Limitations of Authorisation-only CNP Protocol 
The convenience and simplicity with which the customer can make a purchase make authorisation-
only protocol the most widely used protocol across the globe for accepting CNP payments. However, 
the authorisation-only protocol does not provide complete confidentiality of customer’s card data 
leaving many opportunities for an attacker to steal the customer payment card data. Primarily, this is 
because the identity of the customer making a transaction is not established by the card issuer and the 
security of the transaction relies on the cardholder entering their static card details as requested by the 
merchant. The card details used for making a payment are static, and the same card details are 
requested by every merchant over the Internet or across MO/TO platforms. This makes the security of 
authorisation-only protocol distributed where each participant processing the payment possess a local 
copy of customer payment card data. Following are the statistics from PCI council which illustrates 
how the payment card data is stolen: 
 76% exploited stolen credentials including phishing  
 40% incorporated malware 
 52% involved some form of hacking including identity theft 
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 35% involved physical attacks 
 29% leveraged social tactics 
Let us discover some of these attacker tactics in more detail: 
 Phishing  
Phishing might seem as a very primitive yet very effective way for fraudsters to deceive a victim. The 
primary aim of phishing is to get valuable private information by contacting a victim via email, text 
message, phone call, social media or via any other communication means. Scammers try to disguise 
their messages as official communication from authorities, banks or similar organisations to gain trust 
of their victims and derive private information from them to further use with criminal intentions. Such 
phishing emails can also contain a link to a fake phishing website, which is veiled to appear as a 
legitimate website of victim’s online bank or any other organisation.  
It is now a common practice by the card issuing banks to advice to its customers to check that the web 
merchant page address contains “https” and a lock sign on the address bar of a web browser. This is 
important as it indicates the legitimacy of a website. 
What can make phishing even more deceiving for victim is spoofing technique. This technique 
involves using real e-mail or IP addresses. Fraudsters are able to mask their email address as 
somebody else’s e-mail address and send their phishing messages from this spoofed e-mail. This 
technique allows to gain absolute trust of victims, who will think that the e-mail is coming from an 
authorised sender. Same applies to IP addresses, when fraudsters create IP packets that use someone 
else’s IP address to appear as a legitimate host. Quite often a web site can also be spoofed in 
combination with a pharming method. Pharming is redirecting victim to a spoofed web site when they 
are clicking on a link, which was supposed to lead to a legitimate site. Such technique can easily be 
used to scam buyers on spoofed online merchant web sites by collecting their card information at 
check out. 
 Malware  
In a nutshell, malware is a malicious software - computer program, which is created with fraudulent 
intentions. Malware brings such threats like viruses, worms, Trojan horses, ransomware and bots. 
Such malicious agents can attack and gain control over operating system, database, network or 
computer on behalf of a fraudster. They aim to collect any sensitive information of victims such as 
passwords, personal information, payment card detail and more. Malwares can be very advanced and 
can automate numerous attacks. Such fraud poses a big threat and contributes to the increasing 
number of financial internet crime every year.  
Potentially Unwanted Programs (PUPs), which usually contain malware, is a substantial threat for 
internet users’ private information. As a rule, victims are fooled into downloading these malicious 
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applications on social networks and websites where upon the PUPs will install themselves on victims’ 
computers even without their consent. Furthermore, they are not easy to be removed from computer 
once installed. The PUPs and their purposes can be diverse. They may gain control over the computer 
and lead to disabling security software and infecting computer with even more malware. With the use 
of browser parasite criminals can manipulate victim’s browser. Such PUP might not only track visited 
pages, but if very advanced might also steal passwords and any sensitive information (including card 
data) that was input in the browser. Another dangerous PUP is a spyware, which is designed 
specifically to collect private information like e-mails and messages, record keystrokes and take 
screenshots to steal any valuable data. PUPs are very effective criminal tools for identity theft.  
 Identity Theft 
Payment card details for authorisation-only systems are usernames and passwords which are shared 
with every merchant on the Internet that customers do business with. When a customer makes a 
transaction, he has no assurance that the payment card details will be safeguarded by the merchant and 
the security of customer’s payment card details is only as secure as the merchant server. Consider a 
scenario where a merchant either an Internet-based or MO/TO based, who plays a rogue. All the 
customer payment card data is visible to the rogue merchant who has the freedom to use to across 
myriad of CNP platforms. This makes the system more vulnerable to identity theft attacks where 
rogue merchants, if any, would misuse the customer payment card details. 
Once payment card information has been collected with the use of identity theft techniques or 
purchased from another criminal group, then fraudsters move on to committing online payment fraud 
(trial stage) by simply making purchases on online stores. One of variations of online payment fraud 
is account takeover. The technique involves fraudster gaining control over victim’s account in online 
payment website or even in online banking system. Account numbers and passwords are obtained 
with the use of any of the identity theft techniques. Then a fraudster will change the personal 
information of the victim in the account such as e-mail address and home address and will use the 
provided card details for making purchases. After the unauthorised purchases are done it might take 
some time for the victim to find it out and identify the account takeover. 
 No Real-Time Exchange of Fraud Information 
The other limitation with authorisation-only CNP payment system is that there is no real-time 
exchange of fraud information. Fraud detection in the CNP payment system can either be detected by 
the merchant or the card issuers. Additionally, if customers find any illicit activity on their account or 
find any unknown transaction the fraud is then reported to the card issuing banks.  
Fraud detection by merchants. If a merchant detects that it is a fraudulent transaction, the 
information is kept locally with the merchant unless the acquirer is providing the fraud monitoring 
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service. The fraud data with acquirer is only available to all the subscribed merchants, and this comes 
at an extra cost from the acquirer to the merchants. 
Fraud detection by customers and card issuers. If the customer discovers any false statement on 
their bank account, the customer files a complaint with the card-issuing banks which further 
investigates if the card details have been misused after being stolen. If found stolen and misused, the 
card is blocked by the card issuer. It is important to note the time it may take for a victim to notice an 
unknown transaction in their bank statement and report it and by that time the fraudster has already 
completed an illicit transaction.  
Once fraud is reported by the customer, the card issuer generates a record in the TC-40 (for Visa and 
MasterCard) report file [91]. The TC-40 is an electronic file that audits all the fraud identified by the 
card issuing banks, and the card number is recorded on to the file. The file is distributed across the 
acquirers typically once in a week who can update their fraud database. If a transaction is attempted 
using a card found in TC-40, the attempt is rejected by the acquirer and is not sent to the issuer for 
authorisation.  
To summarise, authorisation-only protocol provides a method for securely handling the payment for 
goods purchased through the Internet. This protocol also goes beyond securing the Web session; 
rather, the protocol also provides assurance to merchants and consumers that the payment is 
authorised by a payment card issuer, that the merchant’s bank will be paid, that the order was 
correctly received by the merchant. 
5.4 Authentication-Enabled CNP Protocols 
After the problems associated with authorisation-only protocols were realised, the card payments 
networks started working on a more secure version of online CNP payment protocol which came in 
the form of authenticating a cardholder for each transaction. Cardholder authentication or simply 
authentication is a process which verifies the identity of a cardholder. Authentication-enabled CNP 
protocols require the customers making a transaction at the checkout to establish their identity with 
the card issuer before the transaction is being accepted for authorisation. Once the customer is 
authenticated, the merchant is provided with an authentication code which can later be submitted to 
claim authorisation and settlement. Cardholder authentication in CNP payments is achieved by using 
either of the two protocols: 3D Secure 1.0 (3DS 1.0) and 3D Secure 2.0 (3DS 2.0). 
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 3D Secure 1.0 (3DS 1.0) 
3DS 1.0 aims to provide more security as opposed to earlier “authorisation-only” systems which 
relied on static card data to verify the customers at the checkout. Along with the card details, 3DS 1.0 
requires the customer to enter password for each online payment transaction. 3DS 1.0 got the 
economics right, in that, the fraud liability was shifted to the card issuing banks. Where-as, the 
merchants with authorisation-only systems were forced to bear the losses associated with fraud. In the 
year 2001, Visa introduced the 3DS 1.0 protocol which was later adopted by MasterCard. Each card 
payment brand has their alias name for the technology. Visa calls it as Verified by Visa, MasterCard 
refers to the protocol as SecureCode, and American Express referred to their implementation of the 
technology as SafeKey. 3DS 1.0 transaction process involves a number of parties, each with different 
responsibilities. Figure 24 - 3D Secure 1.0 checkout windows from Visa and MasterCard. The display 
of these screens on the merchant website indicates that the merchant supports 3DS 1.0 protocol on 
their checkout system. It can be observed from MasterCard SecureCode screen that 3DS 1.0 can be 
extended to support Out-Of-Band authentication where a password is sent to the customer to their 
registered mobile devices. We will further discuss OOB authentication in Chapter 7 where we discuss 
the authentication methods supported by 3D Secure 2.0. 
Figure 25 on the next page shows actions and parties involved in a 3DS 1.0 payment process. As 
discussed, a 3DS 1.0 enabled transaction adds an extra phase of user-authentication over the 
authorisation-only protocol. Therefore, the phases of a 3DS 1.0 enabled transaction includes: user-
authentication, payment authorisation, payment clearance and payment settlement. 
 
 
Figure 24 - 3D Secure 1.0 checkout windows from Visa and MasterCard 
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5.4.1.1 User-authentication Phase 
1) The first step involves the customer/cardholder entering their payment card details on the 
payment page of the online merchant website. The merchant controls which data fields are 
used to authorise the payment. At this step, merchant has enough card data to start transaction 
process. 
2) The merchant server hosts Merchant Plugin (MPI): a software module that process payer 
authentication and authorisation messages. To ensure that the card number is enrolled for 
authentication, MPI builds a Verification Request (VEReq) message and forwards it to the 
Directory Server. 
3) The Directory Server (DS) maintains a list of all card issuing banks that support payer 
authentication schemes. If the card number is in the participating range, DS requests Issuers 
Authentication Server to determine whether the card number is enrolled for authentication. 
4) Issuer Authentication Server (IAS) serves two integral functions: Firstly, it will validate the 
card number in VEReq is enrolled for authentication. Secondly, it stores all the customer 
authentication data (passwords, security questions or PIN) to facilitate the actual cardholder 
authentication process. IAS responds to DS, indicating whether authentication is available for 
the card number. If the cardholder is not enrolled in the system, the card issuing bank 
connects to the cardholder and registers the cardholder with the 3DS 1.0 system. For this 
transaction, we assume the cardholder is enrolled with 3DS 1.0 and the authentication is 
available. 
5) The MPI receives a Verification Response (VERes) from the DS. 
6) MPI combines the transaction data and customer card details in a single Payer Authentication 
Request (PAReq) to IAS via the customer’s browser. 
 
Figure 25 - Actions and parties involved in a 3DS 1.0 payment process 
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7) IAS receives PAReq from the MPI. IAS maintain a history list of all previous transactions for 
the given card number. The history list can be used as records in case of any disputed 
transactions. 
8) IAS authenticates customer as appropriate owner for the card number, then formats the Payer 
Authentication Response (PARes) message with a cryptographic hash (CAVV) which is later 
used by authorisation server to verify the integrity of a message. 
9) IAS returns PARes to the MPI via shopper’s browser. IAS maintains a copy of Payer 
Authentication Response for the transaction 
10) The MPI receives PARes. Merchant now has all the data required to submit an authorisation 
request. 
 
5.4.1.2 Authorisation Phase 
11) The MPI passes the PARes + Authorisation request (AuthzReq) to their chosen payment 
acquirer, which provides a service of authorising and processing the merchant’s payment 
request. The payment acquirer on behalf of the merchant can also implement additional 
security filters at this point. 
12) The Payment acquirer then connects the merchant to the card payment network to request 
payment from the customer’s bank account held at the card issuing bank. The payment 
networks provide the link between payment acquirers and the thousands of card-issuing 
banks. 
13) The payment network now forwards the PARes + Authz request to the Issuer Authorisation 
Server. The Issuer Authorisation Server holds the customer’s bank account and makes the 
final approval of the payment. The issuer has access to information such as account balance, 
customer name and full address not visible to the rest of the payment network. 
14) In this step, the Issuer Authorisation Server checks the cryptographic hash received in PARes 
matches with a copy stored in the IAS. 
15) The Issuer authorisation server responds payment network with the authorisation response. 
17) The payment confirmation from the payment acquirer is passed to the merchant from where it 
is forwarded to the customer. 
The payment-clearance and payment-settlement phase of a 3DS 1.0 transaction are similar to the 
authorisation-only protocol and so are omitted in this section for brevity. Table 6 shows the 3DS 1.0 
transaction data that is passed from the when the customer clicks the “pay” button on the 3DS 1.0 
enabled merchant website. The merchant collects this data to frame a PaReq message and the 
transaction is processed as described in the authentication phase.  
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Table 6. 3DS 1.0 transaction data passing from merchant to acquirer 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//Worldpay//DTD Worldpay PaymentService v1//EN" 
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService_v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="098749304394857<!--Enter your own merchant code--> 
<submit> 
  <order orderCode="9842408"> <!--Enter a unique order code each time--> 
    <description>YOUR DESCRIPTION</description>  
    <amount value="2000" currencyCode="EUR" exponent="2"/> 
    <orderContent> 
      <![CDATA[]]> 
    </orderContent> 
    <paymentDetails> 
      <CARD-SSL>  
        <cardNumber>4444333322221111</cardNumber><!-This is a test card number--> 
        <expiryDate> 
          <date month="01" year="2020"/> 
</expiryDate> 
 <cardHolderName>3D</cardHolderName> 
  <cardAddress>  
    <address> 
            <address1>Worldpay</address1> 
            <address2>270-289 The Science Park</address2> 
            <address3>Milton Road</address3> 
            <postalCode>CB4 0WE</postalCode> 
            <city>Cambridge</city> 
            <countryCode>GB</countryCode> 
          </address> 
        </cardAddress> 
      </CARD-SSL> 
      <session shopperIPAddress="127.0.0.1" id="SESSION_ID"/> <!--Session id must be unique for each 
order--> 
    </paymentDetails> 
    <shopper> 
      <shopperEmailAddress>jshopper@myprovider.com</shopperEmailAddress> 
      <browser> 
        <acceptHeader>text/html</acceptHeader> 
        <userAgentHeader>Mozilla/5.0 ...</userAgentHeader> 
      </browser> 
    </shopper> 
  </order> 
</submit> 
</paymentService> 
 
Table 7 shows an example PAReq message as generated by MPI to request user-authentication via 
3DS 1.0 enabled IAS. The PAReq message is forwarded to the IAS (<issuerURL> shown in Table 7 
with a grey background represents the IAS URL) via the customer browser. 
Table 7. An example PaReq message 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//WorldPay//DTD WorldPay PaymentService v1//EN" 
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="098749304394857"> <!--The merchantCode you supplied in 
the order--> 
  <reply> 
    <orderStatus orderCode="ExampleOrder1"> <!--The orderCode you supplied in the order--> 
      <requestInfo> 
        <request3DSecure> <!--PaRequest must be supplied as-is. Do not truncate--> 
          <paRequest>eJxVUsFuwjAM/ZWK80aSUgpFJogNpHEo2hjTzlVr0Uq0KUkYsK+fUwpl72Q/2y/Jc2B2LvfeD2pTqGr
aE33e82YStrlGXHxietQoIUZjkh16RUYdQTge8DAII3846kl4n2/wIKFVkCTQ94HdUhrVaZ5UVkKSHl5Wayk6AGs5KFGvFo8lh+e
u71qHOjHmpHQmhT8IhuFoDOxOQZWUKL+V3md1cvEWWCqTqxpYw0OqjpXVFzn0aeiWwFHvZW5tPWGsUtqqylilEZjjgXV3fz+6yJD
Ouchk/DsX8XZ3Wi+WPP6YP2IKzHVAlliUPhchHwnf4+FkGEz8CFjDQ1K6C8jl18YTT5yTD1cCanfO/JoIV3gkgJahsUovMnIvv2e
A51pVSB1k/D2GDE0qLRrrkT2o6WxHAOve8vrmtpJasjYgDAg+4baapuDEC7JKRDxs1F0CzI2ydvWs/R4U/fs2f8B1wXg=</paReq
uest>  
          <issuerURL> 
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            <![CDATA[https://secure-
test.worldpay.com/jsp/test/shopper/ThreeDResponseSimulator.jsp]]> 
          </issuerURL> 
</request3DSecure> 
      </requestInfo>  
      <echoData>1374244409987691395</echoData> <!--For compatibility with older integrations - can 
be ignored--> 
    </orderStatus> 
  </reply> 
</paymentService> 
 
As discussed, once the card issuer authenticates the cardholder, it frames an ARes message and 
forwards it to the merchant MPI through the customer browser. Table 8 shows an example PaRes 
message.  
Table 8. An example PaRes message 
?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<!DOCTYPE paymentService PUBLIC "-//Worldpay//DTD Worldpay PaymentService v1//EN" 
  "http://dtd.worldpay.com/paymentService_v1.dtd"> 
<paymentService version="1.4" merchantCode="YOUR_MERCHANT_CODE">   
  <submit> 
    <order orderCode="jsxml3792597179"> <!--The order code from the first message--> 
      <info3DSecure> <!--PaResponse must be supplied as-is. Do not truncate--> 
        <paResponse>eJx9UlFvgjAQft+vILxrQQHBnDUsaMKDxkyW7JXABZsIuBaM+/e7VicuZvte2n739e67a2F5qY/WGaUS
bbOw3bFjW9gUbSmaamG/Z+tRaC85ZAeJmOyx6CVy2KBSeYWWKOmGF/hR6LmzwA9dm8MufkP1HBkrUTVYkuBWi1Op8QTYz5GSyuKQ
Nx2HvPh8TbfcHQDsxkGNMk0eQxqjQXeNAxuy7Xq9U2T7Ikqexn9iAUwroMw75BPHDZzA9S0nmnvRfBoAMzycdLq4bnvK7ToOsEcC
aD6SxvfFo1kI7H4CvJzaBklBHd/3wAZvu3jLPcKUMCFcu9EsZB8cOlE/efKmwAwPqsu7XvE0WW2zdJ2uEmA3Cor8fOabf5s2EsBC
cMcnd7SaW/GxaqXoDrX2/JsApj0x89Qc9vSyVEwiM3M3X0NLHr/MyzdYf7wy</paResponse> 
      </info3DSecure> 
      <session id="ssn792597179"/> <!--The session id in the first message--> 
    </order> 
  </submit> 
</paymentService> 
 
5.4.1.3 3D Secure 1.0 Challenges 
Although 3DS 1.0 helps to reduce number of fraud and offers an extra layer of security for both 
cardholder and merchant, it does not solve all the problems. First of all, 3DS adds an extra step in the 
checkout process that complicates the payment process. During the checkout, the cardholder needs to 
enter his password in a separate pop-up window or enrol to the 3DS service if this has not been done 
before. This introduces a disruption on customer journey, which confuses customers and can lead to a 
reduction in the conversion rate. Additionally, 3DS 1.0 supports only browser-based purchases while 
in-app (mobile based) purchases were not supported. 
When implementing 3DS 1.0, the merchant can benefit from the liability shift from merchant to the 
issuer in case of fraud for 3DS 1.0 authorised transactions. On the other hand, the merchant needs to 
invest in additional components which may even increase the scope of their PCI-DSS certification. 
Moreover, the risk of dropping the conversion rate due to complication of the checkout process holds 
some merchants from implementing 3DS. 
Lastly, 3DS 1.0 can potentially be vulnerable to phishing and “man-in-the-middle” attacks. This is 
caused by the redirection to another URL for the 3DS process. An attacker can generate a similar 
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looking pop-up window that can steal personal information or download malicious content on the 
computer of the customer.   
 3D Secure 2.0 (3DS 2.0) 
As online fraud rates were steadily increasing, the European Commission (EC), in the year 2015 
emanated with their interest to secure the card payments. The EC published the Payment Services 
Directive 2015/2366 (PSDII) [92], a regulatory standard, which ruled card issuing banks within 
Europe to mandate Strong Customer Authentication (SCA) for each online payment transaction. With 
the PSD-II, SCA is required to be carried out by combining two out of the three following elements: 
something you are (e.g. biometrics), something you have (e.g. a token generator) and something you 
know (e.g. a password). However, payment industry stakeholders expressed concerns that the 
methods proposed in the PSD-II for SCA ignored the objectives of user-friendliness. As proven with 
the adoption of 3DS1.0, more steps in the checkout process will have serious implication on the 
customer experience. The stakeholders rather argued that the PSD-II should exempt the compulsion of 
SCA on every transaction and allow card issuing banks freedom to perform selective authentication 
through Transaction Risk Assessments (TRAs). For card issuing banks, TRA prompted SCA only on 
payment transactions categorized as high risk of fraud. After a long negotiation of almost six months 
with over 200 payment industry stakeholders, the SCA requirements of PSD-II were replaced with 
Transaction Risk Assessment.  
With 3DS 2.0, the card issuing banks perform TRA and authenticate cardholders using either of the 
two schemes: Challenged and Frictionless authentication. Challenged authentication which is 
typically for a purchase with a high risk of fraud will have the card issuers prompting authentication 
challenge to cardholders (through software tokens like one-time pass-codes (OTP) or security 
questions). Schemes of user-authentication with OTP’s and security questions, are still vulnerable to 
real-time Manin-the-Middle (MitM) attacks. As demonstrated by Drimer et. al.[3] and RedTeam 
researchers [62], [63], attackers can initiate transaction with card issuing banks and synchronously 
request the cardholder to enter their one-time passcode information on phishing websites. However, 
real-time MitM kind of attacks would require a real time co-ordination between the attacker, the card-
issuing bank and the cardholder.  
The payment networks and card-issuing banks believes that 3DS 2.0 is a better solution to combat 
online payment fraud because as with the data provided by the payment networks [40][41] more than 
80% of the CNP transactions are processed through frictionless authentication which does not require 
any OTP yet provides a secure way of making purchase online. With Frictionless authentication, the 
customer will not be bothered to authenticate themselves in the checkout flow by inputting the 
information, rather, the card issuer will lean on “some” data from the customer machine to provide 
frictionless authentication. However, the 3DS 2.0 data used by the card issuer for frictionless 
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authentication is not defined in either the PSD II technical standard or the EMV 3DS 2.0 
specifications. We will learn more about 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication in Chapter 7 but what 
follows is the technical description of 3DS 2.0 challenged authentication as defined by the EMV 3DS 
2.0 specifications. 
A 3DS 2.0 challenged transaction can be broadly classified into four phases based on the order in 
which they occur. They are: User-authentication, Payment-authorisation, Payment-clearance and 
Payment-settlement. As we are primarily dealing with user-authentication and payment-authorisation, 
for brevity, we consider the other two payment process as out of scope of this section. Figure 26 - 
Parties and processes in 3DS 2.0 transaction 
5.4.2.1 User-authentication phase 
1) Figure 26 shows parties and process involved in a 3DS 2.0 transaction. After filling the 
checkout page and as the ‘Pay’ button is clicked, the payment card details along with customer 
browser’s (B1’s) HTTP headers and merchant session cookies are posted to the merchant. 
2) The merchant decides to have user-authentication enabled for this transaction. The merchant 
enables 3DS 2.0 protocol. 
 
Figure 26 - Parties and processes in 3DS 2.0 transaction 
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3) For the payment card provided at the checkout, the merchant in this step requests the ACS 
version number, 3DS Method URL (address of the ACS) and a unique 3DS Server Transaction 
ID from the 3DS Server. 
4) The 3DS Server responds back to the merchant with the ACS version number, 3DS Method 
URL and a unique 3DS Server Transaction ID. The merchant sends the ACS version number 
and 3DS Method URL to B1 for routing to the ACS. 
5) In step 5, B1 is connected to card issuer ACS, and this connection is made via the 3DS Method 
URL received from the previous step. The 3DS Server Transaction ID along with B1’s HTTP 
headers are passed to the ACS in this connection. 
6) The ACS can use this link to collect data from the customer machine. However, “The 
manner in which the issuer obtains the device information and which information is gathered 
is outside the scope the specification” (section 3.3, step 4 of 3DS 2.0 specifications [75]).  
7) The 3DS Server collects the necessary data from the merchant and frames an AReq message 
which is forwarded to the ACS.  
8) The Issuer performs Risk-Based Authentication (RBA) AReq and decides to have a 
challenged authentication for this transaction. Therefore, the issuer through Authentication 
Response (ARes) message responds back the 3DS Server indicating that the challenged 
authentication is required to further process the transaction. If the customer was 
authenticated using Frictionless authentication, the ARes will indicate a successful user-
authentication.  
9) The 3DS Server initiates a Challenge Request message (CReq) and posts it to the customer 
browser to redirect it to the ACS 
10) The CReq travels through the customer browser to the ACS. The link to CReq is achieved by 
connecting the customer session to the issuer using a URL that the merchant received in the 
ARes. 
11) The issuer having received a CReq message sends a challenge user interface (UI) to the 
customer browser. This UI is an interaction platform where the issuer can interact with the 
customer to obtain challenge responses. At this point, the card issuer prompts authentication 
challenge to the cardholders (through software tokens like One-Time Passcodes (OTP) or 
biometrics). 
12) Once successfully authenticated, the issuer determines the customer as appropriate owner of 
the payment card.  
13) The issuer formats the Results Request (RReq) message with a cryptographic hash which is 
forwarded to the 3DS Server. The RReq and the hash is later used by the Authorisation 
network to verify the integrity of authentication messages. 
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14 To acknowledge the receipt of the RReq, the 3DS server prepares the Results Response 
(RRes) and forwards it to the ACS. 
15 Finally, the issuer formats the Challenge Response (CRes) message and shuttles it to the 3DS 
Server which later forwards the CRes to the merchant (not shown in figure) through the link 
it received in the CReq message. The CRes indicates the completion of challenged 
authentication for the cardholder. 
5.4.2.2 Payment-authorisation 
During the payment-authorisation phase, the merchant builds the Authorisation Request message 
(AzReq) which includes the RReq message and a hash received in the previous phase. The AzReq is 
forwarded to the Issuer Authorisation Server which checks the correctness of RReq message with a 
copy stored in the ACS. If the customer account has enough money for the item at the checkout, and if 
the account is in good standings, the authorisation response (AzRes) is sent back to the 3DS server 
indicating a confirmation of payment. The merchant and the customer are further notified of the 
completion of a purchase. Later the merchant and the acquirer process the relevant authorisation and 
settlement messages. 
5.4.2.3 3DS 2.0 Advantages 
The introduction of EMV 3DS 2.0 has several advantages that allows enhanced security of online 
CNP payment transactions while optimising the cardholder’s experience. Merchants will be able to 
make their checkout process smoother and available through different channels/devices without 
compromising security. 3DS 2.0 allows the non-payment authentication flow that enables merchants 
to offer additional secure non-payment services. Furthermore, 3DS 2.0 allows for further development 
of risk-based authentication techniques for cardholder authentication. Based on their internal rules, 
issuers would be able for example to authorise low value transaction without additional interaction 
with the cardholder. 
Dismissing of the 3DS 1.0 requirement to authenticate the customer in a different screen than the 
merchant’s website will not only enhance the user experience but also reduce the chance of phishing 
and “man-in-the-middle” attacks. Moreover, not relying on the static password will allow the use of 
new authentication options such as biometrics through Out-Of-Band (OOB) or One-Time Password 
(OTP). 3DS 2.0 focuses on interoperability not just across various card association services but across 
both the desktop and mobile based platforms. Besides, the powerful driver of EMV 3DS 2.0, at least 
in the European Union is the Payment Service Directive 2 (PSD 2) that mandates the use of strong 
customer authentication for both types of payments: mobile and browser based.  
Ultimately, 3DS 2.0 tends to solve multiple technical pain points of 3DS 1.0. Such as the reduction of 
customer confusion, making the checkout process smoother for both browser based and mobile based 
purchases, the introduction of a frictionless authentication flow, non-payment authentication flow and 
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enhanced security. However, to ensure success of 3DS 2.0 both issuers and merchants need to actively 
participate in the 3DS 2.0 program. Otherwise there is a risk that EMV 3DS 2.0 may share similar 
technical and business challenges as 3DS v1.0. To summarise, 3DS 2.0 have the following advantages 
over 3DS 1.0 protocol: 
 Support of in-app purchases on mobile phone and other customer devices. 
 Enable merchants to integrate the authentication process into their checkout experiences, for 
both app and browser-based implementations. 
 Enable the issuing banks to perform risk-based decisions on the transaction authorisation that 
enables frictionless consumer authentication when the customer is not required to perform an 
additional authentication to the bank. 
 Enables non-payment customer authentication that allows services like Identification & 
Verification (ID&V) for mobile wallets and secure request of tokens for card on file. 
5.5 Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) Protocol 
Secure electronic transaction (SET) is a secure protocol jointly developed in 1996 by MasterCard and 
Visa with the backing of Microsoft, Netscape, IBM, GTE, SAIC, and other companies to facilitate 
credit card transactions over the Internet. The objective of SET is to provide security for credit card 
payments as they traverse the Internet from the customer to the merchant sites and onto the processing 
banks. SET has been developed to secure the entire credit card payment process, including verifying 
that the consumer is indeed the owner of the credit card. Although Visa and MasterCard have publicly 
stated that the goal of proposing the SET protocol is to establish a single method for consumers and 
merchants to conduct payment card transactions on the Internet, acceptance of the standard has been 
slow. 
SET was never implemented practically, it is still nonetheless, but it laid foundational requirement for 
a much secure CNP payment eco-system. The SET specification uses public key cryptography and 
digital certificates for validating all participants in the transaction. In contrast to the SSL protocol, 
which only provides confidentiality and integrity of credit card information while in transit, the SET 
protocol provides confidentiality of information, payment data integrity, user and merchant 
authentication, consumer nonrepudiation, and payment clearinghouses (certificates). 
The major components of SET are as follows: 
1. The issuer (or customer’s bank) is a financial institution that issues bankcards (credit cards or 
debit cards). 
2. The customer (or cardholder) is an authorised user of the bankcard who is registered with 
SET. The customer participates in the SET transaction by use of an electronic wallet. SET 
calls this the cardholder wallet. This is where the customer/consumer’s credit card 
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information is stored in an encrypted manner. The wallet software is able to communicate and 
interoperate with other SET components. 
3. The merchant is the seller of goods and services. The merchant uses the merchant server 
software to automatically process credit card authorisations and payments. 
4. The payment gateway processes merchant authorisation requests and payment messages 
including payment instructions from cardholders. It is operated by either an acquirer or some 
other party that supports acquirers (for example, the merchant’s bank). It interfaces with 
financial networks to support the capture of SET transactions. 
5. One or more certification authorities’ issue and verify digital certificates related to public 
keys of customers, merchants, and/or the acquirers or their gateways. The SET public key 
infrastructure proposes a top-down hierarchy of certification authorities comprising the 
following types: 
 Root certification authority: All certification paths start with this authority’s public 
key. It is operated by an organization that the entire industry agrees to trust. The 
initial root key is built into the SET software with provision for replacing it in the 
future. It issues certificates to brand certification authorities. 
 Brand certification authority: These authorities are operated by different credit card 
brand owners like Visa and MasterCard. Each brand has considerable autonomy as to 
how it manages the certificate subtree rooted at it. 
 Geo-political certification authority: This is an optional level of certification 
authority. It allows a brand to distribute responsibility for managing lower level 
certificates across different geographic or political regions. This is to account for 
variations in how financial systems operate in different regions.  
 Cardholder certification authority: These authorities generate and distribute 
cardholder certificates to cardholders. Depending on brand rules, the certification 
authority maybe operated by an issuer or other party. 
 Merchant certification authority: These authorities issue certificates to merchants 
based on approval by an acquirer. 
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The SET infrastructure is deliberately planned not to interoperate with any other payment 
infrastructure other than the bankcard system. Although this may be considered a restriction of SET, it 
ensures that the operating organisations are not subjected to any unknown risks. The main steps of 
SET are described in Figure 27. The sequence can be summarized as follows: 
1. Customer and merchant registration: In this step (messages 0 in Figure 27), the customer and 
the merchant acquire relevant certificates from the corresponding authorities that will allow 
them to participate in the transaction. This needs to be done once before any SET transaction 
and needs to be re-executed if the certificates expire or are revoked. 
2. Browse and negotiate purchase: This step (message 1) proceeds in an offline manner; it 
allows the customer to select the product and negotiate on a price. SET is not involved in this 
phase. 
3. Purchase request: Once the customer has completed the product selection process, it invokes 
the cardholder wallet software on its machine. This is where the main SET protocol starts 
(message 2). The cardholder wallet initiates a SET session with the merchant server; it sends 
its certificate to the merchant and requests a copy of the merchant’s certificate and the 
payment gateway’s certificate. On receipt of these, the cardholder wallet creates a payment 
information (PI) and an order information (OI). The PI includes the cardholder’s credit card 
account information and public key certificate, among others. The OI includes necessary 
information about the order. Two digests are computed, one each for PI and OI. They are 
concatenated and signed by the customer’s private key. The PI is encrypted with the payment 
gateway’s public key. Next, the OI and encrypted PI are together encrypted with the 
 
Figure 27 SET Steps  
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merchant’s public key. Finally, the entire message is signed and sent to the merchant server. 
The merchant server verifies the cardholder’s certificate. It verifies the signature on the PI and 
OI. If it agrees to OI, it forwards the encrypted PI to the payment gateway for authorisation 
(message 3). While waiting for authorisation, the merchant prepares an order confirmation 
(OC), signs it with its private key, and sends it encrypted with the customer’s public key. 
4. Payment authorisation: To request payment authorisation, the merchant sends the encrypted 
PI (received in step 3) signed with its private key (message labeled 3) to the payment 
gateway. The payment gateway verifies the merchant’s signature on the message, decrypts the 
PI with its private key, and retrieves the customer’s certificate. It then verifies the relevant 
signature and performs an authorisation at the issuer (message 4). When the issuer authorises 
payment (message 5), the payment gateway generates an authorisation response (AR) and a 
capture token (CT). Both are signed by the payment gateway’s private key and sent to the 
merchant encrypted with the latter’s public key. The merchant, on receipt, stores the payment 
authorisation response and capture token for later use. 
5. Payment capture: The merchant prepares a payment capture request with the transaction 
identifier from the original OI and the CT obtained earlier. It signs the capture request (CR) 
and sends it encrypted with the payment gateway’s (PG) public key (message 7). The 
payment gateway verifies the capture request message and sends a clearing request message 
to the issuer (CLR) (message 8). When the issuer clears the payment (message 9), the 
payment gateway generates a capture response (CR) and sends it encrypted with the 
merchant’s public key. The merchant stores the CR and completes the transaction with the 
customer. 
A major advantage of using SET over the SSL protocol for electronic credit card payment is that SET 
does not allow the merchant to view the customer’s complete credit card information, which provides 
an additional degree of protection. In addition, SET prevents the payment gateway and/or the issuer 
bank from being able to view the terms of the transaction established between the merchant and the 
customer. This way the privacy of the customer is also enhanced. However, SET has received a 
lukewarm reception in the payment industry and, so far, has not attracted a large number of merchants 
and consumers, though it seems to be the “best” protocol for securing payment over the otherwise 
unsecured Internet. 
5.6 Conclusion 
Ensuring the security of online CNP payment transactions is a fundamental requirement for commerce 
over the Internet. Lack of trust in an online store, fear of financial loss through theft of a credit card or 
other banking information, and other concerns over the privacy of information transmitted to and 
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stored by an online store are just some of the concerns faced by consumers in CNP payment 
transactions. 
Secure communication protocols such as SSL and TLS can be used to secure Web based sessions 
including commercial data transactions. Although these protocols can authenticate both parties and 
provide privacy in the transaction, they do not provide protocols for payment. To fill this void, a 
number of payment systems have emerged, from authorisation-only systems to 3D Secure 2.0.  
The differences between the two systems point to the advantages and disadvantages of both 
approaches. Authorisation-only systems provide high accountability, real-time online verification of 
payment for merchants, and the ability to use the existing back-end financial infrastructure for settling 
payments between banks. Authorisation-only systems also provide a high level of security because all 
transactions are traceable, and the value of the transactions never actually leaves the banks. The trade-
off for consumers, however, is the lack of confidentiality and privacy provided in authorisation-only 
transactions. All transactions are mediated by financial institutions or a third party, so it is entirely 
possible that complete spending profiles for consumers can be collected and potentially used for 
purposes that are often equated with “big brother” intrusive oversight. Also, the payment card details 
are shared with each merchant that the customer shops with.  
Authentication-enabled payment systems, on the other hand, offer the ‘potential’ for anonymity. 
Although authentication-enabled systems have numerous advantages, the usability and security risk 
associated with the protocol have help up widespread adoption. The combination of online 
verification and the ability to support small-value transactions over the internet and in specialised 
applications may end up being the most viable economic model for launching the widespread 
adoption of the protocol globally.
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Chapter 6. Distributed Guessing Attack 
 
In this chapter we present our work in conducting an in-depth investigation of authorisation-only CNP 
protocol and the state-of-affairs with respect to payment security. In this process, we have discovered 
certain weakness in the online CNP payment system which allowed us to formulate an attack we call 
“Distributed Guessing Attack”.  The attack effectively turns the process that is meant to validate the 
card payment details into a process which delivers to the attacker all card data required to make an 
online payment. The attack has a potential to subvert security filters in place to protect CNP payment 
system from fraud. 
The chapter is divided into following sections; section 6.1 gives a brief description of the 
vulnerabilities and introduces the distributed guessing attack. Section 6.2 details the controls that are 
in place to protect the authorisation-only CNP payment from fraud. Section 6.4 will describe the 
techniques and tools we used for vulnerability assessment against authorisation-only protocol, section 
6.6 will outline the attack scenario and experimental work carried-out to demonstrate the attack, 
section 6.7 will detail the attack landscape, in section 6.8 we will detail the vulnerability disclosure 
exercise that we initiated to disclose the vulnerabilities to affected parties and finally in section 6.9 we 
will discuss potential solutions to address the vulnerabilities and conclusion. 
6.1 The Attack 
A CNP payment is effectively a “card-not-present” credit or debit card transaction, which means the 
merchant cannot physically verify that the customer actually has the card. The security of CNP 
payment is therefore dependent upon the customer correctly entering a number of data fields – which 
only the valid owner of the card should know. Our experimental work has shown that many online 
payment systems can be subverted to generate the payment validation data fields (card number, expiry 
date, CVV2 and cardholder address) when these data are not known.  
To obtain card details, one can use a web merchant’s payment page to guess the data: the merchant’s 
reply to a transaction attempt will state whether the guess was correct or not. The reason this attack 
works in practice is due to two weaknesses, each not too severe on its own, but when used together 
present a serious risk to the global payment system.  
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The first weakness is that in many settings, the current online payment system does not detect multiple 
invalid payment requests on the same card from different websites. Effectively, this implies that 
practically unlimited guesses can be made by distributing the guesses over many websites, even if 
individual websites limit the number of attempts.  
Secondly, the attack scales well because different web merchants requests the customer to provide 
different card data fields, and therefore allow the guessing attack to obtain the desired card 
information one field at a time. To understand how essential the scaling issue is, we look at the 
differences in websites in some more detail. The data fields that web merchants use can be divided 
into three categories: 
 2 fields: PAN + Expiry date (the absolute minimum)  
 3 fields: PAN + Expiry date + CVV2  
 4 fields: PAN + Expiry date + CVV2 + Address  
Figure 16 shows the distributed guessing attack processes. Starting with a valid card number (PAN), 
to guess the expiry date an attacker can utilise several merchants’ websites that check only two fields: 
the card number and the expiry date. Once the expiry date is known, the attacker can use it along with 
the card number to guess the CVV2 information using another set of websites that check 3 fields (the 
card number, the expiry date, and the CVV2). 
For many purposes, knowing the PAN, expiry date and CVV2 is sufficient to use a card online, but 
for some purchases, an attacker would also need to obtain address information. To guess address 
information, the attacker needs to use websites that ask for 4 fields.  
 
Figure 28 - Distributed guessing attack process 
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We will demonstrate that the potential impact of the attack is substantial because by exploiting the 
vulnerabilities an attacker can generate a database of usable payment card details in a matter of few 
seconds. 
The vulnerabilities described in this chapter apply to cards that do not enforce centralised checks 
across transactions from different sites. Our experiments were conducted using Visa and MasterCard 
only. Whereas MasterCard’s centralised network detects the guessing attack after fewer than 10 
attempts (even when those attempts were distributed across multiple websites), Visa’s payment 
ecosystem does not prevent the attack. Because Visa is the most popular payment network in the 
world, the discovered vulnerabilities greatly affect the entire global online payments system. 
The vulnerabilities and the attack scenario that we discuss later in this chapter involves exploiting the 
weakness in the fraud protection filters that are in place to protect the CNP payment system from 
fraud. Therefore, to have a complete understanding on working of the distributed guessing attack, in 
what follows is a brief introduction of online CNP transaction safeguards. 
6.2 Online CNP Transaction Safeguards 
Card issuing banks and payment acquirers regularly monitor activities on customers’ accounts to 
check if any of those have a risk of being fraudulent.  Investigating every transaction in real time is a 
complex task which can only be achieved by employing a suite of fraud protection software. In this 
section, we describe the fraud protection tools and filters (often called “controls”) provided by online 
merchant, payment acquirers and card issuing banks.  
 Address Verification System (AVS) 
AVS can be used by merchants to validate the billing address provided by the customer at the 
checkout page against the address information stored at the card-issuing bank. AVS is an issuer-side 
control, which means enquiries are made during authorisation phase. The issuing bank will respond to 
the payment acquirer’s request with the result of the authorisation process, along with an AVS 
response code. A response code can either be a “full match”, “no match” or “partial match” and it is 
completely up to the merchant to decide whether to evaluate the response code and take the 
appropriate action based on their risk management plan, or not. Regardless of the value of the AVS 
response, the merchant can still proceed with accepting the transaction as long as there is an 
acknowledgement of successful authorisation from the issuing bank. AVS can be further improved at 
the payment acquirer level through the provision of: 
 International Shipping/Billing Address Checks (ISF): This flag is used by the merchant to 
screen orders requested to be shipped or completed to foreign country. Such transactions 
trigger ISF flag and a merchant may either decline a transaction or evaluate it with further 
verification checks. 
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 International AVS Check: Some merchants limit their services only to domestic customer. 
For example, Visa checkout [95] only allows US based customers to register their cards on 
their payment system. Any transactions made using cards issued by foreign banks are 
declined. 
 Shipping/Billing Address Mismatch Checks: Orders with different shipping and billing 
address are either declined or evaluated with further verification checks.   
 Postal code Risk List Match Checks: Payment acquirers maintain a history of all fraudulent 
transactions made at specific address zones. New orders involving risk zones trigger this flag, 
indicating the possibility of new fraudulent transaction. However, there is a problem here. 
Our experiments have confirmed that different websites perform varying levels of validation 
upon the address field and the address validation is only on the numeric digits: 
o Full Validation: the website validates the full postcode digits and the house number, 
against the address details held by the issuing bank for the cardholder. 
o Postcode validation: the website validates the full postcode digits ignoring the door 
number against the details held by the issuing bank. 
o Postcode prefix validation: the website validates only the prefix of the postcode, for 
example if the cardholder’s full postcode was AB1 2CD the website would validate 
as correct any postcode starting with 12. 
 Card Security Code Checks  
Issuing banks can also perform CVV2 checks during payment authorisation. For a given PAN, the 
system generates the CVV2 using (keys) and compare it against value provided by the customers 
during checkout. Results are later made available for merchants (match or no-match) to decide the 
outcome for purchase request.   
At this point, it is very important to note the shift of liability. Regardless of the outcome from the 
AVS and CVV2 filters, banks take no responsibility, therefore merchants have to reimburse the card 
holders for any transactions that are later marked as fraudulent. Card Issuer banks takes fraud liability 
only for 3D Secure enabled transactions. 
 Email Service Provider (ESP) and IP Risk List Match Filter  
This filter screens for the transaction requests originating from specific domain email addresses. 
Standard email service providers sometimes keep track of their users’ behaviour which may also 
include traceable information such as IP address and location information [96]. Not to get traced, 
fraudsters can use completely random and disposable email addresses which are valid only for a few 
minutes. Such email id’s are freely available online through domains like [97] and requires no prior 
user registration. ESP put a hold on any transaction made using fake and short-lived email addresses 
and warn merchants about the likelihood of cheat. 
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 Velocity Checks 
 One way to detect potentially fraudulent activities is by monitoring the number of invalid login 
attempts made in a certain time span. Attackers can develop and use automated tools against checkout 
systems to learn passwords and another login information. PCI DSS in requirement 8.1.6 [21] 
describes testing procedures and guidance to be adopted against brute force attacks to gain 
unauthorised control of a user account. The requirement states that the procedure to be taken is to 
restrict continuous login attempts and lock out the affected user account temporarily after five or more 
attempts. This is called “velocity check” and there are two types of velocity checks that are of 
importance here: 
 IP Address Velocity Checks: Blocking legitimate access to a customer account can 
adversely affect the customer’s experience and ultimately might cause loss of business to the 
merchants. Merchants and acquirers must, therefore, operate an intelligent approach, for 
example by blocking IP address of known malicious customers attempting to brute force the 
login, while letting through legitimate customers. Any consecutive login requests originating 
from blacklisted IP addresses are either blocked or are evaluated under PAN velocity rules 
which is explained later on. 
Limitations: IP address velocity filter works well for login requests originating from static IP 
addresses. However, attackers can trick the IP velocity filters by making use of dynamic IP 
addresses. Moreover, many proxy servers and internet service providers forward requests 
from customers by routing them to merchant websites through a static IP. In such 
transactions, IP addresses recorded are of proxy servers’ and not of the actual customers’. 
This will trigger the IP velocity filter to reject the transactions. The bottom line is that 
fraudsters using a proxy account are harder to track. 
 Account/PAN Velocity Checks. Just as IP velocity filters tracks IP addresses, acquirers or 
merchants can use the account number velocity checks to keep an eye on the frequency of use 
for card numbers. The advantage of using PAN velocity filters is that: if an attacker bypasses 
the IP filters, multiple purchase requests targeting compromised card number can still be 
tracked. For example, in the latest payment processing schemes like Verified by Visa and 
MasterCard Secure Code, irrespective of customers’ IP address, cards are blocked for making 
payment after four invalid transaction attempts. 
 Transaction Amount Checks  
When it comes to electronic purchase on the Internet, transactions can be of any value and/or 
currency. Largest single online CNP transaction recorded is amounted to 40000000 US DOLLAR(S) 
by Mark Cuban in 1999 [98]. Card details if compromised, attackers can effort buying a high-value 
product or can make multiple shots of lower value. To safeguard customers from such attacks, 
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banking systems usually marks higher value purchase as suspicious until the transaction is actually 
verified by real cardholders. 
6.3 Limitations of CNP Safeguards 
With this short survey on fraud filters we observed several inconsistencies and limitations within the 
implementation of fraud filters. 
 Fraud protection controls are not made mandatory by card issuing banks to be implemented 
by the online merchants. This is also reflected in every merchant online payment 
implementation guide [34, 35, 46, 49]. 
 For online merchants several fraud protection controls like Address Verification Systems 
(AVS), email service provider and IP risk list match filter comes at an extra cost. The online 
merchant may opt-out of choosing advanced fraud filters, but this comes at a risk of less 
secured checkout system. 
 As standards do not define any requirement for velocity filters (IP address and PAN velocity 
checks), this leaves payment acquirers and online merchants more open options for 
determining precise limits of invalid attempts. 
  The more security filters implemented by the online merchant, the more fields a customer has 
to fill in the checkout and less convenient it is for the customer to make payment. 
 There are already established limitations with IP velocity filters on their limited ability to 
keep track of attackers operating from dynamic IP addresses. 
All these inconsistencies in the ways that an authorisation-only transaction is assessed made us to 
design experiments to assess their security. 
6.4 Vulnerability Assessment Landscape 
 Selection of Websites 
This study was conducted on over a total of 400 global commercial websites. The selection of 
websites was based on a maximum number of visitors as provided by Alexa web traffic analysis. In 
some cases, it was required for us to study the websites that we have been regularly using, this 
answers our question on whether the loyalty of returning customers over the web merchant have any 
change in efficiency of security filters. Since some web merchants redirect or host the payment page 
to the supported payment acquirers (hosted checkout), for websites we studied, we made sure that 
they accept and support at least one or more type of payment card - credit card, debit card, prepaid 
card. We also created new accounts on various payment sites with account holder’s name that do not 
match the names printed on the payment cards. This is to replicate the situation where the attacker 
might not necessarily know the cardholders name, and to illustrate the issue that hardly any of existing 
online payment systems cross check the cardholder’s name.  
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 Test cards 
In total 11 test cards were included in the research: divided between nine Visa cards and two 
MasterCard cards. Details of the type of card used, masked card numbers, range of expiry dates and 
CVV2’s are shown in Table 9. All test cards used belonged to our research team. It is true that we 
have all the card details, but we configure the bots to replicate the situation whereby these pieces of 
information are not known to the attacker at the beginning. 
All the experiments we performed were from a Windows 10 machine, with Chrome web browser. To 
automate the interaction with web stores where required, we designed a website bot using Selenium 
web drivers and AutoIt scripts. 
 Software Tools 
To test the websites and validate our research, we have implemented a number of software tools, 
which demonstrate the viability and practicality of the attack. (We stress that we only tried the tools 
on our own credit/debit cards.) The tools consist of two separate applications: 
Automated web crawlers to automate the process of guessing the remaining card details. There are 
two types of bots implemented:  
 Website bot, as introduced in Chapter 4, a website bot can run the experiments against fraud 
prevention filters. Website bot can also be used to brute force expiry dates, CVV2 values and 
postcodes until the selected website or group of websites API returns a true value (indicating 
a successful attack) or the website’s limit on the number of attempts has been reached (failed 
attack). 
 AutoIt scripts. An AutoIt [99] script, which interfaces with a well-known service provider in 
order to brute force CVV2 guesses until this service provider accepts the card for a correct 
 
Table 9 - Test cards used for experiments 
Card Ref Card Type Card Number Expiry Date CVV2 
V1 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-1010 06/2017 126 
V2 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-4009 03/2018 577 
V3 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-2617 05/2017 349 
V4 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-9010 02/2018 022 
V5 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-8649 04/2016 927 
V6 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-5027 10/2015 954 
V7 Visa 4xxx-xxxx-xxxx-1719 07/2018 614 
M1 MC 5xxx-xxxx-xxxx-8565 08/2016 090 
M2 MC 5xxx-xxxx-xxxx-0106 07/2015 130 
 
Chapter 6 Distributed Guessing Attack  
 
86 
value of CVV2 (there is no limit enforced by this service provider regarding the number of 
guesses allowed, so this attack will eventually return a success all the time). An example 
AutoIt script to automate iTunes application is shown in the textbox below: 
$cvv = 001 
$password = "************" 
Run ("C:\Program Files\iTunes\iTunes.exe", "C:\Program Files\iTunes\") 
Sleep (5000) 
AutoItSetOption ("MouseCoordMode", 0) 
WinWait ("iTunes") 
WinActivate ("iTunes") 
MouseClick ("primary", 1046, 23, 1, 100) 
MouseClick ("primary", 1046, 172, 1, 0) 
Sleep (5000) 
Send ($password) 
Sleep (2000) 
Send ("{Enter}") 
Sleep (20000) 
MouseClick ("primary", 938, 273, 1, 50) 
Sleep (10000) 
MouseClick ("primary", 585, 281, 1, 200) 
Sleep (2000) 
Send ("100") 
Sleep (5000) 
Send ("{Enter}") 
For $cvv = 001 to 999 Step +1 
Sleep (10000) 
MouseClick ("primary", 594, 352, 1, 200) 
Sleep (5000) 
Send ("{BS 3}") 
Sleep (5000) 
Send ($cvv) 
Sleep (5000) 
Send ("{Enter}") 
Sleep (5000) 
Next 
 
Figure 29 - A snapshot of the Website bot 
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 NFC Android app: additionally, we programmed an NFC android skimming application 
capable of reading an EMV contactless payment card. When a card was scanned, the android 
application is capable to read the card number, the card’s expiry date and any additional 
payment application information available on the card’s contactless interface.  
6.5 Identification of the Vulnerabilities 
We started our assessments by selecting 50 websites from our 400 global commercial websites and 
created purchase orders of values ranging from £1-£500. Once we were directed by the website to the 
checkout page to pay for the checked items, we recorded and compared several features from websites 
which included: 
 Type of payment options available (card payment, cash-on-delivery) 
 the number of card data fields requested 
 the type of CNP payment protocol implemented by the web merchant (authorisation-only or 
authentication-enabled) 
 the support of multiple payment options 
Figure 31 - Illustrating the components of website-x checkout page. It can be observed from the figure 
that: (1) the type of payment cards supported, (2) Number of card data fields requested and (3) 
indicates the type of protocol used for accepting payment (as there is no ‘verified by payment-network 
icon, the website supports authorisation-only payment protocol). This created one entry in set of 
 
Figure 30 - Android app for NFC skimming 
Chapter 6 Distributed Guessing Attack  
 
88 
reference tables maintained to record checkout information from all the online merchants that we 
visited. Appendix D gives a reference table which documents the details that we captured from each 
website. Comparing Figure 31-33, it can be observed that different websites request different pieces 
of card information from their customers. 
 
 
Figure 31 - Illustrating the components of website-x checkout page 
 
 
Figure 32 - Illustrating the components of website-y checkout page 
 
 
Figure 33 - illustrating the components of website-z checkout page 
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6.6 Attack Scenario 
This section describes the distributed guessing attack scenario which is composed of three stages: 
generating the card data fields, creating a fraudulent account, and finally transferring the money. 
 Generating the card data fields 
Card data fields have a limited number of possible values (analysis of which is shown in Table 10). 
This means an automated web script (a “bot”) can cycle through these values in a short time to find 
the correct information. 
For example, to find the correct CVV2 value, the bot will simply need to cycle through the possible 
values starting at 001 until the website blocks further attempts (i.e. the attack has failed) or the 
website API returns a success. A handful of payment sites allow unlimited attempt, while most of the 
other payment sites allow ten or 50 attempts to enter a correct CVV2 value. This may not sound like a 
big number but coupled with another limitation in the global payment system (there is no evidence of 
coordination or synchronisation among various payment sites regarding a particular payment card), 
there exists a scenario of “farming out” the brute force attack to tens or even hundreds of payment 
systems, which practically means we can carry out unlimited guesses.  
Table 10 - Possible values of generating card data fields 
Field Possible Values 
Expiry Date Up to 60 possible values (12 months * 5 years) –average lifetime of credit 
cards is 3 years while debit cards are usually valid for 5 years. 
CVV2 999 possible values (001 to 999). 
Address of 
cardholder 
999 possible values in the United Kingdom. Address validation is performed 
for only the numeric digits of the postcode, a full list of which can be obtained 
from the internet. 
Name of 
cardholder 
Any random value can be entered.  Our research has found that the cardholder 
name is not validated on any of the payment websites we used in our 
experiments. 
 
6.6.1.1 Obtain PAN 
In the attack scenario described, the 16-digit card number (PAN) is the starting point for the 
generation of all of the other fields. We identify three methods of obtaining valid PANs:  
Prevalence of Card Number as a Plain text: The design of Europay MasterCard Visa (EMV) 
protocol [23][25] mandates the card number to be stored as plain text within the card’s memory; this 
enables even an illegitimate card reader to communicate and interpret the card details. Such an 
unusual design for a payment protocol offers opportunities for an attacker to obtain card details. It is 
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well-known for a contactless card that card number and expiry date could be skimmed from a distance 
with any NFC enabled device [29][32] and in fact, in a single google play search, we located 38 freely 
available Android apps which could be used by an attacker to read the contactless payment cards.  
Merchant Receipts. Another channel that for an attacker to follow to obtain the card number is from 
the merchant’s sales receipt from reader Point of Sale (POS) terminal. 
To maintain the sales records made using payment cards, in-store merchants store merchant copy of 
customer’s transaction. We found that the merchant copies from a number of high street retailers 
revealed their customer's complete credit card number and expiry date (shown in Figure 34). Worst of 
all, none of the merchants were educated about the risks of losing merchant copies, and few of the 
merchants even agreed to sell several merchant copies for under a pound. This means, whenever a 
customer uses their card with in-store retailers, there is a risk of card number being stolen. Just from 
around our organisation, we found 23 such retailers whose merchant copy revealed full card number 
and expiry date. 
Guessable Card Numbers We further investigated the possibility of an attacker generating payment 
card numbers and explored that an adversary can easy produce and validate a database of active 
payment card numbers as discussed below: 
The payment card numbering specifications are governed by the ISO/IEC 7812-1:2017 [100] and the 
ISO 10202-6:1994 [101]. Table 11 enumerates the useful insights that can be obtained from a credit 
card number. It can be learned from a card number that customer account number fills nine spaces and 
therefore, the maximum number of possible active card numbers for a bank would be one less to 109 
(a billion). An attacker starts after selecting target banks BIN (bank with a high number of customers 
would give high positives), randomly generates thousands of accounts number using Luhn’s check 
algorithm [102](or with automated bot) and makes transactions using the generated card numbers on 
online payment websites.  
 
Figure 34 - Merchant receipts obtained from different acquirers 
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Table 11 - Card number information fields (Numbering is from left to right) 
Card number: 4658 – 5900 – 0000 – 000C 
 First six digits: called as Bank Identification Number (BIN), identifies the card 
brand and issuing bank 
 Digits 7 to (15): assigned by the card issuing bank and denotes personal account 
number (shown as zero’s) 
 Last digit: akin to checksum (indicated by ‘C’), used by a computer to verify 
the card number entered is correct 
 
 
Figure 35- Response code revealing the validity of a card number 
 
 
Figure 36 - Payment cards belonging to the same cardholder and card numbers are shown 
issued in a sequence 
When a transaction is made, a transaction authorization request is sent by the merchant to the card 
issuing bank. The card issuing bank, through authorization response message (further discussed in 
next section), indicates to the merchant that the card number used while trying to make a purchase is 
not correct. For an attacker, the Authorization response will reveal the validity of a card number. For 
example, when we made a transaction with invalid card number on a merchant website-x (website 
name masked), we received the response as shown in Figure 35. If the card number was valid, the 
authorization only changes to indicate any other invalid card data element. A recent investigation into 
Tesco bank breach revealed that attackers used similar technique to exploit payment card details of 
around 9000 customers [20]. Additionally, we observed a weak security practice by a leading card 
issuer (name masked) while issuing the payment card numbers to their customers. We found that the 
card issuer issued payment card numbers in a serial guessable sequence. Shown in Figure 36, are three 
payment cards belonging to the same customer and card numbers are shown issued in a sequence with 
a difference of 8. 
Underground forums. It is well known that criminals sell credit card details in bulk online. They are 
pretty cheap to buy (especially if you only need the PAN and the expiry date information), so an 
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attacker can easily take this route to come up with the PAN (and the expiry date). In Appendix C, we 
identify 25 live underground forums where payment card details are still traded. 
6.6.1.2 Obtain Expiry Date 
Once the PAN is known, an attempt to obtain the expiry date can commence. In many cases, the 
expiry date can be obtained at the same time as the PAN, for example by using the NFC skimming 
method described above. But if that is not possible, a distributed brute force attack can be carried out. 
A bot or a script can be programmed to systematically guess the expiry date of a given PAN. As 
shown in Table 10, a maximum of 60 guesses will be needed to find the correct expiry date. Many 
payment sites are prone to this attack because they do not limit the number of attempts one can make 
to guess the expiry date, and they do not require CVV2 or address to be entered. 
Our experiments were successful in getting a valid expiry dates for each of our Visa test cards. 
Among 26 websites which were used to get expiry dates, two highly popular websites allowed us 
unlimited attempts to verify card number and expiry date match. 
6.6.1.3 Obtain CVV2 
The third stage of data generation involves getting the card’s CVV2 using the PAN and the expiry 
date information obtained in the first two stages. To achieve this, we need to configure the web bot to 
switch to payment websites that do not implement AVS filters for card verification or payment 
capture. For a given range of CVV2 guesses, the bot iterates over the list of selected websites and 
multiple instances can be run in parallel to speed up the experiments and to overcome the attempts 
 
Figure 37 - A website bot instance for finding expiry date 
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limit imposed by IP and PAN velocity filters. Figure 38 shows a screenshot of the bot trying to find a 
card’s CVV2 from 291 websites. 
More than 11,000 CVV2 iterations were performed using the web bot and scripts, and our 
experiments have found that there is no standard (or centrally imposed) limit on CVV2 attempts. We 
have managed to find valid CVV2 for all of our Visa test cards. 
6.6.1.4 Obtain Postcode 
The final stage is to get the postcode. BinDb [103] and ExactBins [104] are two well-known online 
databases that feature a list of card-issuing banks based on the 6-digit BIN. The free version of such 
online databases allow an attacker to learn about the card’s brand, issuing bank name, and card type. 
An example output from ExactBins is shown in Table 12 below. 
Once the issuing bank is known, the attacker can increase the probability of guessing the right 
postcode by assuming that the victim might be registered with one of the branches nearby – this is 
particularly relevant if the attacker uses NFC skimming to obtain the PAN and expiry date in the first 
place. Now, the web bot just needs to start brute force guesses from a list of issuing bank postcodes 
for a particular city where the card details have been skimmed from. 
We performed more than 3000 iterations to get first four characters of the postcode. We extended our 
experiments running multiple instances using our bot on the hosts that verify postcode and complete 
address. Hence, we achieved in getting the complete address for all our visa test cards.  
 
Figure 38 - A website bot instance for finding CVV2 
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There is no need to generate the cardholder name because this field is not verified by any payment 
systems, i.e. any value will be accepted by these systems. At this point, the attacker is ready to make 
fraudulent transaction or money transfer. 
 Transferring Money 
Once either two, three, or four fields of the card data have been obtained, the attacker can use them to 
purchase goods on a website. This is damaging enough for the owner of the card, but we looked at 
even more impactful attacks. Rather than buying online goods from an online merchant website, we 
created an attack scenario that uses the card details to open a money transfer account, sends the 
money to an anonymous recipient abroad, where the money is picked up within minutes of issuing the 
transfer. The attacker needs to be able to clear the funds before the issuing bank reverses the payment 
and thwarts the attack. It is therefore desirable from the attacker’s point of view that the funds are 
transferred to an account outside the country (because it is more time consuming and costly to reverse 
payment across countries) or be conducted through a wire transfer to an anonymous cash recipient by 
using services such as the Western Union. 
 In our experiment, the card information extracted using our bot was used to create a bogus account 
from which we transferred money to a recipient in India. Within minutes, we received a confirmation 
email for the order made, and our contact confirmed the pick-up of the money. The time it took from 
the process of creating an account to collecting the money at the destination was only 27 minutes, 
which is short enough to avoid the bank reversing the payment. 
6.7 Guessing Attack as Systemic Problem 
Our brute force attack experiments have demonstrated an important vulnerability in online payment 
systems whereby the variations in payment security settings across multiple online merchants’ 
websites could be exploited to make fraudulent online payments. 
In order to further illustrate the feasibility of such attack, we carried out a comprehensive survey of 
existing online payment technology, in which we examined the payment security settings of the top 
400 Alexa rated commercial websites [105], including many top global websites such as iTunes, 
Google, PayPal and Amazon.  Our survey has documented the following aspects: 
Table 12 - A sample of the information given by ExactBins 
BIN 465859 
Card Brand VISA 
Issuing Bank Barclays Bank PLC 
Card Type Debit 
Card Level Classic 
ISO Country Name United Kingdom 
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 the data fields requested by each merchant to authorise an online payment 
 the number of incorrect attempts for each of these fields 
 the presence (if any) of additional security features selected by online merchants such as 
Verified by Visa and MasterCard SecureCode 
 sites which supported alternative payment methods, such as PayPal, where the customer was 
not asked for their credit card details 
The aim of the survey is to assess the nature and scope of the vulnerability described in Section 6.6. 
We would like to find out whether this vulnerability only affect a few merchants with poor 
implementation of their online payments (in which case our attack scenario would only have a very 
limited impact), or whether this was as a result of a systemic problem created by the underlying 
regulations and design of the payment networks (which makes our attack scenario feasible and 
practical). 
Unfortunately, our survey shows that this is indeed a systemic problem, affecting all websites 
including the most popular online retailers. 
 Survey Results 
Our survey results (detailed in Table 13 - Variation in payment security settings of online payment 
websites) show that the attack described in Section 6.6 is a credible threat.  The variations in online 
merchants’ payment security settings exist in large enough numbers to be exploitable.  We used data 
from 389 of Alexa’s most visited sites. There are 26 sites from which an attacker can generate the 
expiry date, 291 sites for generating the CVV2 and 25 sites for generating the postal code. There is 
also a variation in the number of attempts allowed at each of these sites, ranging from 4, 5, 10, 20, 25, 
50, or even unlimited. Of these 389 sites, there were only 47 merchants (i.e 12%) who had 
implemented 3D Secure payments [106][107][108], which would have prevented our attack. 
Table 13 - Variation in payment security settings of online payment websites 
Number of 
attempts 
Expiry 
Date 
CVV2 Postal 
Code 
3D 
Secure 
Total 
0 to 5 2 23 2 - 27 
6 to 10 20 238 18 - 276 
11 to 50 2 28 3 - 33 
Unlimited 2 2 2 - 6 
3D Secure  - - - 47 47 
Total 26 291 25 47 389 
 
Table 13 shows that the majority of online merchants (291, i.e. 74.8%) chose to use the 16-digit card 
number, the card expiry date and the CVV2 as the payment security fields for authorising payments. 
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There are 72 merchants who opted for additional security, of which 25 are requesting the verification 
of the customer’s postal code and 47 are using 3D Secure. Twenty-six merchants, including one 
merchant in the top ten, opted for much lower security settings, just requiring the 16-digit card 
number and expiry date.  It is these merchants that allow the attack described in Section 6.6 to be 
accomplished. 
Table 14 - Variations in payment security data fields required 
Alexa Rank 
Expiry 
Date CVV2 
Postal 
Code 
3D 
Secure Total 
0 to 100 6 68 5 21 100 
101 to 200 5 81 2 12 100 
201 to 300 7 79 2 12 100 
301 to 389 8 63 16 2 89 
Total 26 291 25 47 389 
 
One of the primary aims of the survey was to determine if the vulnerabilities described in this chapter 
were systemic. To assess this, we compared the security profiles of the most popular websites with the 
less popular websites, grouping the surveyed websites into a popularity order according to Alexa top 
100, followed by 100 to 200, 200 to 300 and 300 to 400. 
We observed that the more popular online merchants were more likely to implement additional 
security features, such as address verification and 3D Secure (Table 14).  There were two notable 
outliers to this observation in the top 10 merchants, one of which allowed unlimited attempts to input 
the CVV2 and another who only required the 16-digit card number plus the expiry date. 
An interesting finding from our survey was that the majority of the merchants (276, i.e. 71.0%) opted 
to give between 6 and 10 incorrect data entry attempts.  This is in contrast to 3D Secure which only 
allows 4 incorrect data entry attempts. Table 15 shows that more popular online merchants were more 
likely to implement 3D Secure, which limits the number of attempts to 4. 
Table 15 - Variations in number of incorrect payment data input attempts 
Alexa Rank 0-5  6-10 11-50 Unlimited 
3D 
Secure Total 
0 to 100 9 53 16 1 21 100 
101 to 200 12 63 13 0 12 100 
201 to 300 1 86 1 0 12 100 
301 to 389 5 74 3 5 2 89 
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Total 27 276 33 6 47 389 
 
Furthermore, our survey counted the number of merchant websites which accepted alternative 
methods of payment such as PayPal [96], Google Wallet [109], Visa Checkout [95], MasterPass [110] 
and Amazon Payments [111]. These digital wallet systems have the advantage that the customer 
enters their credit / debit card details in a single trusted system (the digital wallet), which makes it 
possible to pay at the merchant’s website without revealing the card details. Table 16 presents the 
figures of accepted alternative payment methods among the top 400 Alexa ranked websites  [105]. 
Table 16 - Merchants supporting alternative methods of payment 
Alexa 
Rank PayPal Visa 
Master 
Card Amazon Others Total None 
0 
to 100 61 10 4 3 6 84 16 
101 to 
200 67 8 3 6 5 89 11 
201 to 
300 67 2 1 6 7 83 17 
301 to 
389 67 2 1 6 4 80 20 
Total 262 22 9 21 22 336 53 
 
For merchants, digital wallet systems have an advantage that they (the merchants) do not have to store 
payment cards and shipping details on their own PCI-certified secure server, thereby reducing their 
regulatory burden and the risk of online card fraud and identity theft losses which could put small 
merchants out of business. The disadvantage of digital wallets is that customers who are not signed up 
for that particular brand of wallet, e.g. a customer who has Google Wallet but not PayPal, may be 
discouraged from completing their purchase, thereby causing a lost sale for the merchant. Our survey 
shows that digital wallets are accepted by 336 (86.4%) merchants out of the 389 observed. The most 
popular digital wallet is PayPal, which is accepted by 262 (67.4%).  Surprisingly, only 51 (13.1%) 
merchants accept multiple digital wallets. 
More detailed survey results are given in Appendix D. 
6.8 Responsible Disclosure 
Two weeks after we completed the distributed guessing attack experiments, we initiated an 
ethical/responsible disclosure exercise, notifying Visa and a selection of affected sites. Based on the 
number of fields that a website checks, we categorised them into three groups: expiry date, CVV2 and 
postcode. Since the total number of vulnerable websites was very high, we selected the 12 biggest 
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players from each category (in terms of the highest number of users), taking the total number of 
notified websites to 36.  
Once a suitable contact person or team for each website was found, we presented them with the 
disclosure information that featured the experiments we performed and the type of vulnerabilities on 
their site. We used our official work/university email address, and this served as a means for these 
merchants to trace us back, so that they can verify our authenticity. This would also allow them to 
request more detailed and technical information about our experiments should they wish to find out 
more. 
We recorded the responses received from these websites over the duration of four weeks after we 
disclosed the vulnerabilities to them. Altogether, we received 20 human responses from 10 websites 
and 18 websites came back to us with machine generated response mostly confirming the receipt of 
our notification. All the human responses requested more technical details while some asked us to 
suggest solutions. Out of the 36 websites we contacted, eight never responded. When a web merchant 
requested more information, we offered them an initial draft of our research experiments and results, 
which explained the experiments and the attack to help them understand the actual problem. We 
followed the disclosure policy requested by the websites and anonymised the affected sites in our 
research publications. As a result of our disclosure process, eight of the 36 websites changed their 
online security settings, but the other 28 websites remained unchanged four weeks after the 
disclosure. We call such changes ‘patches’ in what follows, and Table 17 illustrates the nature of the 
patching of the notified websites. Of the eight websites that modified their approach (labelled A to H), 
four used two fields (labelled ‘Exp. Date’ in the ‘Information Leak’ column) and four used three 
fields (labelled ‘CVV2’).  
In most cases, we learned about the patching behaviour through manual observations, but in two cases 
(Website B and Website G), the affected websites notified us about the changes they made. Website A 
and Website B patched their checkout system by adding an address verification field. However, this 
 
Table 17 - Nature of patching on the notified websites 
  Patching Behaviour 
Website Information 
Leak 
Adding 
Addr. 
field 
Adding 
Delay 
filter 
Adding 
velocity 
filter (PAN 
based) 
Adding 
velocity 
filter (IP 
based) 
Adding 
CAPTCHA 
A Exp. date √     
B Exp. date √     
C Exp. date  √    
D Exp. date  √    
E CVV2   √   
F CVV2    √  
G CVV2    √ √ 
H CVV2    √ √ 
 
Chapter 6 Distributed Guessing Attack  
 
99 
was not a good idea because it did not provide additional security, but instead opened up a new 
avenue for guessing and will be discussed at the end of this section. 
Typically, an online payment request is authorised almost instantly (within 2 seconds). From our 
observation, we noticed that Website C and Website D (both with expiry date leak) had introduced 
additional delays to the payment authorisation processing times. They did it in a staggered manner: 
few attempts were processed instantly but after certain incorrect attempts had taken place, the time 
taken for payment confirmation were increased. In this manner, fewer attempts were available (at 
least practically speaking) to enter the right expiry date without setting a hard upper bound to the 
number of attempts.   
We found that Website E (one of the Alexa top-10 websites in terms of the number of visitors) 
patched their checkout system by adding PAN velocity filters, reducing the number of attempts 
allowed (based on the PAN) from unlimited to 100 attempts within 24 hours. Website F followed a 
similar approach and added IP-based velocity filter to limit the number of attempts to get CVV2 from 
50 to 10 in 24 hours. Initially, Website G and Website H added CAPTCHA on their checkout page, 
thus disrupting our bot from carrying out the attack. Our experiment protocol limited the interaction 
with the administrators of notified websites. Due to complex trade-offs that payment websites need to 
consider when deciding which fields and filters to use, our ethical disclosure protocol did not 
volunteer advice about what actions to take to deal with the vulnerabilities. However, in one situation 
we felt we needed to depart from the protocol, namely in the case of Websites G and H, who added a 
CAPTCHA. CAPTCHAs prevent automated attempts in getting the sensitive card information but 
may adversely affect the usability of those websites [112]. To help Websites G and H to better 
understand the implications of adding a CAPTCHA, we provided these two websites with more 
detailed information about the attacks. This resulted in the CAPTCHA being replaced with IP address 
velocity filters, which allowed five attempts per IP address in 24 hours (hence a mark in two cells in 
Table x, for these websites). 
The overall result of our study on the nature of patching on the notified websites revealed that the vast 
majority (78%) did not make a change. We do not know the reason behind this and further research 
will be needed to find the explanation. Of the eight that patched, the general approach taken by 
merchants is either to add a filter to make it more cumbersome to try many times (6 of 8 sites that 
patched added delay or velocity filters), or to add a field (Website A and Website B). Perhaps 
surprisingly, none of the sites reacted by simply putting a hard limit on the number of allowed 
attempts. The effect of these patching behaviours is not so obvious. As we already pointed out, the 
sensible measure of limiting the number of attempts will not stop the guessing attack if it is not done 
on all websites. Furthermore, adding a card validation field may be a reasonable idea for a site for 
various reasons, but inadvertently may even weaken the protection against the guessing attack of the 
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payment system as a whole. After all, the added field may be a welcome opportunity to attempt 
guesses on this added card detail. 
6.9 The Challenges in Solving the Problem 
Improving the security of the online payment system is a complicated challenge for a variety of 
reasons. One could argue that payment card security mechanisms are bound to remain unsatisfactory 
since they have not been designed for distributed operation over the distributed Internet. Many of the 
solutions, such as 3D Secure can be seen as afterthoughts, and they struggle to gain widespread 
adoption. Any suggested improvement or solution faces the challenge that the online landscape 
contains many players that all have their own – at times competing – incentives for or reasons against 
change. Any solution would have to combine technical concerns with financial and business 
operational concerns, and its adoption will depend on legal and economic dynamics. We explore and 
discuss these issues from the perspectives of the five parties involved in authorisation-only transaction 
process. 
 Customer / Cardholder 
Since the distributed guessing attack described in this article uses merchant websites and card 
payment network to get all the card details, there is not much a cardholder can do to prevent it. At the 
same time, the cardholder is severely impacted by the attack: money may be lost, cards may have to 
be blocked, and the result is a waste of time and effort and a decreased sense of security. Arguably, it 
would be beneficial for cardholders if they could get organised as a group, or would have 
representatives in various bodies, to put pressure on the other stakeholders. As an individual, 
cardholders could ‘vote with their feet’ and select cards from card payment networks that are not 
exposed to the distributed guessing attack. At the moment, the payment system is too complex and 
non-transparent to expect customers to be able to make such choices. 
 Online Merchant 
On their own, a merchant can do very little to prevent distributed guessing attacks. All merchants 
would have to agree or be forced to use the same number of fields so that the guessing attack cannot 
be staged as explained in Section 6.6. At the same time, a merchant can avoid being exploited in the 
attack either by only using cards that use a payment network that is not vulnerable from the attack, or 
by using 3D Secure technologies recommended by the payment card industries  such as the American 
Express ‘SafeKey’ [68], ‘Verified by Visa’ [94] and MasterCard ‘SecureCode’ [93]. If 3D Secure is 
implemented, the card issuing bank is responsible for authenticating a cardholder before authorising 
the payment and it monitors the frequency of transactions and the total value of purchases for each 
card or bank account. The system will initiate additional security checks such as IP address and/or 
request an additional password if the frequency or value of the transactions appears to be unusual. Our 
experiments confirmed that 3D Secure payments are protected from the distributed guessing attack 
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described in this article since the issuing bank has visibility of all transaction requests directed at a 
single card, even if those requests are distributed across many websites. From the perspective of the 
merchant, 3D Secure has several drawbacks, and these are reflected in that only 47 merchants in the 
Alexa top-400 have elected to implement 3D Secure. First, the proportion of the customers who do 
not complete the transaction can be high when the customer encounters the 3D Secure login screen: 
up to 43% in the United States and 55% in China [113]. Second, there are additional costs associated 
with implementing 3D Secure. We reiterate that from the whole payment system’s perspective, we 
would need a very high adoption rate of 3D Secure technology to prevent the distributed attack, 
because the attack would still work as long as there are sufficient vulnerable websites not using 3D 
Secure. 
 Payment Acquirer 
There are many payment acquirers, which charge web merchants different rates depending on the 
number of fields and filters they ask to check and utilise. One cannot expect all of these acquirerss to 
be able to coordinate sufficiently to prevent the distributed guessing attack. Nevertheless, payment 
acquirers can provide advanced features to their merchants, and these features should at least make it 
more difficult to exploit a website for the attack. Most importantly, payment acquirers may use IP 
address velocity filters [34, 35, 46], which are implemented to detect repeated invalid attempts made 
within a certain time span from the same IP address. But with no coordination between different 
payment acquieres, these velocity filters can easily be circumvented just by switching to a website 
that uses a different payment acquirer. 
 Card Payment Network 
Our experiments have shown that distributed guessing attack described in the chapter only works on 
Visa cards, independent of which bank issued the card. When the attack is applied to a MasterCard, 
the distributed attack is detected. This suggests that the payment networks have the capability to 
detect and prevent a distributed attack where the network is globally integrated [114].  
The most obvious defence against the distributed guessing attack would be at the level of the card 
payment network. However, we are not in a position to know whether payment network providers 
could modify their network infrastructure to detect payment requests from multiple, globally spread 
payment acquirers, looking for suspicious activities on a single card distributed across multiple 
merchant websites. 
 Card Issuing Banks 
The bank comes into play at the final stage of the payment process, to approve the transfer of funds, 
but it would not be party to each individual guess (unless 3D Secure is used). Banks play an important 
role in limiting the damage that can be done if attackers get hold of card information. Many issuing 
banks are now running intelligent fraud detection systems which detect transactions which are outside 
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their customer’s normal spending habits [66]. The issuing bank then has the option to block the 
payment, or ask the customer for confirmation, or accept the payment taking a calculated risk that a 
transaction may be found to be fraudulent later. A complicated set of considerations comes to the fore 
in the bank’s decisions, from ease of use to financial risks. However, one would expect that if they so 
desire, banks could have considerable influence on the payment acquirers and card payment networks 
in protecting against the distributed guessing attack. 
6.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we studied 400 of the most popular e-commerce websites and surveyed their web 
payment interface, identifying that different websites present different sets of fields to identify the 
cardholder. It turns out that this disparity between different websites inadvertently creates conditions 
for a scalable distributed guessing attack. By conducting a guessing attack one field at the time – 
using a set of appropriate websites at each stage – the attack becomes practical. With the obtained 
data, the attacker can make purchases or transfer funds, as we have demonstrated.  
We showed that the attack works if the card payment network is not able to relate card activities from 
different websites. Fundamentally, much of the problem with card payment stems from the fact that 
the identity of the payer needs to be established in the ‘card-not-present’ mode. This is inherently 
problematic since it is at odds with the original use of cards (where the card and cardholder are 
present at the moment of purchase). It also implies that, for instance, Chip-and-PIN is not available to 
establish the identity of the payer. This is exacerbated by the fact that the Internet facilitates 
distribution of guesses for data fields over many merchant sites.  
To prevent the attack, either standardisation or centralisation can be pursued (some card payment 
networks already provide this). Standardisation would imply that all merchants need to offer the same 
payment interface, that is, the same number of fields. Then the attack does not scale anymore. 
Centralisation can be achieved by payment gateways or card payment networks possessing a full view 
over all payment attempts associated with its network. Neither standardisation nor centralisation 
naturally fit the flexibility and freedom of choice one associates with the Internet or successful 
commercial activity, but they will provide the required protection. It is up to the various stakeholders 
to determine the case for and timing of such solutions.
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Chapter 7. Reverse Engineering the 3D Secure 
2.0 Frictionless Authentication 
 
3 Domain Secure 2.0 (3DS 2.0) is a user-authentication payment protocol introduced to combat online 
card payment fraud while keeping online payment simple and fast. 3DS 2.0 can challenge the 
payment initiator, who provided the payment card details, for second factor authentication 
information (e.g., a passcode). For convenience, 3DS 2.0 also offers a frictionless authentication 
mode, in which the authenticator can decide not to challenge the payment initiator depending on 
perceived transaction risk. Transaction risk is assessed based on rules set in the 3DS authentication 
service using several sources of information, including data fingerprinting the browser. The 3DS 2.0 
standard itself does not specify how to implement transaction risk assessment for frictionless 
authentication. The research question addressed in this chapter therefore are: how is transaction risk 
assessment implemented for current payment cards; do there exist practical attacks against 3DS 2.0 
exploiting the frictionless option; and, if so, what alternative designs exist to avoid the security 
problem while maintaining reasonable ease-of-use.  
This chapter therefore conducts a detailed reverse engineering study of frictionless authentication in 
3DS 2.0 for payment using a browser. We identify the data that card issuers use for transaction risk 
assessment, for five payment cards from Visa as well as Mastercard, used at a number of different 
web sites. In addition, we conduct experiments to identify if the 3DS authentication service uses 
additional rules in the risk assessment.  
7.1 Revisiting 3DS 2.0 
3DS 2.0 protocols was introduced to combat the “phishing” and “malware” attacks that were still 
possible on 3DS 1.0 protocol. These attacks enabled fraudsters to steal the static passwords used by 
3DS 1.0 for cardholder authentication. With 3DS 2.0, as shown in Figure 39, the card issuing bank 
performs user-authentication either by challenged authentication or frictionless authentication. With 
challenged authentication, cardholders were authenticated through one-time tokens such as passcodes 
over the phone. However, such schemes of user-authentication are still vulnerable to real-time man-
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in-the-middle attacks. As demonstrated by Drimer et. al. [3] and RedTeam research [2][3], attackers 
can initiate transaction with card issuing banks and synchronously prompt the cardholder to enter their 
one-time passcode information on phishing websites. Such one-time passcodes can also be easily 
stolen by malware hidden within the cardholder machines [3].  
However, such kind of attack requires real time co-ordination between the attacker, the card-issuing 
bank and the cardholder. The payment networks and card-issuing banks believe that 3DS 2.0 is a 
better solution to combat online payment fraud because as with the data provided by the payment 
networks [94][93] more than 80% of the CNP transactions are processed through frictionless 
authentication which does not require any OTP yet provides a secure way of making purchase online. 
In the following section, we aim to assess the security provided by the 3DS 2.0 frictionless 
authentication for CNP transactions. Before we start our assessment process, the first challenge we 
have is - the definitions provided by 3DS 2.0 specification for frictionless authentication are not well 
defined. EMV 3DS 2.0 specifications does not define standards or methods on the operational 
workings of frictionless authentication.  
However, section 3.3 (step 4) of EMV 3DS 2.0 specifications [75] hints that “The methods used and 
any data elements that are extracted from a customer machine during the 3DS 2.0 frictionless 
authentication are out of the scope of EMV specification and is left to card issuer's implementation 
[75]”. This implies frictionless authentication relies on some data extracted from the customer 
machine by the card issuing bank during the checkout process. The security of this data is crucial 
because it is this data that makes the transaction to go frictionless and authenticate the cardholder 
securely without any challenge. 
7.2 Reverse Engineering Transaction Risk Assessment 
3DS 2.0 specifies very little about how card issuers should implement Transaction Risk Assessment. 
To understand how merchants and card issuers assess the risk of consumer payments we therefore 
reverse engineer existing implementations. To that end we place a proxy between web browser and 
merchant/card issuer to intercept communication between payment initiator and authentication 
 
Figure 39 - 3DS 2.0 supported transaction schemes 
Chapter 7. Reverse Engineering the 3D Secure 2.0 Frictionless Authentication  
105 
service, as we describe in Section 7.2.1. Section 7.2.2 introduces the 3DS 2.0 transaction sequence, 
combining specification information with that obtained from the reverse engineering. Section 7.2.3 
presents the data the risk assessor collects to inform its decision whether to challenge the customer. 
Section 7.3 discusses differences we found across the implementation of 3DS 2.0 we encountered. 
 Reverse Engineering System Set-up 
Figure 40 shows the reverse engineering set-up. Within 3DS 2.0, a number of services and 
stakeholders are involved in the frictionless authentication protocol: the payment initiator using a 
browser, the merchant providing the check-out page at every purchase, and a set of services and 
servers for the authentication, termed the Access Control Server (ACS). The ACS maintains payment 
initiator’s data which can be used to authenticate the cardholder during a purchase. The ACS 
functionality is usually carried out by or on behalf of the card issuer (such as Visa [66] or Mastercard 
[67]), but some large vendors like PayPal [96] and Amazon [111] use their own solutions.  
To intercept communication, we use the Fiddler proxy, which is available as open-source at [115]. 
The proxy runs on the machine of the payment initiator. We configure the machine’s web browser 
(WB) to send its HTTP(S) requests to Fiddler, which then forwards the traffic to the communicating 
merchant or ACS. The responses are returned to Fiddler, which passes the traffic back to WB. When 
HTTPS decryption is enabled, the Fiddler proxy generates a self-signed root certificate and a 
matching private key. The root certificate is used to generate HTTPS server certificates for each 
secure site that is visited from WB.  
Apart from intercepting the browser communication we use two other techniques. First, using Fiddler, 
we challenge WB as if we were the merchant or the card issuer. Secondly, from Fiddler, we challenge 
the merchant as if the challenge was originating from WB. To handle (‘tamper’ in Fiddler 
terminology) a challenge, Fiddler provides a breakpoint function, which invokes a pause to the 
communication, as shown in Figure 41. Once paused, we can tamper or edit the changes to the 
communication data. In Figure 41 the arrow labelled ‘1’ adds a breakpoint when the user navigates to 
the payment URL on the merchant website ‘hps.datacash.com’, and the arrow labelled ‘2’ points to 
where we edit the communication data to the merchant. Using this platform, we are able (1) to sniff 
the communication, (2) control the input to WB and (3) control the output from WB. Implementations 
 
Figure 40 - Shows the reverse engineering set-up 
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differ between different ACS providers, and for the same providers may differ depending on the 
merchant or cards. However, from our experiments it seems that there is considerable overlap 
between implementations. In total, we used five test cards for our experiments, three Visa cards (C1-
C3) and two MasterCard cards (C4, C5). To make sure that 3DS 2.0 does not have any machine 
identifiers pre-installed on the machine, we had a fresh installation of Windows 10 operating system 
and Chrome 59.x web browser. 
The merchant web sites we used were all enabled with 3DS 2.0 checkout and were selected from 
Alexa list of merchant web sites [116]. The ‘Verified by (payment-network)’ icon on the merchant 
web site indicates that it is 3D Secure enabled. To ensure that we have a representative sample of 
merchant websites, during our experiments we kept track of the ACS URL’s to which our transactions 
were redirected. All ‘Verified by (payment-network)’ websites redirected us to the same ACS URL 
indicating that the implementation of 3DS is issuer based. For each test card, we made several 
legitimate transactions and recorded the complete checkout session for each transaction with Fiddler. 
We decided to stop making further transactions once authenticated by the ACS using frictionless 
authentication. This ensures that the ACS trusts WB enough for frictionless authentication. We 
decoded the 3DS 2.0 transaction data as necessary and analysed the outcomes in detail. 
Using our test cards, we made several legitimate frictionless transactions on websites enabled with 
3DS 2.0 checkout. Fiddler recorded the complete checkout session for each transaction which is later 
retrieved for analysis or decoding a part of 3DS 2.0 transaction visible from B1.  
After assessing the checkout sessions obtained from Fiddler, we establish that card issuing banks have 
at least two variations in the implementation of frictionless authentication. We name these variations 
as frictionless authentication over 3DS 2.0 and frictionless authentication over 3DS 1.0. In the 
following two sections, we will detail each variation of the frictionless authentication implementation. 
For each type, we start with providing a detailed description of the sequence of steps involved in the 
 
Figure 41 - Screenshot of Fiddler proxy tool 
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transaction. We will then explain the methods that are used by each implementation to perform 
frictionless authentication and finally we will detail the data that is used by each type to perform 
frictionless authentication. 
 3DS 2.0 Frictionless Authentication Protocol 
Figure 42 shows the transaction sequence for frictionless authentication over 3DS 2.0, collating 3DS 
2.0 specification with the transaction information extracted from Fiddler. The box labelled ‘Tunnel 
(Customer,ACS)’ represents the reverse engineered part of transaction visible from WB, while the 
transaction sequence steps for the rest of the parties are derived from 3DS 2.0 specifications. 
Steps Description 
1 After filling the checkout page and as the ‘Pay’ button is clicked, the payment card details 
along with the Customer Web Browser’s (WB’s) HTTP headers are posted to the merchant. 
2 The merchant decides to have user-authentication enabled for this transaction. The 
merchant enables 3DS 2.0 protocol. 
 
Figure 42 - Transaction sequence for frictionless authentication over 3DS 2.0 
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3 For the payment card provided at the checkout, the merchant in this step requests the ACS 
version number, 3DS Method URL (address of the ACS) and a unique 3DS Server 
Transaction ID from the 3DS Server. 
4 The 3DS Server responds back to the merchant with the ACS version number, 3DS Method 
URL and a unique 3DS Server Transaction ID. The merchant sends the ACS version 
number and 3DS Method URL to WB for routing to the ACS. 
5 In step 5, WB is connected to card issuer ACS, and this connection is made via the 3DS 
Method URL received from the previous step. The 3DS Server Transaction ID along with 
WB’s HTTP headers are passed to the ACS in this connection. 
6 Having received WB’s session and 3DS Server Transaction ID, the ACS adds a session 
cookie to the transaction and loads a JavaScript (named dfp.js) in B1. 
7 WB executes the methods included in JavaScript (dfp.js) which has a logic to extract data 
from WB and post the dfp.js extracted data to the ACS (explained below the table is the 
analysis of dfp.js code).  
8 As shown in the figure, through step 8, the dfp.js extracted data is posted to the ACS. 
9-11 Interestingly, for first transaction, we found that steps (6 -8) were repeated to form steps (9-
11). The only difference was observed in step 9 where the ACS additionally store two 
persistent cookies (ID cookies) in WB and fetch it in every subsequent transaction, as 
shown in step 11 of Figure 42.  
12 Hereafter, the transaction is processed according to the rules specified in EMV 3DS 2.0 
specifications that states the 3DS Server to submit an Authentication Request (AReq) to the 
ACS.  
13 The Issuer performs Risk-Based Authentication (RBA) on the data it receives from the 
dfp.js and AReq and authenticates the customer at WB as the valid owner of the card. The 
Issuer's decision to not challenge the customer is added to Authentication Response 
(ARes). 
14 The ARes is forwarded to the merchant via the 3DS Server. 
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Table 18 - dfp.js data extracted from B1 during frictionless authentication 
 
Chapter 7. Reverse Engineering the 3D Secure 2.0 Frictionless Authentication  
110 
 3DS2.0 Transaction Risk Assessment Data 
The reverse engineering exercise we conducted shows how the ACS builds up a fingerprint of the 
payment initiator’s machine based on interaction with the browser. The ACS uses three pieces of 
information to establish a fingerprint for the payment initiator’s machine: 
1. the fingerprint information extracted from the browser using JavaScript 
2. the 3DS 2.0 ID cookies fetched from the browser 
3. the HTTP headers from payment initiator’s browser forwarded by the merchant to the ACS as 
well as network data 
In addition, the ACS may have other sources of data, such as customer or card type information or IP 
headers, but centre the discussion on the above three 
7.2.3.1 Fingerprint Data using JavaScript.  
The JavaScript fingerprinting scripts that we analysed contain functions to (i) collect browser-
supplied information from the end-user device, and (ii) forward the collected data to the 3DS 2.0 
server as a single Base-64 encoded string (the 3DS 2.0 specifications [75] requires all the data 
messages to be in Base-64 format). Table 18 shows an exhaustive list of device attributes from card 
C1 to C5 that are passed from WB to the ACS. The loading and execution of dfp.js by the ACS as a 
part of the checkout process is similar for all our test cards that we used. The ‘Method’ column 
indicates the functions implemented in the dfp.js that extract information from WB (for readability, in 
some cases we have simplified the method name). The details that are fetched in each function are 
shown in ‘Attribute description’ column of the table. The ‘Source’ column marks the origin of each 
attribute (JavaScript or HTTP). Finally, the rightmost column shows an example output value of each 
function. It would go too far to discuss all attributes in detail, but a number of them are particularly 
interesting. The data obtained is quite diverse, from browser and operating system information, to 
display, time, geo-location and some plug-in software information. What follows are the details 
description of the methods and attributes listed in Table 18.  
 deviceprint.userAgent(). B1 sends an HTTP request to the server it communicates. The 
request structure is defined as a part of HTTP protocol [16] and has a field userAgent that 
carries detailed information about the B1’s configurations. This method returns the value of 
the user-agent field send by B1 HTTP request.  
 test(). Attributes within this methods extracts fields from the HTTP header and indicates to 
the server B1’s support for MIME type, accepted: charsets, encodings, languages, support for 
activex, geckoactivex, adobereader and other components. 
  deviceprint_browser(). This method extracts more information about B1’s settings. Some 
properties within this method navigator.appVersion, navigator.platform and 
navigator.browserLanguage extracts the B1 version, platform (operating system) on which the 
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B1 is installed and the language installed on the B1 and its operating system. It also has a 
geolocation attribute that checks if the location settings on a B1 is enabled.  
 deviceprint_display(): This function captures the B1 machine’s detailed screen information 
like colour depth, screen width, height and available height.  
 window_information(): collects attributes like window’s inner width, inner height, outer 
width, outer height and length. 
 DoNotTrack: The attribute navigator.doNotTrack within this method retrieves B1 tracking 
preference. Do Not Track attribute is discussed in [117].  
 Useofadblock: If an advertisement blocker plugin is installed on a user browser, this attribute 
will have a value of 1. 
 deviceprint_software(). This function captures all the browser plugins and types installed on 
the user machine. The navigator.plugin attribute extracts the full path of all the plugin files. 
However, the dfp.js script only extracts the filename ignoring the description and length or 
size if available. 
 deviceprint _timez() and deviceprint java(). These functions within dfp.js extract the client 
machine’s timezone and verify if whether Java is installed/enabled.  
 Deviceprint_cookie(). This function has a logic to test whether the browser settings have 
cookies enabled.  
 Flash: Along with dfp.js some frictionless implementation may additionally invoke a flash 
script on B1 browser. With our experiments, we found that only test card C4 had this script 
enable. This flash script can collect details about the status (enabled or disabled) and version 
of a flash plugin installed on a user browser. It also collects the number and complete list of 
fonts from the user browser. The collected attributes are again sent to the ACS in a base-64 
format. 
There are two other methods that we found were implemented in dfp.js: encode_deviceprint() and 
asyncpost_deviceprint(url) 
 encode_deviceprint() combines the collected data into a single string. It formats the string by 
removing whitespace, add delimiters and other characters as requires by the ACS. Table 
shows an example output from encode_deviceprint function. 
 asyncpost_deviceprint(url) posts the data to the ACS URL. The data is converted to base-64 
before being sent as a form element to the ACS. 
An example of resulting encoded device fingerprint is displayed in Figure 43. 
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7.2.3.2 The 3DS 2.0 ID Cookies fetched from the browser  
We found three types of cookies installed by the ACS on our machines. These are also described in 
Table 18, bottom rows. Full cookies are displayed in Figure 44.  
 Session cookie. The cookie is deleted after a user closes the session. 
  Test cookie: A test cookie with a name TESTCOOKIE and a value of Y was observed in an 
exchange during the transaction. This is set by the ACS server to determine if the user 
browser settings allowed cookies to be set.  
 IDCookies. When the cardholder first enrols into the 3DS 2.0 system, a token in the form of 
ID Cookie(s) is placed on the cardholder browser. The number of cookies installed varied 
from one to three. These cookies we found have a validity of three years from the date of 
installation and also have an HTTP-only security tag. The HTTP-only tag on a cookie protects 
it from being accessed by cross-domain websites, meaning, only the website that has tagged 
the cookie on the cardholder browser can access this cookie. 
 
Figure 43 - Device fingerprint information encoded and sent to ACS 
 
Figure 44 - Cookies installed by the ACS on our Machines 
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Understandably the dfp.js script data and the persistent ID cookies generate a fingerprint of the B1 
profile that will enable the card issuer ACS to frictionless-ly authenticate the cardholder at the 
checkout. Further examination of fingerprint data reveals that the ACS makes use of the Browser 
Object Model (BOM) [118] which is a larger representation of information provided by the browser 
through JavaScript.  
The BOM deals with browser components like history (limited), location, navigator, screen any other 
detailed functionality the browser may expose to JavaScript. Because no standards exist for the BOM 
at the time of this writing, each browser has its own implementation of BOM.  
7.2.3.3 Data Passed from Merchant to ACS.  
Data passed by the merchant in AReq message (step 12 of Figure 39) contains elements that identify 
payment initiator browser configuration. For instance the EMV 3DS 2.0 specifications [75] (Table 
A.1), mentions the merchants to include browser accept headers, language, screen details and user 
agent to be passed in the AReq message whenever available. The browser configuration helps the 
ACS to render correct iframe for the cardholder device and may be used by the ACS to compare the 
information passed with dfp.js. To inspect the methods by which the merchant collects data to frame 
the AReq message, we referred to the merchant developer guides from payment networks Visa [65] 
and MasterCard [70] and payment service providers like PayPal [96], which suggest to use the HTTP 
headers passed on by the merchants during checkout as part of WB’s authentication data.  
7.3 Frictionless Authentication Over 3DS 1.0 
Figure 46, shows a sequence diagram detailing the process of frictionless authentication over 3DS 1.0 
that we obtained from test card C1 and C3. To have a clear understanding of the process the sequence 
diagram above collates the information extracted from Fiddler and 3DS 1.0 specification.  Data from 
Fiddler represent the part of the transaction visible from B1. 
 
Figure 45 - Browser information passed on from merchant to ACS 
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Steps Description 
1 After filling the checkout page and as the ‘Pay’ button is clicked, the payment card details 
along with the Customer’s Web Browser’s (WB’s) HTTP headers and merchant session 
cookies are posted to the merchant. 
2 The merchant decides to have user-authentication enabled for this transaction. The 
merchant in this case enables 3DS 1.0 protocol. Although the 3DS protocol version is 
internal to the merchant implementation, we can derive the 3DS version number from the 
data passed in step 5 through the WB.  
3 The transaction is processed according to the 3DS 1.0 specifications. For the payment card 
provided at the checkout, the merchant in this step requests the 3DS Method URL (address 
of the ACS) and AReq message from the 3DS Server. The data that is passed from the 
merchant to the 3DS Server includes merchant data and transaction data. 
4 The 3DS Server responds back to the merchant with the 3DS Method URL and an AReq 
message.  
5 The merchant sends the 3DS Method URL and AReq message to the WB for routing it to 
the ACS. 
 
Figure 46 - Frictionless flow sequence diagram 
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6 The WB is connected to card issuer ACS, and the connection is made via the 3DS Method 
URL received from the previous step. The AReq message along with WB’s HTTP headers 
are passed to the ACS in this connection. 
7 Having received the WB’s session and AReq message, the ACS examines the data received 
in AReq message and adds session and ID cookies to the transaction. 
8 The WB is tagged with the cookies from the ACS 
9 Interestingly, for the first transaction, we found that steps 6 was repeated as step 9. The 
only difference observed was, in step 9, ID cookies were fetched by the ACS along with 
AReq and WB’s HTTP headers 
10 The Issuer performs Risk-Based Authentication (RBA) on the data it receives from the 
AReq message, WB’s headers and ID cookies and authenticates the customer at WB as the 
valid owner of the card. The Issuer's decision to not challenge the customer is added to 
Authentication Response (ARes). 
11-
13 
The ACS after authenticating the customer, responds back with the ARes message and a 
CAVV. 
7.4 Discussion of 3DS 2.0 Implementations 
There exist a number of notable differences between different implementations of 3DS 2.0. These 
differences can be categorized as follows: 
1. Difference in the use of 3DS protocol version 
2. Difference in transporting the device fingerprint: obfuscated versus plain-text 
3. Difference in amount of data collected as a fingerprint: JavaScript based versus HTTP 
headers and cookies only. 
7.4.1.1 Difference in the use of 3DS protocol version 
We observed that the ACE associated with card C2 use an extended version of 3DS 1.0 protocol for 
frictionless authentication. The optimisation is achieved by adding an extra layer of frictionless 
authentication over the 3DS 1.0 protocol. As opposed to 3DS 2.0, in Message 4-5, the browser 
collects and submits the AReq message with the transaction identifier, as defined in the 3DS 1.0 
specification. Through Message 6 and 8, using device fingerprinting JavaScript, the ACS collects the 
fingerprint data from the 
browser. Like 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication, if this is the first 3DS 1.0 transaction from the 
machine, the ACS repeats the messages 9-11 to install IDCookie. Hereafter the transaction is 
processed according to the 3DS 1.0 specification. The ACS decision (to not challenge) is added to the 
ARes which is then forwarded to the merchant via the browser. More importantly, comparing the 
frictionless authentication of 3DS 1.0 and 3DS 2.0, both of these protocols capture static fingerprint 
data in base-64 encoded format and use HTTP-only IDCookies for transaction risk assessment. 
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7.4.1.2 Difference in device fingerprint implementation 
The other variant that we observed is in the technique with which the device fingerprint JavaScript is 
implemented. In two cases (C2 and C5) we noticed that code obfuscation techniques were applied to 
make the JavaScript difficult to read and analyse. However, obfuscated codes has certain general 
limitations, in that, it is an encoding technique (not encryption) and needs to make sure that the code 
does not loose its functionality when executed over the system. The 3DS 2.0 device fingerprint 
JavaScript can still be run to obtain base-64 device fingerprint values. Additionally, code obfuscation 
is a technique that has long been used by malware writers to hide their malicious code. Therefore, 
there are plethora of security tutorials and freely available security tools designed to de-obfuscate 
JavaScript. The most reliable deobfuscater that we discovered for our research is available as open 
source from Intelligent Systems Lab, Zurich [119]. 
7.4.1.3 Difference in amount of machine data collected 
Table 18 shows an exhaustive list of all the data elements collected by the fingerprinting scripts and 
HTTP headers, the amount of data collected by each implementation of the JavaScript varies and in 
some cases to a substantial extent. We noticed that some of the card issuers have no device 
fingerprinting JavaScript implemented at all. For example, card issuer of C3 implements frictionless 
authentication over 3DS 1.0 and only relies on the data received in the AReq message. The 
transaction sequence that we obtained with C3 is detailed in Section 7.3 Frictionless Authentication 
Over 3DS 1.0.  
In this chapter we focus predominantly on the transaction phase of the 3DS 2.0 protocol, in which 
device fingerprint and ID cookies are collected and then used together with the transaction data to 
decide whether to challenge the payment initiator. However, the 3DS 2.0 protocol also defines an 
enrolment phase during which the card issuer firstly collects the fingerprints from the card issuer 
computer and signs the fingerprint data to create ID cookies. The card holder computer is then 
‘tagged’ through the usual cookie mechanism with these ID cookies. This enrolment phase is 
imperfect, in that it cannot be determined if the payment initiator who enrols a certain card is a 
legitimate user of the card–this vulnerability existed in 3DS 1.0 as well. 
7.5 Conclusion 
Our reverse engineering exercise on 3DS2.0 protocol indicates several inconsistencies in the  EMV 
3DS 2.0 and regulatory standards which are listed below: 
 The PSD II standards do not regulate the technical requirements transaction risk assessments. 
This leaves the protocol designers and the merchants to have their own  
 The EMV 3DS 2.0 standard, does not define the data elements to be used for frictionless 
authentication for browser-based transactions. 
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 Frictionless authentication is optional for the card issuing banks and card issuing banks even 
being compliant to the PSD 2 by adopting EMV are unsure of how to consistently perform 
frictionless authentication 
Also with 3DS 2.0, access control policies can only be defined for cookies which can be marked 
‘http-only’. Apart from this the frictionless authentication data simply relies on the data extracted 
by java scripts. This raises a question on the security of frictionless authentication. Although the 
transfer of javascript data is SSL protected, the actual data is a plaintext base-64 data which can 
be easily be extracted by malicious websites using the same javascript code as used by the issuer 
ACS. This will have the device fingerprint data in the same format as accepted by the ACS. There 
is no uniqueness to the transaction leaving from the cardholder machine. 3DS 2.0 was introduced 
to defeat malware’s that infests more PCs to steal user payment data. However, the 
implementation of frictionless authentication is not secure as it relies on static and plain text data 
stored as persistent cookies.
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Chapter 8. Designed to be broken: 
Vulnerabilities and Attacks on 3DS 2.0 
 
In this chapter we device a realistic impersonation attack, where an attacker uses obtained data 
described in section 7.2.3 and avoids being challenged for a second factor of authentication 
information. We first describe the precise attack model in Section 8.2, and then explain in Section 
8.2.2 how the attack can be implemented, particularly related to obtaining the data. We carried out a 
number of experiments with different machines to demonstrate that the impersonation attack indeed 
succeeds, as we will describe in the rest of this chapter. Lastly, in section 8.5, we identify a betrayal 
attack in which an attacker can perform friendly fraud to cause an actual business loss to the online 
merchant. Let us start with the introduction to the cardholder impersonation attack on 3DS 2.0 
protocol. 
8.1 Introduction – Cardholder Impersonation. 
The design of 3DS 2.0 also suggests an obvious vulnerability, in that the authentication service may 
decide incorrectly not to challenge a payment. We will demonstrate an impersonation attack, in which 
a perpetrator impersonates a payment initiator, thus ‘tricking’ the authentication service into allowing 
a transaction to complete without being challenged for second factor authentication information. This 
attack is practically feasible if one manages to install malware or similar on the payment initiator’s 
machine to obtain the necessary data. A main function of the malware would be to recreate the 
machine fingerprint and then transport the fingerprint to the attacker, who can use it for a purchase 
impersonating the card holder (see Section 8.2 for details). By the design characteristics of 3DS 2.0, 
the security level of 3DS 2.0 then defaults to that of old-style authorization-only online payment. 
We complete the security analysis of 3DS 2.0 by comparing different payment protocols, and by 
discussing design alternatives. From this analysis we conclude that alternatives to 3DS 2.0 exist but 
that the challenge remains to effectively balance security and usability on browser platforms. An 
interesting question is whether, in hind-sight, the regulator (who originally proposed stricter two-
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factor authentication in PSD II) is satisfied with emerging approaches from the industry to transaction 
risk assessment, such as those reported in this chapter. 
8.2 Attack Model – Cardholder Impersonation 
The objective of the attack is to use the credit card of another party to successfully complete an online 
purchase, despite the fact that the merchant uses 3DS 2.0. We assume that the attacker has no manner 
in which it could respond successfully to a challenge for a second factor of authentication 
information. Therefore, the objective of the attacker is to avoid a challenge and be allowed to 
complete a frictionless transaction. We consider the attack successful if an attacker avoids being 
challenged in situations the ACS actually wants to challenge. To demonstrate the success of the 
attack, we therefore have to show that there exist transactions that trigger a challenge in normal 
operations, but that allow the attacker to complete the transaction without challenge. To succeed, the 
attacker needs to obtain the credit card details, the cookies and the fingerprint data used for 
Transaction Risk Assessment, as described in section 7.2.3. We do not assume any insider 
administrative access privileges of the attacker, neither at the payment initiator’s machine nor at any 
of the 3DS 2.0 services. The attack assumes a perpetrator manages to install malware or plug-in that 
collects the necessary data from the payment initiator’s machine, which includes running the 
JavaScript fingerprinting scripts–we will argue in the next section that that is not far-fetched. Shipping 
this data to the attacker allows the attacker to impersonate the cardholder’s identity by crafting its 
3DS 2.0 authentication data to be identical to the 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication data belonging to 
that of the payment initiator. 
 Attack Implementation 
The attack implementation needs to complete two stages: (1) obtaining the card and transaction risk 
assessment data, and (2) using the card and transaction risk assessment data.  
Obtaining Card and Transaction Risk Assessment Data. In this stage, the attacker needs to obtain 
credit card details and machine fingerprint data (including cookies). There is a variety of reasons why 
this can only be done through a Man in the Browser. A challenge is that the ID cookies (see Section 
7.2.3) are http-only protected, that is, they cannot be read by any cross-domain web pages or through 
JavaScript. Browsers allow access to http-only cookies to extensions (including malware) because 
extensions are considered “trusted” once installed, whereas regular JavaScript is not. Cross-site 
scripting (XSS) [96, 97, 98], in which a script from a web site different than the merchant or 3DS 2.0 
server attempts to access information such as cookies, is therefore not possible. The most feasible 
attack will therefore be through making the browser user install malware or similar in the browser, 
which obtains the data from the browser. 
The most basic approach to obtain the required data is a browser plug-in that can sniff the browser 
communication to steal http-only cookies, record keystrokes to steal user payment data and execute 
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device fingerprint JavaScript to capture the device fingerprints. More advanced malwares incorporate 
also have such features, and are commonly available at [123], see for instance the ZeUS, SpyEye, 
Dridex and Tinba malwares. Once such malware is installed, it has an ability to obtain card 
transaction data for a purchase, the associated transaction risk assessment data described in section 
7.2.3, as well as the http-only cookies [100–102]. Malware SpyEye, for example, gets into a browser 
by prompting them to install a pdf reader or a flash player plug-in. Once into the browser, it updates 
itself as needed to configure fake entity certificates into the browser storage, record keystrokes, sniff 
the browser communication, records browser sessions and also can capture screen shots of user screen 
[127][128].  
Using the Obtained Card and Transaction Risk Assessment Data. The task in exploiting the 
obtained data is to impersonate the card holder in the attacker’s browser. The attacker copies the 
cookies to their own browser, and initiates a transaction with the merchant of choice, even if the 
merchant uses 3DS 2.0. It also receives credit card details and machine fingerprint data, per the above. 
At payment, the attacker creates or replays the correct responses in the protocol of Figure 42. Since 
there is no randomness in the fingerprint data, the same string of dfp.js data and HTTP headers 
obtained from the payment initiator’s machine can be replayed on the attacker’s machine using 
Fiddler (if required). To tamper the data using fiddler breakpoints are added whenever the merchant 
and the ACS connects to the attacker’s browser. 
 Attack Demonstration 
The demonstration of the attack aims to identify if it indeed is possible to impersonate from a different 
machine a legitimate payment initiator. In this demonstration we use the data obtained from machine 
M1, using the experiment set-up from Figure 40. We randomly selected a merchant with 3DS 2.0 
enabled checkout and repeated transactions using all test cards C1 to C5 until M1 was trusted enough 
for frictionless authentication. The payment sessions made from M1 were recorded by the Fiddler 
proxy and were reused on different machines M2 and M3.  
The detailed configuration of Machine M1 and M3 is shown in Figure 6. It can be seen from the 
figure these machines were configured with chrome 59.x browser and the same version of operating 
system i.e. Windows NT 10.0. Machine M2 differed both in operating system and the web browser 
configurations. For M2, the operating system is Windows 8 and the web browser installed Mozilla 
FireFox. We note that M2 and M3 were on networks different from M1, so that the IP source address 
is different.  
The approach behind our experiments is as follows. We conduct the experiment for the five credit 
cards mentioned. First, we ran an experiment to verify that transactions from machine M2 with the 
five cards are indeed challenged if one only enters card information (and does not impersonate the 
card holder with the risk assessment data). This verification was successful in all of the cases except 
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for card C1 where only lower value transactions below £10 were approved (we will get back to this in 
the next section). Then, we ran an experiment in which we used the obtained transaction risk 
assessment data to impersonate the card holder, to see if we were allowed to complete the purchase 
unchallenged, i.e., in frictionless mode. We initiated transactions where we selected products with 
values ranging between a £1 to £300, on an online merchant that uses 3D Secure 2.0 at checkout.  
We were successfully able to execute the attack for all our test cards (C1-C5), in that the transactions 
were approved without any challenge by the card issuing bank’s ACS. Interestingly, only for test card 
C5, the card issuer ACS issued challenges when the value of transaction reached above £200 (a 
typical transaction threshold set for frictionless authentication). 
We ran a second experiment, using different machine M3, with the same hardware and software as 
M1. In so doing, we wanted to see if different machines construct the same Fingerprint data. This is to 
simulate a scenario where an attacker is unable the device fingerprint data but was able to get the ID 
cookies. In that case, we did not use the Fiddler proxy to recreate the M1 Fingerprint data, but simply 
completed the transaction normally. In all cases, the transactions were allowed to go on without being 
challenged. Close inspection of the data that M2 sent to the merchant and ACS revealed that the 
transaction risk data was essentially identical for M1 and M2.  
Reflection. For consumers it would be important to know how merchants and card issuers respond if 
the above attack took place. To that end, we communicated with the card issuing banks to understand 
how it would react if we were to report the fraudulent transactions that were made from the attacker 
machine. The card issuer for C3 asks cardholders to identify some previous transactions made from 
the victim’s machine and would not register the transactions made from attacker machine as fraud. 
The card issuer for C3 also blocks and re-issues a new payment card to the card holder. However, in 
two cases (C4 and C5), the card issuer argued that the transactions must have originated from the 
actual card holder’s machine. They argued the card holder is trying to perform a ‘friendly fraud’, and 
so is denied a refund of any reported losses. This chapter makes clear that this situation can easily 
arise when the situation is in fact an actual impersonation attack which can create an actual monetary 
loss to the cardholder. 
8.3 Further Re-Engineering of Transaction Risk Assessment 
Section 7.2.3 established which data 3DS 2.0 implementations used in their transaction risk 
assessment, and we showed that with that data alone, one can execute an impersonation attack. 
However, this does not yet provide us with full understanding of the way risks are being assessed by 
the ACS. First, the ACS may use additional sources of data, for example, it may use header info from 
the protocol stack such as the IP source address or some other data about the card holder available 
from the card issuer. Secondly, the ACS will set certain rules about when to invoke a challenge. These 
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rules will stipulate which data to consider when checking the fingerprint and specifies bounds on data 
outside which the transaction will be challenged (e.g., a limit for the transaction amount). 
There is a number of questions of interest motivating further re-engineering of the risk assessment 
approach. First, it provides information about which variants of the impersonation attack would 
succeed and thus allows us to assess the security and risks behind online payment. Secondly, it serves 
as a suggestion for a possible methodology to assess consumer implications of Transaction Risk 
Assessment. Approval of TRA as a mechanism shifts liability to the card issuer but nevertheless still 
exposes consumers to possible distress when an impersonation attack is carried out. Arguably, it 
would be in the interest of the public if there is visibility in the implementation of Transaction Risk 
Assessment. The re-engineering experiments in this section demonstrates how to provide such 
visibility. 
The experiments in this section obtain responses from the ACS for transactions in 8 different 
scenarios. These scenarios provide all combinations of the following three features: 
1. submitting the machine data and IDCookie or not (from Section 7.2.3.1 and 7.2.3.2) 
2. submitting different transaction values 
3. submitting transactions from different regions 
 
Table 19 - Experimental simulation and results with C1 and C2 
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Table 19. shows selected results from our experiments on two test cards C1 and C2. Our set-up was 
identical to Section 7.2.1, with data obtained from machine M1 used on an alternative machine M2. 
Payments were initiated on two merchant websites (W1 and W2) that enforce 3DS user 
authentication. W1 is a web merchant local to country of where the victim card is issued and W2 is an 
overseas merchant for a victim’s card. 
The columns specify the scenario. For instance, Scenario S1 copies the machine data and the ID 
Cookie, for a low value transaction, within the region. With respect to the region, experiments for C1 
and C2 were made from UK and Germany. Region (✓) indicates the transaction attempts were made 
from same country as of the Victim. 
We see from Table 19 that different card issuers make different risk-based decisions. In particular, 
card issuer for C1 provides more frictionless options and is more focused on providing convenience to 
the customer. Whereas, the card issuing bank for C2 makes more security-oriented decisions, 
challenging the payment initiator more often. Interestingly, comparing transaction T4 and T10 from 
C2 it can be derived that C2 card issuer challenges every transaction if the web merchant is 
established in a country overseas to C2. 
Figure 47 and Figure 48 summarise the findings of Table 19. The ‘states’ are phases in the 3DS 2.0 
transaction, where Pay indicates initiating payment, while the other refer to possible outcomes, either 
approved, challenged/declined or blocked. Note that for our purposes we do not have to differentiate 
between challenge and declined, they both imply that the transaction has not gone through as 
frictionless. 
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Figure 47 - Summarising C1's risk assessment outcomes over merchants W1 and W2 
 
Figure 48 - Summarising C2's risk assessment outcomes over merchants W1 and W2 
The arcs are labelled with the scenario given in the second column of Table 2. CAC stands for 
challenge limit counter, which counts down from the limit to zero. Here, the limit is 4, and at the fifth 
attempt the card is blocked. 
8.4 Discussion of Card Payment Systems Security 
In this section we discuss security of card payment systems from various angles. First, we discuss in 
Section 8.4.1 practical aspects of the attack on 3DS 2.0 introduced in this chapter, and will see that 
strong security solutions can be devised but for various reasons have not gained widespread adoption 
of the technologies. In Section 8.4.2 we discuss 3DS 2.0 in relation to the various security approaches 
used over the years for card payment. 
 Impersonation Attack in 3DS 2.0 
The problem of authenticating cardholders in the online payment system is exacerbated by the desire 
to cause minimal friction during the checkout. The introduction of 3DS 2.0 addresses this 
security/usability challenge through the use of Transaction Risk Assessment, and it is clear that the 
industry strongly favours such risk-based approaches, given that in the US about 75% of the card 
issuers have adopted risk-based authentication [129]. However, as we have seen in this chapter, the 
remaining security bottleneck is the secure storage and transfer of machine authentication data and 
http-only cookies from the customer machine to the authentication service. 
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Once 3DS 2.0 is common and authorisation-only transactions can no longer be exploited, the 
impersonation attack presented in this chapter is potentially attractive for perpetrators. Its net effect 
would be that perpetrators can use stolen 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication data in online shops 
without the cardholder being negligent, exactly as was the case with authorisation-only systems 
before the introduction of 3D Secure. The attack does not require to synchronize fraudulent purchase 
with that of an unwitting customer (as a relay attack would). Malware could easily be designed to 
sniff the 3DS 2.0 transaction data and later forward it to the attacker server. In fact, there are a number 
of such open source browser extension available and installed be thousands of browsers, e.g., 
HTTPWatch [130] and LiveHTTPHeaders [131]. Other developments, such as FraudFox [132], are 
also cause of concern. FraudFox aims to make it faster and easier to change a browser’s fingerprint to 
one that matches that of a victim, for instance through profile generator scripts. 
Attempts to complicate executing the attack through JavaScript obfuscation, as some implementations 
do, cannot be expected to be of much help. Techniques exist that mask the JavaScript functionality 
and prevent it from being stolen (code stealing). JavaScript obfuscation typically works by replacing 
the white spaces in the JavaScript code and renaming the variable and function. There exist several 
tools and tutorials on the Internet which can be useful to re-establish the original data and script 
obfuscation is therefore far from sufficient. 
More helpful is the manner in which cookies are stored in the observed implementations. All ID 
cookies we discovered were secure enabled, which means the cookies are only passed on secure 
connections (HTTPS). Secondly, the cookies were tagged http-only, which implies that the cookie is 
not readable to JavaScript. This prevents the cookies from being accessed by the cross-domain 
websites, i.e., prevents cross-site scripting attacks (XSS). Nevertheless, cookie storage in browsers 
remains non-secure unless the machine uses secure storage. 
Technologically, an obvious solution for secure transfer would be to use private/public key 
approaches to encrypt and sign messages between the payment initiator and the 3DS Server. 
However, for such a solution to gain acceptance would require a separate trusted secure storage 
environment for cryptographic keys and certificates. The payment industry standards [21] require 
payment credentials, including keys and certificates to be stored in ‘TamperResistant Security 
Module’ which is defined as the set of hardware, software, firmware, or some combination thereof 
that implements cryptographic logic or process (including cryptographic algorithms and key 
generation) and is contained within the cryptographic boundary. Today’s computer systems and their 
software systems are not provably secure enough. This issue has come up before, when Google first 
introduced Android pay with the concept of Host Card Emulation with Android KitKat 4.4 [133] in 
2014. The key storage security model for Host Card Emulation was software controlled and contained 
the threat that an attacker may compromise the mobile OS to steal the credentials. This approach was 
therefore not found suitable to host EMV payment applications [57]. 
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Compared to the desk top browser, the situation with respect to security is more positive when using 
mobile payment apps. Using hardware security elements [57][134] one combines aspects of tamper 
resistance and payment security with tokenization [134]. With tokenization, the actual card number is 
replaced with a ‘meaningless’ token and each transaction performed is signed with securely stored 
device-specific keys. Not surprising, EMV supports this approach to security of payments and defined 
a 3DS 2.0 SDK [75]. Such approaches do not allow attackers to steal the payments credential or any 
party intercepting communication to alter the transaction data and so is not vulnerable to the 
impersonation attack discussed. 
With the desktop browser being the security bottleneck, the industry is working on evolving the 
security of client authentication mechanisms on desktop platforms. Apple recently introduced 
biometric fingerprint readers and secure enclaves in their laptops [134], which meets payment 
industry standards for storing payment credentials. Lenovo, alongside with Intel [135], and payment 
service provider PayPal are already working with Fast Identity Online (FIDO) [136] to develop PKI 
based solution for the customers identity using a hardware security module. 
 Security Solutions across Card Payment Systems 
Table 20 provides an overview of the security techniques utilized in various card payment protocols 
that have been in us. The protocols considered are the following: 
1. Card Present technologies: 
a. Magnetic stripe 
b. EMV Chip and PIN, with three data authentication variants: static (SDA), dynamic 
(DDA) and combined (CDA) 
c. EMV Contactless, with three data authentication variants (SDA, fast DDA and fast 
CDA) 
2. Card Not Present technologies: 
a. 3D Secure 2.0 
b. 3D Secure 1.0 
c. Chip Authentication Programme or CAP (generates one-time tokens) 
d. Transaction Authentication Number or TAN (a variant of CAP mostly used in 
Germany) 
We compare the technologies with respect to eight types of techniques they may or may not provide. 
These are: 
1. Payment Data Confidentiality techniques.  These ensure that the cardholder payment data 
(authentication data, cryptographic keys) or any data used to access a cardholder account are 
not made available to unauthorised individuals [11]. 
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2. Payment Data Integrity techniques. These ensure that only authorised parties (cardholder or 
card issuer) are able to modify the payment data when stored and transmitted. 
3. Card Authentication / Machine Authentication approaches.  These confirm the identity of 
the card (token) or, when appropriate, the machine (computer of the payment initiator) that is 
linked to the cardholder account. 
4. Transaction Authentication. These authenticate specific transaction, typically 
cryptographically binding a random one-time code to the data of the transaction, achieved by 
the card or machine signing the transaction data [30]. 
5. Second Factor User Authentication. These are additional user authentication techniques that 
use information about a second authentication factor to confirm the identity of the cardholder. 
6. Payment Authentication. Techniques to ensure that the origin of any payment transaction 
message is correctly identified, combining (i) Card / Machine Authentication and (ii) 
Transaction Authentication. 
7. Payment Non-repudiation techniques. These ensure that the customer / cardholder cannot 
deny the fact that they completed a transaction. When required, they must be able to provide a 
proof of the transaction. Typically, this is achieved by signing the transaction data with user 
specific keys. 
Table 20 details the comparison of card payment protocols and the security technologies they utilise. 
The table also highlights reported attacks on card payments that are made possible when any security 
feature is not included in the protocol. We provide a summary discussion of the salient points. 
8.4.2.1 Solutions for Card Present 
This category corresponds to the left four columns in Table 20, providing payment when the card is 
physically present. With magnetic stripe cards, data integrity and card authentication features were not 
placed on the actual card itself. The data stored in a magnetic stripe is static and is kept in plain text 
which made magnetic stripe cards vulnerable to identity theft attacks [4], cardholder impersonation 
attacks [41] and card cloning attacks [137]. 
EMV extended the features of smart cards which provided a secure, “tamper proof”, storage for the 
card’s private cryptographic keys. The Chip and Pin protocol defined by EMV to secure card 
Table 20 - Comparison of card payment protocols and their security features 
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payments makes use of RSA public key infrastructure in three variants. The SDA card has a static 
signature which is generated by the issuer signed by using the issuer’s private key and written to the 
SDA card during manufacture. However, static signatures are used to approve every transaction, 
which makes SDA cards vulnerable to cloning attacks [138]. DDA payments on the other hand 
generate a unique ‘challenge-response’ RSA signature (SDAD) for each transaction, including a 
nonce. CDA improves upon DDA by encoding the Application Cryptogram into the signature rather 
than the transaction data. This makes DDA and especially CDA highly robust against any form of 
attack. 
EMV contactless provides convenience to the customer by authenticating the card instead of actually 
prompting the cardholder to approve the transactions. Fast DDA (fDDA) and CDA (fCDA) are 
enhanced versions of DDA and CDA of EMV chip and PIN, excluding the cardholder authentication 
methods from the protocol. Both DDA and SDA offer protection against known attacks on the 
payment system, however, each DDA and SDA enabled transactions would require the cardholders to 
prove their identity, thus adversely affecting usability. This was further addressed with enhanced 
versions of fDDA and fCDA in EMV contactless [28]. However, fDDA and fCDA still fail to provide 
payment authentication and non-repudiation of payment transactions. 
8.4.2.2 Solutions for Card Not Present 
If the card is not present, the situation is very challenging, as we have seen in this chapter. As 
discussed in the introduction, the complications associated with the implementation of the 3DS 1.0 
protocol made it possible for attackers to bypass its security features and perform identity theft attacks 
[4][117]. Chip Authentication Programme and Transaction Authentication Numbers [36][37] are two 
token generation technologies that consumers use to produce the answer to a challenge from the 
authorisation system. Typically, this is done with a little machine that reads a credit card and/or uses a 
PIN to generate a response to a challenge. These are increasingly commonly provided by banks, but in 
many cases are limited to payments through banking transactions. 
In conclusion, different payment protocols have been developed for different purposes. Satisfactory 
solutions find a successful combination of usability and security, and also manage the exposure to risk 
were something to go wrong. For instance, transaction limits on contactless cards as well as the 
frictionless 3DS 2.0 payment limit both manage the risk by limiting loss exposure of consumers. Not 
surprisingly, sound approaches challenge for a second factor of authentication information, either 
through a PIN such as in Chip & PIN as well as Challenged Authentication in 3DS 2.0 or using token 
generators such as in CAP and TAN. However, these do not always satisfy the usability wishes of 
merchants, leaving consumer with systems such as 3DS 2.0 that are designed to allow less secure 
payments and therefore inherently (and by design) expose consumers and card issuers to fraud. 
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8.5 Betrayal Attack on 3DS 2.0 Transaction Risk Assessment 
For customers in the white list (detailed definition below), Visa’s 3DS 2.0 system (Verified by Visa 
(VbV)) does not instantly authorise the card details used while making the purchase. Once in the 
white list, an attacker can use randomly generated card details to make any number of fraudulent 
online transactions. The fraudulent transactions will stay undetected until the next payment settlement 
request which is usually about 24 hours after the transaction [96]. 
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Figure 49 - The topology in which VbV capable merhant using Rules based and 
TRA/Statistical system 
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Figure 49.  taken from Visa’s official guide to merchants [140], shows an approach in which a 
Verified by Visa (VbV) capable merchant uses the TRA authentication system (TRA is referred to as 
statistical model by Visa payment network). As discussed before, TRA is a tool used by card issuers 
to help them evaluate if a transaction is risky. Card issuers evaluate a purchase request for its fraud 
potential using specific thresholds and risk indicators set by the merchant and/or acquirers.  Rule-
based authentication, which is introduced by Visa as an additional layer to 3DS 2.0, gives card issuer 
an ability to rely on the user’s TRA information and determine if the merchant wants to authenticate a 
cardholder. With the Rule-based system, merchants can have their own rules giving them a control on 
when to deploy 3DS 2.0, which in some cases will minimise authentication to only when required. 
One such rule is devised to be based on the grey list and the white list of customers.  
The white list will include the customers that are valuable to the merchant’s business. For white list 
customers, transactions will pass authentication without any cardholder authentication [140] and the 
merchant would process orders from white list customers regardless of what products they buy. The 
white list customers are selected based on TRA data assigned by the issuers to their customers. The 
grey list of customers includes the converse i.e. known bad IP addresses, email addresses, account 
numbers, customer names and addresses. Purchase requests from grey list customers fall into higher 
risk transactions that may fail authentication (transaction declined) or will be challenged using 
dynamic methods such as One Time Passcodes (OTPs) or secret questions.  
Our experiments3 with VbV unveiled few security concerns over a rule-based system which led us to 
formulate an attack, we call it as a Betrayal attack. We found that for white list customers the VbV’s 
Statistical and the Rule-based system does not instantly verify the card details entered during the 
purchase. To fall into the white list category, attacker first needs to make ‘x’ number of valid 
transactions (x is decided by the merchants or card issuing banks). Once in the white list, the attacker 
can make unlimited number of small value transactions using randomly generated card details. The 
fraudulent transactions will stay undetected until the next payment settlement request (almost about 
24 hours or in some cases a week -as it depends on acquiring banks). The attack works because 
transactions from the white list customers are not passed through any of the statistical checks or fraud 
detection controls (highlighted with a dashed line in Figure 49). The attack significantly affects the 
customers that process instant services, for instance, mobile phone top-ups. 
8.6 Conclusion 
3D Secure 2.0 is a standard that proposes a risk-assessment based approach to securing online 
payments. Its objective is to move the payment industry from authorisation-only transactions (using 
                                                     
 
3 Link to the experimental video: https://goo.gl/UgfQee 
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credit card details only) to two-factor user authentication. To avoid making the payment laborious for 
consumers it contains the option to complete a transaction through frictionless authentication. That is, 
if the authorisation service considers the transaction low risk, it carries out frictionless authentication, 
which does not challenge the payment initiator for second factor authentication information. 3DS 2.0 
is pushed hard by the regulator, especially in Europe through the Payment System Directive (PSD II) 
[92], and is gaining considerable traction.  
This chapter presents the first sizeable experimental study of reallife implementations of 3DS 2.0. 
Through a reverse engineering study, we map out the transaction sequences for frictionless 
transactions and we identify two main types of implementations. In most implementations we 
encountered, the payment initiator’s machine is fingerprinted through JavaScripts, except for the 
implementation based on 3DS 1.0. In our experiments we obtained further insights in the decision 
making of the authorisation service, experimenting with transaction amounts and the region from 
which payment was initiated. We found that card issuers differ in terms of their risk appetite, with 
some issuers considerably more liberal in allowing transaction to proceed unchallenged.  
We also demonstrated an impersonation attack against 3DS 2.0, which is more or less a direct 
implication of the vulnerabilities associated with a risk-based design. This impersonation attack is 
practically feasible and exploits that fingerprinting information from the payment initiator’s machine 
can be recreated by malware or plug-ins, if installed on that machine. Private/public key and secure 
storage solutions to such attacks are commonplace, and for instance integrated in mobile payment 
apps, but these have not found wide-spread acceptance on desktop platforms, leaving payment 
through browsers vulnerable to attacks.  
Giving merchants freedom to choose the security settings may prove useful for merchants’ business, 
but our experimental results and observations with the betrayal attack confirm that it can be 
detrimental to the overall security of the online payment system. 
A key question for the regulator is whether it was justified to allow risk-assessment based approach to 
online payment security as result of the PSD II negotiations. To answer that question, one needs to 
consider a variety of factors, including technological feasibility and acceptance, ease-of-use, liability, 
as well as vulnerabilities and threats. In addition, one would need deeper insight into the specifics of 
the risk assessment carried out by the card issuer. This and the previous chapter provides the reverse 
engineering tools to probe the authorisation service and divine which data is used in the decision 
making and for what values of transaction amount or other parameters it challenges the payment 
initiator for second factor authorisation information.
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
Our research on the security analysis of CNP payment systems started with an aim to answer the 
following question: “Does the philosophy of providing excessive convenience to the customer at the 
checkout have any effect on the security of the CNP payment system?.” The vulnerabilities and the 
attack scenarios that emerge from our analysis demonstrates that ‘lack of security standardisation’ and 
‘freedom of choices given to card issuers and online merchants in ways to accept online CNP 
payments’ are in fact credible threats to the overall security of CNP payment system. The element that 
makes these vulnerabilities exist in the CNP payment system is the ultimate business need to provide 
convenience to the customer at the checkout; inadvertently benefitting the cybercriminals.  
Specifically, the security of CNP payment system is further worsened by: 
 The use of guessable (if not obtainable) static payment card number as a primary element that 
links the customer to their online payment account. 
 Availability of card number as plain text across myriad of platforms for example at magnetic 
stripe interface, merchant receipts, EMV chip and pin and EMV contactless interface. 
 Introduction of the wireless interface on payment cards enabling false readers to communicate 
with victim’s card from a distance to steal payment card details. 
 Insecure methods of assigning payment card numbers (sequential card numbers) to their 
customers by some card issuing banks. 
 Lack of real-time sharing of online payment fraud information among payment processors 
enabling fraudsters to use stolen payment card details across global platforms (discussed in 
Section 5.3.4). 
 Lack of education among online merchants on the risks involved in processing online 
payments with variable card data fields as reflected in distributed guessing attack (Chapter 6). 
Furthermore, lack of education among payment acquirers and in-store merchants on security 
risks of losing merchant receipts.  
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 Insecure design of authentication and authorisation response codes from the card issuing 
banks revealing information about user payment card details to the online merchant. 
 The incapabilities and limitations of payment processing systems in not detecting simple 
distributed brute force attacks.  
 Use of static data for customer authentication for 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication, stored as 
plain-text on the customer machine. 
All these weakness and vulnerabilities when combined introduce several new categories of 
exploitable attacks that were not present previously in the CNP payment system. The attack scenario 
that we have practically demonstrated by exploiting the above vulnerabilities include but are not 
limited to: distributed guessing attack on authorisation-only CNP payment system, cardholder 
impersonation attack and betrayal attack on 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication. 
This PhD thesis “Does the Card Payment System Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate Fraud?” presents 
our security analysis of the CNP payment system. The vulnerabilities and attack scenarios that we 
have identified in this research are made possible because of the systemic weaknesses of the card 
payment system. These vulnerabilities have even proven to aid fraudsters to contribute to growing 
online payment fraud and has also curtailed the loss of customer confidence in the technology where 
even Sir Tim Berners Lee is no exception [5]. 
For many reasons, research into the security of card-not-present is projected as a business activity, and 
payment system stakeholders (card issuing banks and online merchants) are too sensitive to talk about 
their fraud detection systems. Even as pointed by several researchers there is a need for academic 
scrutiny into the security of CNP payment systems [4]. Therefore, the research work in this PhD sets 
out to bridge the gap in between the academia and the business worlds, provides an approach to an 
investigation into the security of CNP payment systems and fill in the needs for literature into the 
security of the CNP payment systems. At the core of this PhD research is the systemic methodology 
that we adapted for responsible research into practically sensitive payment systems. The approval of 
our findings by the academia and even by the payment processing entities, to a substantial extent has 
demonstrated the practical impact of our research work. 
9.1 Summary of Contributions 
Contributions from my PhD research are:  
 The contribution of the literature review: a detailed literature review that binds the research 
on the security analysis of various card payment systems and protocols. 
 The contribution of Methodology: A framework for current and future research looking into 
the security analysis of CNP payment systems 
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 The contribution of software tools: Creation of multiple software tools for the protocol 
security analysis 
 The contribution of identified vulnerabilities: The identification of several weak practices in 
CNP payment system, undocumented vulnerabilities and practical demonstration of at least 
three attack scenarios: Distributed guessing attack, cardholder impersonation attack and 
betrayal attack 
 The contribution of Distributed Guessing Attack  
 The contribution of Reverse engineering the 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication 
 The contribution of Cardholder impersonation attack on 3DS 2.0 frictionless authentication 
 The contribution of betrayal attack 
 Practical experimental research with impact 
 The Contribution of the Literature Review 
In the literature review, we have established a link between the existing academic research into 
payments security and the areas of weaknesses in CNP payment systems, which were of potential 
interest of this research. With literature review on payments security, we established certain weakness 
in the architecture of card payment system. Specifically, 
 The wireless interface on payment cards introduces new categories of attack (i.e. skimming, 
eavesdropping and relay) and the data were stolen from the wireless interface can be used to 
make fraudulent CNP payments. 
 Just like contactless payment cards, the data in the EMV chip and PIN interface can easily be 
read by false readers. This data includes the complete card number and card’s expiry date 
which can be used to make fraudulent CNP payments.  
 The 3DS 1.0 protocol which required the cardholder to enter static passwords on a pop-up 
screen was more burden to the payment industry than a solution. This allowed freedom for the 
online merchant to have options on the protocol they want to implement on their checkout 
systems. 
 Cryptographically bounded one-time passcodes for online payments using EMV readers were 
vulnerable to chip and PIN attacks where an attacker can generate one-time passcodes from 
stolen payment cards.  
The literature review supports the assertion made in this PhD thesis that the security of the online 
payment system is fundamentally weakened by the philosophy of providing convenience to the 
customer. Also, the requirement for backward compatibility makes it essential for the card data to be 
available in plain text across other interfaces which might have an impact on the security of the CNP 
payment system. 
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 The Contribution of the Methodology 
The analysis methodology used for this PhD research consist of four systematic steps (i) the use of 
UML sequence diagrams and comparison table which enabled us to concisely provide the description 
of CNP payment system (ii) involved the use of various vulnerability identification techniques like 
security failure analysis and reverse engineering techniques which allowed us to define the test cases 
and identify the vulnerabilities of CNP payment system. (iii) involved demonstrating the existence of 
attacks in the real world and determining the feasibility, magnitude and representativeness of the 
attack and (iv) examining how disclosure exercise can be done ethically and effectively to mitigate the 
vulnerabilities. 
 The Contribution of Software Tools 
To assess the CNP payment system for vulnerabilities, we have designed several software tools which 
involve (i) tshirtshop - a web store enabled us to link our understandings on CNP payment protocols 
with practical implementations. It provided us with an experimental platform which was used to 
assess the security of CNP payment protocols and fraud filters offered by payment acquirers (ii) 
website bot – enabled us to execute our test case on tens of online merchants. Website bot was 
programmed to link to online websites under study with an aim to explore vulnerabilities in 
authorisation-only CNP payment system. (iii) AutoIt scripts – which automated our experiments on 
tens of windows applications and (iv) Android NFC skimming app – which was developed to 
understand the EMV contactless protocol. This enabled us to explore the vulnerabilities in contactless 
payment protocols that can be linked to the CNP payment system.  
 The Contribution of Distributed Guessing Attack 
The distributed guessing attack demonstrated that the current security model of the payment networks 
is ill-suited to dealing with online CNP payments. The networks lack the ability to correlate 
information from multiple sources to detect distributed guessing attacks. Our survey of the online 
payment landscape highlights that the vulnerabilities we described in Chapter 7 are systemic.  
The variations in merchants’ security settings, which create the conditions for the attack, are present 
in the 400 of the most popular e-commerce websites. We present an attack scenario involving 
payment systems such as iTunes, Google Wallet, and PayPal that allows attackers to subvert the 
payment functionality from its intended purpose of validating entered credit or debit card details, into 
helping the attackers to generate all of the security data fields required to create an online payment 
account. Even worse, these data will allow attackers to transfer money to an anonymous recipient, on 
top of an ability to fraudulently purchase items online.  
Our experimental work has shown that it is possible to implement a web bot which will generate all of 
the fields required to create an online account. We have proved that it is possible to circumvent all of 
the security features (including separation of printed and electronic data and rule for storage of data 
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by the merchants) put in place to protect the cardholders. We have also demonstrated that it is 
possible to refine the web bot so that it will generate data from multiple websites, circumventing the 
limitations of the number of attempts one can make to enter the correct value, which is imposed by 
some payment systems. As a result of our ethical disclosure process, a number of the top 10 Alexa 
rated online merchants have changed their online security settings. This shows that the research is 
relevant and impactful.  
 The Contribution of Reverse Engineering the 3DS 2.0 Frictionless Authentication 
By reverse engineering the frictionless instance of 3DS 2.0 protocol, we provided the first public 
description of the working of the protocol. The research work done in this section was a substantial 
contribution to our PhD as it helped us to identify the vulnerabilities associated with the 3DS 2.0 
protocol. We demonstrated the use of publicly available tools like Fiddler that can be employed for 
performing security research into online CNP payment systems. 
 The Contribution of Cardholder Impersonation Attack 
The work done to explore cardholder impersonation attack was a significant advancement in our 
understanding of attacks against 3DS 2.0 because it is applicable to the payment protocols recommend 
currently by the payment industry. it may be one of the most realistic and attractive attacks for 
criminals, if and when authorisation only transactions are no longer permitted. It could even be used 
at the moment, by criminals who wish to make purchases on the merchant and in the regions like 
Europe which now mandate 3DS 2.0 on merchant websites. If this attack becomes more widely used, 
its net effect will be that criminals can use stolen cards in online shops without the cardholder being 
negligent exactly as was the case with authorisation only systems before the introduction of 3D 
Secure. 
 The Contribution of Betrayal Attack 
Giving merchants freedom to choose the security settings may prove useful for merchants’ business, 
but our experimental results and observations with the betrayal attack confirm that it can be 
detrimental to the overall security of the online payment system. We notified to the payment industry 
stakeholders about the existence of betrayal attack on 3DS 2.0 system as a result of which we saw that 
the 3DS 2.0 merchant guidelines were change reflecting the patching of betrayal attack. By this, we 
conclude that our vulnerability disclosure with betrayal attack contributed to patching of 
vulnerabilities that existed within the 3DS 2.0protocol.   
 Practical Experimental Research 
The research work in this PhD was focussed on protocols that are currently in use by the payment 
industry to accept CNP payment over the Internet. Unlike EMV protocol, the security features of the 
CNP payment protocols are not documented in the available implementation guides and standards by 
the payment processor. As we have demonstrated with betrayal attack that, theoretically, there may be 
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several features in the design of CNP payment protocols but in practice such features, if implemented 
incorrectly can result in exploitable vulnerabilities. 
Even though there were limitations identified with the access of CNP payment system documentation 
and test cards required for experiments, we still took this challenge and designed our experiments on 
real implementations of CNP payment protocols and by remaining ethically moral with the sensitive 
CNP payment processing systems. By documenting our results to public accessible platforms, we 
passed our message of security in CNP payment systems and educated public some best practices to 
be followed while making payments over CNP payment systems.  
9.2 Future Work 
The introduction of IoT devices making purchases over the Internet [141] has brought new security 
challenges to the CNP payment system [142]. My future research on the security of CNP payment 
systems will continue to adopt the best practices learnt from this research and apply it to perform 
security assessments of IoT devices making CNP payments.  
The W3C consortium of web standardisation [143] is also working towards enhancing and 
standardising the payment request API’s. The payment request API’s are the modern methods 
supported by the browser to eliminate the cumbersome fields required to be filled in by the customers 
while making online purchases. The idea behind payment request API is to support one-click 
payments in which browser takes control of the merchant checkout page and fill in the required data 
for making a payment. With my future work, I aim to assess the security of these payment request 
API’s and potential CNP payment protocols that may appear in the future.  
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Appendix A.  
 
Figure 50 - EMV Transaction Sequence (This figure is taken from [29]) 
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Appendix B.  
Table 21 - The website-bot sample code to automate vulnerability assessements over Google 
wallet website 
package com.uk.ac.ncl.Bot; 
        import com.gargoylesoftware.htmlunit.ElementNotFoundException; 
        import org.openqa.selenium.By; 
        import org.openqa.selenium.ElementNotVisibleException; 
        import org.openqa.selenium.WebDriver; 
        import org.openqa.selenium.WebElement; 
        import org.openqa.selenium.firefox.FirefoxDriver; 
        import java.util.NoSuchElementException; 
/** 
 * Created by Mohammed on 19/04/2015. 
 */ 
public class GoogleWallet implements Runnable { 
    static String email = "xxxxx"; 
    static String passwd = "xxxxx"; 
    static String cardNum; 
    static String expMM; 
    static String expYY; 
    static String csc; 
    public boolean flag=false; 
    int from, to; 
 
    public GoogleWallet(String cardNum, String expMM, String expYY, String csc, int from, 
int to) { 
        this.cardNum = cardNum; 
        this.expMM = expMM; 
        this.expYY = expYY; 
        this.csc = csc; 
        this.from = from; 
        this.to = to; 
    } 
 
    public void run() { 
            //System.out.println("I Started with 
values"+cardNum+"\n"+expMM+"\n"+expYY+"\n"+csc+"\n"+from+"\n"+to); 
            final WebDriver driver = new FirefoxDriver(); 
            driver.get("https://accounts.google.com/ServiceLoginAuth"); 
            WebElement element1; 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.id("Email")); 
            element1.sendKeys(email); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.id("Passwd")); 
            element1.sendKeys(passwd); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.id("PersistentCookie")); 
            element1.click(); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.id("signIn")); 
            element1.submit();            
driver.navigate().to("https://wallet.google.com/manage/#CreateInstrumentPlace:"); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-creditCardWidget-ccForm-creditcard-number-
field']")); 
            element1.sendKeys(cardNum); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-creditCardWidget-ccForm-creditcard-month-
field']")); 
            element1.sendKeys(expMM); 
            expYY = expYY.substring(2,4); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-creditCardWidget-ccForm-creditcard-year-
field']")); 
            element1.sendKeys(expYY); 
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-creditCardWidget-ccForm-creditcard-cvc-field']")); 
            element1.sendKeys(csc);       
            element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-saveButton']")); 
            element1.click(); 
            System.out.println("Trying CVV on Google Wallet... Please be patient"); 
            for (int i = from; i <= to; i++) { 
                String cse = Integer.toString(i); 
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                try { 
                    Sleep.sleep(10000); 
                    element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-creditCardWidget-ccForm-creditcard-cvc-field']")); 
                    element1.clear(); 
                    element1.sendKeys(cse); 
                    element1 = driver.findElement(By.xpath("//*[@id='gwt-debug-
CreateInstrumentView-addCreditCardWidget-saveButton']")); 
                    Sleep.sleep(2000); 
                    element1.click(); 
                    Sleep.sleep(10000); 
                } 
                catch (Exception e) { 
                    System.err.println("CVV for the Card: " + cardNum); 
                    System.err.print(i - 1); 
                    flag = true; 
                    break; 
                } 
                if(flag=false){ 
                    System.out.println("Not Found"); 
                } 
            } 
    } 
 
} 
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Appendix C.  
Table 22 - List of 25 active underground forums where payment card details are traded 
Forum name Forum address Forum name Forum address 
Agoraforum Lacbzxobeprssfx.onion Bus1nezz Bus1nezz.biz 
Altenen Altenen.com Cardingmafia Cardingmafia.ws 
Crdpro Crdpro.su Bpcsqad Bpcsquad.com 
Crimenetwork Crimenc5wxi63f4r.onion Procarder Procarder.ru 
Cardingforum Cardingforum.org Cardersforum Cardersforum.se 
Hackingforum Hackingforum.ru Crimes Crimes.ws 
Unixorder Unixorder.com Carderbase Carderbase.su 
Crdclub Crdclub.ws Carder Carder.me 
Carderscave Carderscave.ru Darkstuff Darkstuff.net 
Infraud Infraud.cc Coinodeal Coinodeal.com 
Lampeduza Lampeduza.so Tuxedocrew Tuxedocrew.biz 
Blackstuff Blackstuff.net/forum.php Privatemarket Privatemarket.us 
Omerta Omerta.cm   
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Appendix D.  
Table 23 - Survey results showing distributed attack landscaping exercise performed on over 
400 commercial  websites. 
Alexa 
Rank 
Website Name PAN Expiry 
Date 
CVV2 Address No of 
Attempts 
Leak 
1.  Amazon  YES YES NO NO Unlimited Expiry Date 
2.  Ebay (Paypal) YES YES YES YES 10 Postal Code 
3.  Netflix YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
4.  Walmart YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
5.  Etsy YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
6.  Bestbuy YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
7.  Ikea YES YES YES YES 4 CVV2/Postalcode 
8.  Target - - - - - - 
9.  homedepot - - - - - - 
10.  Steampowered YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
11.  Newegg YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
12.  Macys YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
13.  Lowes YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
14.  Nordstrom YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
15.  Kohls YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
16.  Gap YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
17.  Costco YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
18.  Hm YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
19.  Sears YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
20.  6pm YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
21.  Nike YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
22.  Bodybuilding YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
23.  Overstock YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/Postalcode 
24.  Staples YES YES YES NO 25 CVV2 
25.  Bhphotovideo YES YES YES no 10 CVV2 
26.  Groupon YES YES YES NO 25 CVV2 
27.  Forever21 YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
28.  Ticketmaster YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
29.  Jcpenney YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
30.  Zappos YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
31.  Sky YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
32.  Bedbathandbeyond YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
33.  Walgreens YES YES NO NOT/SURE 20 Expiry Date 
34.  Barnesandnoble YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
35.  Legacy YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
36.  Google.com/shopping - - - - - - 
37.  Qvc YES YES NO NO 5 Expiry Date 
38.  Wiley YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
39.  Gamestop YES YES YES YES 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
40.  Autotrader YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
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41.  Samsclub - - - - - - 
42.  Cvs YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
43.  Victoriasecret YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
44.  Cars - - - - - - 
45.  Rei YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
46.  Rakuten YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
47.  Sephora YES YES YES NO 15 CVV2 
48.  Shutterfly YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
49.  Iherb YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
50.  Officedepot YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
51.  Livingsocial YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
52.  Jcrew YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
53.  Dx YES YES YES YES 10 Postal Code 
54.  
Humblebundle YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
55.  Kmart YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
56.  Hsn YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
57.  Cambridge YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
58.  Tigerdirect YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
59.  Dickssportinggoods YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
60.  Directv YES YES YES YES 10 Postal Code 
61.  Trademe YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
62.  Urbanoutfitters YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
63.  Sierratradingpost YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
64.  Frys YES YES YES YES 10 Postal Code 
65.  Cabelas YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
66.  Ralphlauren YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
67.  Redbubble YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
68.  Yoox YES YES YES YES 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
69.  eshop.Sonymobile.com YES YES YES NO 25 CVV2 
70.  Mango YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
71.  Ae YES YES YES NO 8 CVV2 
72.  Landsend YES YES YES YES 10 Postal  Code 
73.  Drugstore YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
74.  Ulta YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
75.  Blu-ray YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
76.  Cargurus - - - - - - 
77.  Bloomingdales YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
78.  Llbean YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
79.  Neimanmarcus YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
80.  Asda YES YES YES NO 5 Postal Code 
81.  Marksandspencer YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
82.  Potterybarn YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
83.  Net-a-porter - - - - - - 
84.  Harborfreight - - - - - - 
85.  Shopbop YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
86.  Modcloth YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
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87.  Petsmart - - - - - - 
88.  Gnc YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
89.  Anthropologie YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
90.  Saksfifthavenue YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2 
91.  Backcountry YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
92.  Siriusxm YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
93.  Carmax - - - - - - 
94.  Mapsofindia YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
95.  cafepress YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
96.  Petco YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
97.  Adorama YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
98.  Finishline YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
99.  Joann YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
100.  
Mobikwik YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
101.  Vitacost - - - - - - 
102.  Disneystore YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
103.  Westelm YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
104.  William-sonoma YES YES YES No 5 CVV2 
105.  Sportsauthority YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
106.  Dsw YES YES YES No 20 CVV2 
107.  Crateandbarrel YES YES YES No 5 CVV2 
108.  Wightwatchers - - - - - - 
109.  Musiciansfriend YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
110.  Hottopic - - - - - - 
111.  Childresplace YES YES YES No 5 CVV2 
112.  Bonanza YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
113.  Abercrombie YES YES YES No 20 CVV2 
114.  Shop.lego.com YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
115.  Gunbroker - - - - - - 
116.  Underarmour - - - - - - 
117.  Ebags YES YES YES No 20 CVV2 
118.  Worldmarket YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
119.  Sweetwater - - - - - - 
120.  Fineartamerica YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
121.  Techbargains YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
122.  Crutchfield YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
123.  Pier1 YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
124.  Anntaylor YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
125.  Jomashop - - - - - - 
126.  Nespresso - - - - - - 
127.  Oldnavy YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
128.  Freepople - - - - - - 
129.  Advanceautoparts YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
130.  Basspro YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
131.  Midwayusa YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
132.  Dish - - - - - - 
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133.  Bathandbodyworks YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
134.  Orientaltrading YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
135.  Monoprice YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
136.  Containerstore YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
137.  Academy YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
138.  Tirerack YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
139.  Shoebuy YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
140.  Scholasic YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
141.  Autotrader - - - - - - 
142.  Dillards YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
143.  Ebay/motors - - - - - - 
144.  Luluemon YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
145.  Fingerhut YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
146.  
Ashford YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
147.  Aeropostale YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
148.  Customink YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
149.  Shopgoodwill - - - - - - 
150.  Gymboree YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
151.  Polar YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
152.  Snapfish YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
153.  Lordandtaylor YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
154.  Swansonvitamins YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
155.  Lanebryant YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
156.  Acehardware YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
157.  Oakley YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
158.  Rockauto - - - - - - 
159.  Moo YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
160.  Sportsmansguide YES YES NO NO 5 Expiry Date 
161.  Northerntool YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
162.  Tickets - - - - - - 
163.  Express-scripts - - - - - - 
164.  Zennioptical YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
165.  Micromaxinfo - - - - - - 
166.  Instyle - - - - - - 
167.  Coach - - - - - - 
168.  Revolveclothing YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
169.  Pacsun YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
170.  Brooksbrothers YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
171.  Converse YES YES YES YES 20 Postal Code 
172.  Beachbody YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
173.  Tractorsupply YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
174.  Bjs YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
175.  Summitracing YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
176.  Davidsbridal - - - - - - 
177.  Gamestop YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
178.  Payless YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
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179.  Buybuybaby YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
180.  Eddiebauer YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
181.  Adpost YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
182.  Cheaperthandirt YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
183.  Bose YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
184.  Colehaan YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
185.  Watchuseek YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
186.  Drsfostersmith YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
187.  Puritan YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
188.  Movietickets - - - - - - 
189.  Autoanything YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
190.  Famousfootwear YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
191.  Toryburch YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
192.  
Zumiez YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
193.  Pandora - - - - - - 
194.  Tennis-warehouse YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
195.  Funimation YES YES YES YES 5 Postal Code 
196.  Shop.mlb YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
197.  Tradepub - - - - - - 
198.  Pbteen YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2 
199.  Tillys YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
200.  Fabric YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
201.  Bkstr YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
202.  Keurig YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
203.  Art YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
204.  Lulus YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
205.  Onlineshoes YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
206.  Swimoutlet - - - - - - 
207.  Cduniverse YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
208.  Lampsplus YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
209.  Focalprice YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
210.  Restorationhardware YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
211.  Autopartswarehouse YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
212.  Vans YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
213.  Tradesy YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
214.  Campingworld YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
215.  Lids YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
216.  Newbalance YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
217.  Chicos YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
218.  Dollarshaveclub (Check this 
security) YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
219.  Bluefly YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
220.  Swappa - - - - - - 
221.  Musicnotes YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
222.  Torrid YES YES YES NO` 10 CVV2 
223.  Oup YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
224.  Performacebike YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
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225.  Gandermountain YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
226.  Boostmobile YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
227.  Dickblick YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
228.  Golfsmith YES YES YES NO 20 CVV2 
229.  Roomstogo YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
230.  Cdbaby - - - - - - 
231.  Womanwithin YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
232.  Talbots YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
233.  Shoes YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
234.  Forsalebyowner - - - - - - 
235.  Warbyparker YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
236.  Maccosmetics YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
237.  Primagames YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
238.  
Dicksmith - - - - - - 
239.  Grasscity YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
240.  Reebok YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
241.  Starcitygames - - - - - - 
242.  Brownells YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
243.  Copart - - - - - - 
244.  Repairclinic YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
245.  Bluenile - - - - - - 
246.  Tiffany YES YES YES Yes 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
247.  Vitamishoppe YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
248.  Surlatable Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
249.  Quill YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
250.  Competitivecyclist YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
251.  Tumi YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
252.  Apmex YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
253.  Kingarthurflour YES YES NO No 10 Expiry Date 
254.  Loccitane YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
255.  1800petmeds YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
256.  Uncommongoods YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
257.  Auctionzip - - - - - - 
258.  Gamefly - - - - - - 
259.  Autos.yahoo - - - - - - 
260.  Opticsplanet Yes yes yes no 10 cvv2 
261.  Bigbadtoystore YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
262.  Homedecorators YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
263.  Arcamax - - - - - - 
264.  Sunglsshut YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
265.  Venus YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
266.  Sideshowtoy YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
267.  Etrailer YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
268.  Zavvi YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
269.  Jcwhitney YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
270.  Chapters.indigo YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
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271.  Bonton YES YES YES s 10 CVV2 
272.  Boscovs YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
273.  Peapod - - - - - - 
274.  Alibris YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
275.  Mandmdirect YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
276.  Radioshack - - - - - - 
277.  Duckindonuts - - - - - - 
278.  Youmail YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
279.  Threadless YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
280.  Firemountaingems YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
281.  Brookstone YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
282.  Bananarepublic YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
283.  Barenecessities YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
284.  
Fossil YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
285.  Duluthtrading YES YES NO No 20 Expiry Date 
286.  Westmarine YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
287.  Burlingtoncoatfactory Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
288.  hallmark YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
289.  Giant-bicycles YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
290.  Tributes - - - - - - 
291.  Menswearhouse YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
292.  Bricklink - - - - - - 
293.  Rockler YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
294.  Broadway - - - - - - 
295.  Abt - - - - - - 
296.  Zales YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
297.  Hhgregg - - - - - - 
298.  Framesdirect Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
299.  Eurocarparts YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
300.  Minte - - - - - - 
301.  Bergdorfgoodman YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
302.  Hemmings - - - - - - 
303.  Roadrunnersports YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
304.  Orvis YES YES NO No 10 Expiry Date 
305.  Jjill YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
306.  Otterbox YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
307.  Journeys Yes yes yes no 10 cvv2 
308.  Therealreal Yes yes yes no 10 cvv2 
309.  Autobytel - - - - - - 
310.  Sheetmusicplus Yes yes yes No 10 CVV2 
311.  Gazelle YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
312.  Nashbar YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
313.  Landofnod YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
314.  Skechers Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
315.  Fragrancenet YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
316.  Timberland YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
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317.  Mec.ca YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
318.  Harrods YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
319.  Informit YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
320.  Cdjapan YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
321.  Napaonline YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
322.  cooking YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
323.  Entertainmentearth YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
324.  Schwans YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
325.  Brownpapertickets YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
326.  Vodafone - - - - - - 
327.  Kirklands YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
328.  Epage - - - - - - 
329.  Businessesforsale - - - - - - 
330.  
Jpcycles YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
331.  Hermes YES YES YES NO 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
332.  Frontgate YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
333.  Footsmart YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
334.  Tivo YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
335.  Jensonusa YES YES Yes No 10 CVV2 
336.  Appliancepartspros YES YES NO No 10 Expiry Date 
337.  Builddirect Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
338.  Lionbrand YES YES YES No 4 CVV2 
339.  Cracker YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
340.  Fender - - - - - - 
341.  Iboats YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
342.  Personalizationmall YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
343.  Glassesusa YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
344.  Coolstuffinc YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
345.  Ballarddesigns YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
346.  Onofre - - - - - - 
347.  Sonicelectronix Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
348.  Luckyvitamin Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
349.  Worldsoccershop YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
350.  Tinyprints YES YES NO No 10 Expiry Date 
351.  Fnp YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
352.  Ajmadison YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
353.  Bizbuysell - - - - - - 
354.  Weddingpaperdivas YES YES NO No 10 Expiry Date 
355.  Wetseal YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
356.  Zzsounds YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
357.  Hlj Yes yes yes no 10 cvv2 
358.  Replacements Yes yes NO No 10 Expiry Date 
359.  Carandclassic - - - - - - 
360.  Dyson Yes yes yes No 10 CVV2 
361.  Atgstores YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
362.  Baseballexpress YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
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363.  Jtv YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
364.  Jpc - - - - - - 
365.  Tedbaker YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
366.  Channelfireball YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
367.  Ninewest YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
368.  Yandy YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
369.  Knifecenter YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
370.  Gohastings Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
371.  Pandahall YES YES YES No 4 CVV2/PostalCode 
372.  Roamans YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
373.  Guess YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
374.  VisaCheckout YES YES YES No Unlimited CVV2 
375.  MarterPass YES YES YES Yes Unlimited Postal Code 
376.  
Yahoo YES YES YES NO 5 CVV2 
377.  Wikipedia YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
378.  Oracle YES YES NO NO Unlimited Expiry Date 
379.  6pm YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
380.  Adobe YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
381.  Apple YES YES YES NO Unlimited CVV2 
382.  Google YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
383.  Facebook YES YES YES NO 50 CVV2 
384.  Dropbox YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
385.  OneDrive Microsoft YES YES YES No 5 CVV2 
386.  Skype YES YES YES No 5 CVV2 
387.  Twitter YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
388.  Netflix Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
389.  Macys YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
390.  Paypal YES YES YES Yes Unlimited Postal Code 
391.  Rdio YES YES YES Yes 50 Postal Code 
392.  Udemy YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
393.  Hellofresh YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
394.  Yola YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
395.  Strikingly YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
396.  Weebly YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
397.  Webs YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
398.  Asda Yes YES YES Yes 5 Postal Code 
399.  Converse Yes YES YES Yes 20 Postal Code 
400.  Funimation YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
401.  Proflowers YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
402.  Beallsflorida Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
403.  Emusic YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
404.  Garnethill YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
405.  Hammacher Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
406.  Parts-express YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
407.  Tgw YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
408.  Lakeside YES YES YES NO 10 CVV2 
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409.  1800contacts YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
410.  Soma YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
411.  Dockers YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
412.  Partselect YES YES Yes No 10 CVV2 
413.  Swimsuitsforall YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
414.  Digitalrev       
415.  Omahasteaks YES YES NO NO 10 Expiry Date 
416.  Cirquedusoleil .. .. .. .. .. .. 
417.  Citypass Yes Yes Yes No .. CVV2 
418.  nflshop Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
419.  Towerhobbies Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
420.  Avenue Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
421.  1000bulbs Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
422.  
Clinique Yes Yes No No 10 Expiry Date 
423.  Cigarsinternational Yes Yes No No 10 Expiry Date 
424.  Smilebox .. .. .. .. … .. 
425.  Wickedweasel Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
426.  Leevalley Yes Yes No No 10 Expiry Date 
427.  Naturebox Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
428.  
Claires Yes Yes Yes No 4 
CVV2/Postal 
Code 
429.  Moma Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
430.  Classiccars .. .. … .. .. .. 
431.  Horizonhobby Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
432.  Yankeecandle Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
433.  Casper Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
434.  
Suunto Yes Yes Yes No 4 
CVV2/Postal 
Code 
435.  Luckybrand Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
436.  Bikebandit Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
437.  Quadratec Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
438.  Eyebuydirect Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
439.  Karmaloop Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
440.  Juno Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
441.  Wine Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
442.  Timbuk2 Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
443.  Travelsmith Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
444.  Startrek Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
445.  Globalhealingcenter Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
446.  Brooksrunning.com Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
447.  http://www.hannaandersson.com/ Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
448.  Roomandboard Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 Postal Code 
449.  
Americanmuscle Yes Yes Yes No 4 
CVV2/Postal 
Code 
450.  Usfreeads .. .. .. .. .. .. 
451.  Skinstore Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
452.  Overnightprints Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 Postal Code 
453.  Herroom Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
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454.  Buckle Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
455.  Gardeners Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
456.  Onstar .. .. .. .. .. .. 
457.  Gaiam Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
458.  Christopherandbanks Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
459.  Bevmo Yes Yes Yes Yes 10 Postal Code 
460.  Globalgolf Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
461.  Drjays Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
462.  Gojane Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
463.  Carandclassic .. .. .. .. .. .. 
464.  Horchow Yes Yes Yes No 10 CVV2 
465.  Well .. .. .. .. .. .. 
466.  
Jockey 
Link to 
Amazon      
467.  ems YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
468.  Weathertech YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
469.  Urbandecay YES YES YES Yes 10 Postal Code 
470.  Forzieri YES YES YES No 10 CVV2 
471.  Gifts Yes YES YES No 10 CVV2 
 
